

# FACTORS THREATENING CORPORATE ORGANISATIONAL STABILITY – OR GOVERNANCE, MANAGEMENT AND HR IN THE SHADOW OF WAR (INDUSTRY-AGRICULTURE-SERVICES- OTHER SECTORS)

CZECH REPUBLIC–HUNGARY–SLOVAKIA

---

József Poór, Zdeněk Caha, Silvia Tóbiás Kosár, Erika Varga, Erika Seres Huszárík,  
Tibor Zsigmond and Éva Ildikó Kovács (eds.)



2024



**FACTORS THREATENING CORPORATE  
ORGANISATIONAL STABILITY  
– OR GOVERNANCE, MANAGEMENT  
AND HR IN THE SHADOW OF WAR  
(INDUSTRY-AGRICULTURE-SERVICES-  
OTHER SECTORS)**

**CZECH REPUBLIC–HUNGARY–SLOVAKIA**

---



# **FACTORS THREATENING CORPORATE ORGANISATIONAL STABILITY – OR GOVERNANCE, MANAGEMENT AND HR IN THE SHADOW OF WAR (INDUSTRY-AGRICULTURE-SERVICES- OTHER SECTORS)**

**CZECH REPUBLIC–HUNGARY–SLOVAKIA**

---

József Poór, Zdeněk Čaha, Silvia Tóbiás Kosár, Erika Varga, Erika Seres Huszárik,  
Tibor Zsigmond and Éva Ildikó Kovács (eds.)

Budapest  
2024

### **Editors:**

József Poór, Zdeněk Caha, Silvia Tóbiás Kosár, Erika Varga, Erika Seres Huszárík,  
Tibor Zsigmond and Éva Ildikó Kovács

### **Authors:**

Klaudia Balázs Mgr., PhD student (Collegium Talentum), J. Selye János University, Komárno (Slovakia)  
Zsolt Barna PhD candidate, Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Science (MATE)  
József Boros assistant lecturer, University of Debrecen, Debrecen (Hungary)  
Dr. Mgr. Zdeněk Caha, MBA, Ph.D., Head of Institute, Českých Budějovicí,  
Technology and Economic University, (Czech Republic)  
Prof. Dr. Krisztina Dajnoki, PhD, habil., full professor, University of Debrecen, Debrecen (Hungary)  
Dr. Botond Géza Kálmán, PhD, associate professor, Kodolányi János University, (Budapest, Hungary)  
Dr. Éva Ildikó Kovács PhD, economist, senior consultant  
Dr. habil. Sándor Zsolt Kőműves, PhD, associate professor, Kaposvár Campus,  
Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Science (MATE)  
Gábor Lánicz vice-president of BKIK XX and VOE  
Sylvia Molnár, PhD student, J. Selye University (Slovakia)  
Dr. habil. Beáta Szűcs Gáborné Pató, associate professor, Eötvös Lóránd University (ELTE), Budapest (Hungary)  
Prof. Dr. József Poór DSc.,CMC, J. Selye University (UJS) and professor emeritus,  
Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Science (MATE)  
Dr. Erika Seres Huszárík PhD, assistant professor, J. Selye University (UJS)  
Dr. habil Szilvia Szabó, PhD, associate professor, METU, Budapest, (Hungary)  
Dr. Gábor Szabó-Szentgróti, PhD, associate professor, Győr Széchenyi István University, Budapest (Hungary)  
Bence Szeles, PhD student, J. Selye University (UJS)  
PhDr. Silvia Tóbiás Kosár, PhD, assistant professor, J. Selye University (Slovakia)  
Dr. habil. Arnold Tóth, PhD, associate professor, Budapest Business University, Budapest, Hungary  
Dr. habil. Erika Varga, PhD, associate professor, Gödöllő Campus,  
Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Science (MATE)  
Dr. Tibor Zsigmond, PhD, assistant professor, J. Selye University (UJS)

### **Reviewers:**

Dr. Katalin Szabó, PhD,  
associate professor  
Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Science  
(MATE)

PhDr. Zsuzsa Godány, PhD,  
assistant professor  
J. Selye University (UJS)

### **Editors:**

Prof. Dr. József Poór, J. Selye University (UJS) (Slovakia) and professor emeritus,  
Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Science (MATE)  
assoc. prof. PaedDr. Mgr. Zdeněk Caha, Ph.D., MBA, MSc. – Head of Human Resources Management Department,  
Českých Budějovicí, Technology and Economic University, (Czech Republic)  
Dr. Erika Seres Huszárík, PhD, assistant professor, J. Selye University (UJS) (Slovakia)  
Dr. habil. Erika Varga, PhD, associate professor, Gödöllő Campus,  
Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Science (MATE) (Hungary)  
PhDr. Silvia Tóbiás Kosár, PhD, assistant professor, J. Selye University (Slovakia)  
Dr. Tibor Zsigmond PhD, assistant professor, J. Selye University (UJS) (Slovakia)  
Dr. Éva Ildikó Kovács PhD, economist, senior consultant (Hungary)

### **Foreword:**

Dr. László Gazdag CSc  
economist, retired associate professor

**Professional sponsors:**

Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BKIK)  
Economic Service Chapter (GSZT) and 20th Consulting Department



National Association of Human Professionals (HSZOSZ)



HSZOSZ

**Research sponsor:**

Egis Pharmaceutical Zrt.



**Published by:**

Dr. Henrik Hegedüs PhD General Secretary  
National Association of Human Professionals (HSZOSZ)  
Tavaszmező u. 15–17., 1084 Budapest, Hungary  
e-mail: [poorjf@t-online.hu](mailto:poorjf@t-online.hu), telefon: +36-20-464-9168  
[www.hszosz.hu](http://www.hszosz.hu)

**Year of Publication:**

2024

**ISBN:** ISBN 978-615-02-0662-2 (pdf)



© Authors, editors 2024

The terms and conditions of the Creative Commons attribution (CC-BY-NC-ND) licence 4.0 apply to this volume.  
All rights reserved, any copying, reproduction or storage in a data processing system  
requires the prior written consent of the publisher.

# TARTALOM

<b>FOREWORD (LÁSZLÓ GAZDAG)</b>	8
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (JÓZSEF POÓR, ERIKA SERES HUSZÁRIK, SILVIA TÓBIÁS KOSÁR, TIBOR ZSIGMOND AND ÉVA ILDIKÓ KOVÁCS)</b>	9
<b>1. INTRODUCTION (JÓZSEF POÓR, TIBOR ZSIGMOND, SILVIA TÓBIÁS KOSÁR, ERIKA VARGA, ZSOLT BARNA)</b>	11
1.1. SOCIAL-ECONOMIC TRENDS	11
1.1.1. GDP and unemployment	11
1.1.2. Changes in FDI	13
1.1.3. Inflationary price explosion	14
1.1.4. Environmental issues	15
1.2. WAR AND ECONOMY	16
1.2.1. Characteristics of belligerents	16
1.2.2. The causes of war	17
1.2.3. The impacts of war	17
1.2.4. The possibility of finishing the war	19
1.3. SCENARIOS FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY	20
1.3.1. Looking back on the road to date	20
1.3.2. The state and its future role	20
1.3.3. Knowledge above all	22
1.3.4. Conclusions and summary	22
1.4. INTRODUCTION OF THE EXAMINED COUNTRIES	24
1.5. PRESENTING THE RESEARCH	26
1.6. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER ONE	27
<b>2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXAMINED ORGANISATIONS (SILVIA TÓBIÁS KOSÁR, ARNOLD TÓTH AND KITTI HAJMÁSI)</b>	31
2.1. OWNERSHIP (MAJORITY) STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANISATIONS IN THE SAMPLE	31
2.2. ORGANISATIONAL SIZE	32
2.2.1. Number of employees	32
2.2.2. Turnover	33
2.3. MAIN FIELD OF ACTIVITY (BRANCH, INDUSTRY)	33
2.4. LOCATION OF RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS	35
2.5. MARKET RELATIONS	36
2.5.1. In general	36
2.5.2. Russian-Ukrainian market relations	36
2.6. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER TWO	37
<b>3. PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR SITUATIONS (TIBOR ZSIGMOND, BEÁTA SZÚCS GÁBORNÉ PATÓ AND SILVIA MOLNÁR)</b>	38
3.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF PREPAREDNESS	38
3.2. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER THREE	41
<b>4. EFFECTS OF THE WAR CRISIS ON THE ECONOMY OF THE EXAMINED COUNTRIES IN 2023 (SILVIA TÓBIÁS KOSÁR, JÓZSEF BOROS AND KRISZTINA DAJNOKI)</b>	42
4.1. MACRO LEVEL IMPACTS ON THE ECONOMY AND THE LABOUR MARKET	42
4.2. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FOUR	52



<b>5. ECONOMIC AND LABOUR MARKET EFFECTS ON THE RESPONDENTS' ORGANIZATIONS (TIBOR ZSIGMOND, ZSOLT KŐMÜVES AND LÁSZLÓ PÁLMAI)</b>	53
5.1. THE EFFECT OF WAR ON ORGANIZATION AND BUSINESS	53
5.2. ASSESSING THE CHANGE POSSIBILITIES INHERENT IN WAR	56
5.3. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FIVE.	57
<b>6. ORGANISATIONAL ADAPTATION AND MEASURES TO THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE WAR (ERIKA SERES HUSZÁRIK, BOTOND GÉZA KÁLMÁN AND KITTI HAJMÁSI)</b>	58
6.1. ADAPTATION	58
6.2. MEASURES TO MITIGATE THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR	60
6.3. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SIX	63
<b>7. SUPPORTING GOVERNMENT MEASURES (TIBOR ZSIGMOND, SZILVIA SZABÓ AND KLAUDIA BALÁZS)</b>	65
7.1. GOVERNMENT MEASURES.	65
7.2. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EXPERIENCE.	66
7.3. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SEVEN	69
<b>8. CHANGES AND THE FUTURE (ERIKA SERES HUSZÁRIK, GÁBOR SZABÓ-SZENTGRÓTI, ARNOLD TÓTH AND KITTI HAJMÁSI)</b>	70
8.1. CHANGES	70
8.2. THE FUTURE.	72
8.3. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER EIGHT	73
<b>9. CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS (GÁBOR LÁNCZ AND BENCE SZELES)</b>	74
9.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS	74
9.2. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER NINE	76
<b>10. APPENDIX – LIST OF ORGANISATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE RESEARCH (JÓZSEF POÓR AND ZSOLT BARNA)</b>	77
10.1. CZECH RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS	77
10.2. HUNGARIAN RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS	79
10.3. SLOVAK RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS	86

## FOREWORD (LÁSZLÓ GAZDAG)

*“The main lesson of history is that peoples and governments have never learned anything from it”*

*(Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel)<sup>1</sup>*

On 24 February 2022, Russian Federation troops launched an attack on Ukraine. The aim of this book is not historical or political analysis, but to explore the impact of these events on the economies and daily lives of three neighbouring Central European countries: Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. When the readers pick up this analytical work, they will immediately perceive the extreme timeliness of the subject, the special features of the methodology of the study, and the richness of the comprehensive and all-embracing empirical research material. This work is the result of considerable international professional collaboration, and its particular strength lies in the involvement of young doctoral students in the research data collection phase. It is divided into nine chapters:

(1) Introduction, (2) characteristics of the organisations studied, (3) analysis of preparedness for the crisis, (4) empirical analysis of the overall impact on the economy, (5) evaluation of the impact on the labour market and the market environment, (6) the issue of adaptation, (7) exploration of government actions (flexibility, speed, possible scarcity, etc.), (8) expectations for the future, (9) and finally, the characteristics of the respondents.

As soon as one of the major crises was over and the recovery started, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict followed. One after the other, shocks hit the world economy, including the three neighbouring Central European regions surveyed. It is true, however, that taking up this issue would have significantly increased the cost and scope.

The motto chosen for the Preface, a quotation from Hegel, is very much a characteristic of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but this analytical work seems to be trying to refute its truthfulness. At least the participants of the research have tried to learn from history in capital letters. From this point of view, this volume of studies can be regarded as a niche work, and I strongly recommend it to economic policy-makers and micro-enterprise players alike.

<sup>1</sup> Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) is regarded to be the most important philosopher of the 19th century, the great philosopher of German idealism and one of the most important and widely accepted philosophers

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(JÓZSEF POÓR, ERIKA SERES HUSZÁRIK, SILVIA TÓBIÁS KOSÁR,  
TIBOR ZSIGMOND AND ÉVA ILDIKÓ KOVÁCS)

*'The Russian-Ukrainian war began with the annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, which was ignored by the international public. It is no longer possible to turn a blind eye to the current Russian aggression.'*

*Serhii Ploky, (2023:9)<sup>2</sup>*

The aim of the research 'Factors threatening corporate organisational stability – or governance, management and HR in the shadow of war' was to create a picture of the situation: after the recovery from the coronavirus crisis of the past two years, what what the situation like in the wake of Russia's war in Ukraine on February 24 last year? Do business organizations and institutions operating in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia face challenges and impacts in the various areas of management and HR work?

- » **Participating countries:** 25.8 million people lived in 2023 in the three countries examined (Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia). Economic growth was positive in all countries in the year before the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis (2019). The same cannot be said for the year 2020, when the decline ranged from -3.34% to -5.40%. In the year 2021, an increase (3.55-7.20%) was again observed in the examined countries. The values in 2022 were lower than a year ago (1.67-4.87%), but the growth was positive. While in 2023 there was GDP growth in Slovakia (+1.1%), the Czech Republic (+0.18%) and Hungary (-0.9%). With the exception of the first period of the coronavirus pandemic, unemployment in all three countries increased in 2020, after which it continuously decreased. today, among the active population, it is 1.5% in the Czech Republic, 3.5% in Hungary and 4.5% in Slovakia. The price increase in 2023 was 17% in Hungary, 12% in the Czech Republic and 11% in Slovakia.
- » **State of war:** This situation occurred exactly at the time when the countries of the world, including the organizations of the three countries examined, were trying to restart their economies after two exhausting years of the pandemic. The leaders of the nation states were still dealing with reversing the losses of human capital caused by Covid-19, as well as developing measures to mitigate the negative economic effects, when the world was faced with another serious challenge. In addition to the humanitarian crisis, Russia's invasion of Ukraine further worsened the short-term prospects for the recovery of the world economy. With this war, among other things, Russia is working to restore the Great Russian Empire battered by history. We believe that amid the flurry of shocks of the past four years, the global economy has proven to be surprisingly resilient. Major economies have mostly emerged unscathed from the fastest rate rise in 40 years – without the usual scars of steep unemployment rates or financial meltdowns

<sup>2</sup> Serhii Ploky (1957–), professor of History at Harvard University, author of two well-known books (The Gates of Europe, 2016 and Chernobyl History of a Tragedy, 2018)

- » **The investigated organizations:** A quarter of them were privately owned organizations. Nearly 28 percent were foreign-owned companies. Two-thirds of the respondents employed less than 250 people. Almost 50% of the respondent organizations were located in the capitals of the three examined countries and in the regions of the countries. The main market/place of the organizations' products or services is located within the borders of the examined countries (e.g. local, regional or national). Together, 20.3% of the organizations deliver to the European market, and 17.8% conduct worldwide trade. Comparing exports and imports, the proportion of responding organizations dealing with imports (18.2%) is slightly higher than that of exporters (17.7%).
- » **Preparedness for the war situation:** Examining the organizations of all three countries together, it can be said that only 12.1% of the respondents had such a plan of action even before the outbreak of the war.
- » **Macro-level opinions of the responding organizations:** The expectations of the 1,370 organizations examined are significantly more gloomy compared to the inflation forecast of 11.0-12.6% in the reports of international (OECD) and local national organizations (e.g. national banks) that make macro forecasts, because more than a third of respondents calculate with a value above 15%. A third of the respondents believe that a significant upswing will occur soon.
- » **Impact of the war on the examined organizations:** If we examine the three countries together, it can be stated that the most endangered areas are the "Increase in purchase prices due to the war" (28.4% – largely typical) and the "Negative change in the exchange rate of the domestic currency effect" (24.9%) can be considered. The responding organizations often say "If it happened like this once..." or "Let us get the best out of the given situation!".
- » **Adaptation of organizations to a war situation:** The obtained results clearly confirm the uncertainty, more than 40 percent of the respondents cannot even really see the situation and are not aware of the situation and possible losses. Based on the answers received, it can be said that most people consider increasing organizational efficiency to be the primary task, in which the retention of key people and innovation play the main role. Due to the uncertain situation, most of the responding organizations do not currently plan to enter foreign markets, even with the help of subsidies. In addition, they are satisfied with their current raw material sources and procurement channels.
- » **Future opportunities:** Given the different causes of the pandemic, the war triggered different response measures from companies than before the Covid-19. The respondents also considered it important that a new type of energy strategy could be a solution to the problems that the war drew attention to. The results indicate that while the crisis caused by the pandemic is a threat to human resources, the war crisis is primarily caused by the disruption of supply chains.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

(JÓZSEF POÓR, TIBOR ZSIGMOND, SILVIA TÓBIÁS KOSÁR,  
ERIKA VARGA, ZSOLT BARNA)

*'Perfect democracy is a typical category of ideals that exists only in the textbook, not in real life. The real governments can be described to be somewhat democratic, and how democratic depends on the case. The same is true for non-democratic leaders.'*  
(Guriyev Sergey<sup>3</sup>-Daniel Treisman<sup>4</sup> 2023:42)

## 1.1. SOCIAL-ECONOMIC TRENDS

The following part reviews the most important social and economic trends that affect organizations (companies and institutions) operating in the examined countries.

### 1.1.1. GDP AND UNEMPLOYMENT

During the past three years, three significant changes have influenced and still influence the management and HRM systems of organizations and institutions both in the world and in Hungary. In a manner not typical of previous crises, the unprecedented closures required and initiated a wave of measures not seen before (IMF, 2021). The Covid-19 crisis severely affected the export-oriented economy of the examined countries and ended the period of continuous growth in 2016–2019, during which incomes increased stably and the unemployment rate fell to a 30-year low (Fazekas et al., 2021). In the meantime, let us note that many experts are not at all satisfied with the performance of the aforementioned period. They believe that the “export orientation based on cheap labour” rather conserved, for example, the moderately developed state of the Hungarian economy (Lengyel, 2022).

The pre-crisis surveys of the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2019) showed that the unemployment rate worldwide had fallen to 5.7%.

After the end of the first wave of the virus and the appearance of the second wave, it became clear that as a result of the pandemic – with the exception of China’s growth (+2%) – a very significant economic decline of 4-6% will occur throughout the world and in the case of the three countries examined, in the Czech Republic (-5.55%), Hungary (-4.5%) and Slovakia (-3.34%). However, following the vigorous vaccination campaigns that were launched in the meantime, the light – the possibility of 4-6 percent growth following the downturns – shone at the end of the tunnel. During the recovery from the pandemic, the performance of the Hungarian economy was particularly high (7.1%) in 2021. The Czech Republic (+3.55%) and Slovakia (+4.86%) were slightly behind. In our opinion, the fact that a significant part of the organizations we examined saw the coronavirus crisis not only as a problem, but also as an opportunity contributed greatly to the indicated positive growth data.

<sup>3</sup> Sergey Guriyev (1971), Russian economist. Currently a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences, Paris.

<sup>4</sup> Daniel Treisman (1964), American economist and politologist, professor of political sciences in the University of California, Los Angeles.

In response to the social and economic changes caused by the pandemic in the examined Central and Eastern European countries, a series of measures were introduced with which, among other things, they wanted to compensate the lost income of businesses, or certain compensation was paid to those private entrepreneurs who went bankrupt as a result of the pandemic, or certain concessions were also made in terms of tax payment and tax arrears (Csillag et al., 2020).

Despite the fact that, following the Covid-19 crisis, unemployment in the world has increased from the previously indicated 5.7% to 8% (ILO, 2021), the countries of the developed world are also affected by a strong labour shortage. In fact, it was also established that in February 2022, the unemployment level in the OECD (2022) countries returned to the 5.3% level before the Covid crisis.

Table 1/1 Changes in GDP, unemployment and FDI during the previous waves of Covid and today (2019–2023)


GDP increase before Covid-19				Rate of unemployment before Covid-19			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fejlett világ: 2%</li> <li>• Developed world: 2%</li> <li>• Global: 3%</li> <li>• Eastern Europe: 4%</li> <li>• Czech Republic: 3.03%</li> <li>• Hungary: 5%</li> <li>• Slovakia: 2.5%</li> </ul>				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Global 5.7% (ILO, 2019)</li> <li>• Czech Republic: 1.3% (2019)</li> <li>• Hungary: 3.5% (2019)</li> <li>• Slovakia: 3.8% (2019)</li> </ul>			
GDP change during Covid-19 and at present				Rate of unemployment during Covid-19 and at present			
Areas	2020	2021	2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Global: 8% out of 3.5 bn employees (ILO, 2021)</li> <li>• Czech Republic: 1.9% (nowadays 1.5%)</li> <li>• Hungary: 4.5% (nowadays 3.5% )</li> <li>• Slovakia: 4.5% (nowadays 4.1%)</li> </ul>			
Global	-4.80%	5.50%	3.60%				
USA	-4.20%	4.20%	3.10%				
China	2.60%	6.50%	3-3.7%				
EU-27	-7.50%	5%	2.70%				
EU-euro	-8%	5%	2.70%				
Czech Republic	-5.55%	4%	2.46%				
Hungary	-4.8%	7.1%	3.60%				
Slovakia	-4.80%	3%	2.30%				
FDI (foreign direct investments) in the world							
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FDI: 1.500 bn USD (Global, 2019)</li> </ul>				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 837 bn USD (UNCTAD, 2020)</li> <li>• 1.582 bn USD (UNCTAD, 2021)</li> <li>• 1.300 bn USD (UNCTAD, 2022)</li> <li>• 1.370 bn USD (UNCTAD, 2023)</li> </ul>			

Source: Römisch, 2020; IMF 2021a; ILO, 2019, 2021; UNCTAD, 2019–2023; World Bank ,2022, UPSVR, 2022

### 1.1.2. CHANGES IN FDI

One important measure of domestic and international economic activity is the development of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Table 1/1 and Figure 1/1 illustrate that in the first year of the virus crisis, FDI in the world fell by almost 40%. In the year of opening and recovery (2021), global FDI in the world almost doubled compared to the previous year. The latest UNCTAD (2022) report now says that the growth momentum in 2022 was not sustained in that year.

Figure 1/1 FDI in the world (in bn USD)



Source: UNCTAD, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 és 2023

Table 1/2 below summarises the total inflows of FDI for the three countries under review in billions of dollars in 2023. Foreign direct investment is an important source of economic development in the countries under study (Götz, Éltető & Sass, 2023). As a result of the reported foreign FDI, 15-25% of the employed in these countries are employed in foreign-owned subsidiaries (Poór et al, 2020).

Table 1/2 Total amount of total inward FDI (inflow) in the countries surveyed

No.	Country	FDI
1.	Czech Republic	202
2.	Hungary	105
3.	Slovakia	52

Source: Statista (2022 and 2023)

### 1.1.3. INFLATIONARY PRICE EXPLOSION

Already in 2020, the year of Covid's outbreak, annual inflation was relatively low (0.7%), but by 2021 it had reached the level of so-called stimulus inflation (2-3% price increase). Several reasons for the subsequent inflationary price explosion have been identified by various experts.

- » The basic and initial cause is the declining output and economic contraction caused by the Covid pandemic and the heavy spending by governments.
- » The 'bounce-back' of economies and the growth in demand and consumption resulting from the opening and recovery are also cited as a trigger (ECB, 2021).
- » The real cardinal cause is the shortage of raw materials, energy and food in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022.

Annual inflation in the European Union in 2022 was 9.2%, an extraordinary increase compared with 2.9% the previous year. This is the highest ever recorded, according to Eurostat (2024a), which has been measuring this indicator since 1996. Just for the record, the previous 'negative record' was measured in 2008, at 3.7%. In 2022, Estonia had the highest value, with 19.4%. Lithuania was not far behind, with 18.9% inflation. The lowest price increase was recorded in France, at 5.9%. Among the countries surveyed, inflation in 2022 was 15.3% in Hungary, 14.8% in the Czech Republic and 12.1% in Slovakia (Eurostat, 2024a).

For the year 2023, there is an easing of the trend, with annual inflation falling to 6.4% in the EU. However, this was still the 2nd highest rate since measurements began in 1996. In 2023, the highest inflation rate was measured in Hungary (17.0%), making Hungary the only country to see an increase compared to the previous year. Estonia, the former "top of the list", saw inflation fall to 9.1%, while Lithuania's fell to 8.7%. The Baltic States showed the biggest improvement, with Latvia also seeing a fall (from 17.2% to 9.1%). The lowest inflation in 2023 was recorded in the Benelux countries (Belgium 2.3%, the Netherlands 4.1%, Luxembourg 2.9%) and Denmark (3.4%). Interestingly, apart from Hungary, the Czech Republic (12.0%), Slovakia (11.0%) and Poland (10.9%) remain above 10%. In all other EU countries, annual inflation has already fallen below 10%. This shows that the V4 countries have been the worst affected by the economic changes caused by the war (Eurostat, 2024a).

It is often said that the current inflation is a global phenomenon that is further increasing inequalities across the world (Reinhart & Graf von Luckner, 2022).



When looking in detail at the causes and drivers of current inflation, a number of detailed causes are also identified in various publications in addition to those listed above (Ha & Milenkovic, 2022):

- » the rise in commodity prices,
- » increases in production and distribution/marketing costs,
- » firm and consumer effects.

*Table 1/3 Price index between 2018 and 2023 in the European Union*

Year	Annual change in %
2018*	1.9%
2019*	1.5%
2020	0.7%
2021	2.9%
2022	9.2%
2023	6.4%

*Source: Authors' own editing based on Eurostat (2024)*

#### 1.1.4. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

For this point, let us start two years earlier. Not all companies and organisations were equally affected by the global crisis triggered by Covid-19. There were winners and losers. For example, global technology (tech) or online commerce companies saw a significant increase in profits in 2020, while the tourism and hospitality sectors suffered significant losses. This crisis also highlighted the fact that larger and more prepared organisations or public institutions have found it easier to weather the aforementioned global human catastrophe.

In the current war and environmental crisis, too, many sectors have been pushed to the brink of bankruptcy, while some have made and are making significant gains. Without wishing to be exhaustive, a few typical examples are mentioned here:

- » French salt producers are expecting to produce record quantities of salt during the severe drought. Meanwhile, rice giant producers in northern Italy are essentially without a crop
- » Horizontal greenhouses and indoor farms, as well as chemical-free hydroponics, are replacing outdoor vegetable and fruit production, where lack of irrigation and/or UV radiation make production impossible.
- » Automation and robotisation reach further areas through precision agriculture. Examples include drones that can use imaging algorithms to identify weeds and provide targeted and thus effective control of weeds among crops.

For those worried about the future, experts also point out that the recent crises have brought relief in some areas, such as reduced pressure on our environment due to global corporate shutdowns, less mineral depletion, less emissions from factories, less vehicle and logistics traffic and thus less air pollution from transport, less consumption and thus less waste.

The economies affected by the Covid pandemic and related measures have been further burdened by the Russian-Ukrainian war situation, which has an impact not only on the economies of the parties concerned, but also on the economies and business environment of Europe and the rest of the world. From the rise in energy prices since autumn 2021, to the uncertainty in financial markets, to the fall in GDP and the rise in inflation. The negative consequences of the war situation are likely to be reflected in the medium to long term in frequent effects on the real economy (Németh, 2023).

The war situation came at the very time when countries around the world were trying to rebuild their economies after two gruelling years of pandemic. Businesses faced chaotic supply chains as they tried to meet increased demand for goods and services and began to pass on rising production costs to their customers. The war environment and the sanctions and measures imposed have further eroded free access to critical raw materials such as food and energy. Costs rose even further, triggering inflation far in excess of wage increases. This cost-of-living crisis has reduced the health and well-being of people worldwide, especially the poorest, and increased the risk of hunger (Kilfoyle, 2023).

The tight oil supply chain caused by the war and the changes in the structure of energy supply and demand not only affected the Russian oil export trade, but also led to sharp fluctuations in the price of oil on the European market and the world market. Western countries have also taken measures to avoid geopolitical risks by proposing the imposition of a plethora of sanctions.

## 1.2. WAR AND ECONOMY

However, the process of recovery from the Covid-19 crisis and the initial recovery could be overshadowed by a new crisis triggered by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (Tooze, 2022). The war in Europe has so far had global economic repercussions, culminating in declining GDP growth in Europe and the world, rapidly rising inflation, and increasing insecurity and shortages of raw materials.

### 1.2.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF BELLIGERENTS

The economies of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine before the invasion in 2022 were equivalent to a GDP of around USD 2 trillion – an amount roughly equivalent to the size of Canada’s economy in 2021 – or 2% of the USD 100 trillion global economy (IMF, 2021b). Russia grew by nearly 3% in the years before the QERO, despite the sanctions that came into force in 2014. This was partly due to a particularly favourable economic environment and favourable oil market prices. In addition to these sanctions, the Russian state also had to face ‘internal constraints such as the significant weight of the state and an increasingly worrying demographic situation’ (Bost et al., 2021: 249).

To the former, it is worth adding that the resources of the Russian army are vastly superior to those of Ukraine. Russia spends more than ten times as much (\$48 billion/2019) on defence spending per year as Ukraine; the Russian army has slightly less than three times as much artillery as Ukraine and roughly ten times as many fixed-wing warplanes. The figure is one-fifteenth of the US annual military budget (\$740 billion/2019) (Defence, 2022). The Russians are aiming to more than triple that figure in 2019 to \$154.4 billion this year because of the war (Tass, 2022).

### 1.2.2. THE CAUSES OF WAR

There are many opinions about why the war is going on. Russian President Vladimir Putin, especially at the beginning of the war, often stated that the purpose of the invasion was to stop the genocide perpetrated by the “Kiev regime” and ultimately “demilitarise and Nazify Ukraine” (Bauchcamp, 2022).

Khodorkovsky, the arrested and imprisoned for 10 years owner of the Russian oil company Yukos, who was released in 2013 through the intervention of former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, summarised in a 2017 interview one of the main reasons for the current situation as follows. ‘It was a strategic mistake on the part of some Western institutions,’ he said, ‘to think that they could live in peace without principles’... ‘Why not work with Putin when you can make a lot of money doing it’ (Belton, 2022: 475).

In his previously cited book, Belton (2022), in addition to those described there, mentions a number of other personal and human factors linked to Putin that may also have led to the precursors and outbreak of the war. Without claiming to be exhaustive, we list here some of them from the cited book:

- » Already during his first presidency, a model of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet’s where ‘economic reform was driven by the totalitarian power of a centralized state’ (Belton, 2022: 188) was already emerging under the surface of the liberal economy that Putin had adopted.
- » When the pro-Western revolution triumphed earlier in Georgia and later in Kiev’s main square, Majdan Square, these events required Putin and his inner circle to develop a new plan of action. From then on, they saw ‘Russia under siege’ (Belton, 2022: 264).
- » It should also be remembered that Western bankers had been working for some time to integrate the Kremlin’s billions into the global economic model, while turning a blind eye to the emergence of dependence on the Kremlin (Belton, 2022).
- » The West is completely paralysed by Putin’s bold criminal involvement. And this is where Zbigniew Brzezinski’s idea that ‘Russia is a great power with Ukraine, but not without it’ (Buton, 2022: 373) came up again.

### 1.2.3. THE IMPACTS OF WAR

It was often argued during the coronavirus crisis that such a world crisis could be a major and disastrous situation in various areas of socio-economic life but could also be the basis for many innovations. These can be renewals and opportunities and can arise directly or indirectly (WEF, 2020; UN, 2021).

Let us now look at some of the impacts that are to some extent related to war and have a significant impact on our socio-economic life:

- » It is often argued that war is responsible for rising inflation. It is often argued that the war is to be blamed for the fall in commodity, raw material and energy prices, and the deflation that has been spreading from the European Monetary Union for years. Some elements of the process that is unfolding today were already evident during the Coronavirus pandemic, but it was only really unfolding in the third quarter of 2021 (Haszán, 2022). Experts are divided on the real cause of Hungary’s inflation above 10%. In addition to rising energy and food prices, higher spending related to this year’s national elections could be the cause of high domestic inflation.

- » Before the current war situation, our world has already tasted stagflation twice, in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the energy crises during the 1979 Iranian revolution, which is a combination of high inflation and economic stagnation (Origo, 2022). For a description of such a situation, see Table 2 and 1/3 presented earlier.
- » Experts agree that if the issue of stalled grain exports due to the Russian-Ukrainian war is not resolved relatively quickly, there could be significant food shortages and famines in many developing countries (e.g. Egypt and North Africa) (Origo, 2022). Meanwhile, this assertion has been partly contradicted by the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian grain supply agreement was successfully concluded through the mediation of the UN and the Turkish government, and that world grain production has improved, contrary to earlier gloomy forecasts.
- » The same is true for rare earths, which are of particular importance for renewable energy, high technology and military applications. China monopolizes the mining of these materials and the entire supply chain process. Already at the beginning of the last decade, in times of crisis, China has applied embargoes on these materials due to its established monopoly position – it controls 96% of the market (Kalantzakos, 2018).
- » In connection with the above, it is worth looking to our neighbour. In the year 2022, the war in Ukraine will also cause the Slovak economy to grow more slowly and inflation to rise faster than expected a few weeks or months ago. No one can say yet how much this will change, but the first forecasts since the war began have been published by the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank of Slovakia and leading analysts at commercial banks. Their forecasts suggest that GDP growth should slow by 1.4-3.5% compared to the December 2021 projections, mostly due to the war, while inflation should rise by the opposite 1.5-3.8%. Interestingly, the NBS puts the more significant impact of the war in early 2023, although in the case of inflation it is arguable that the impact is already being felt. Residential regulated energy prices always rise in January, with commodity market prices roughly a year and a half higher than a year and a half before. Therefore, if the government does not change the regulatory formula, the price increase in 2023 could even exceed that in 2022 (Aké dopady..., 2022).

We can also observe reactions to the Russian-Ukrainian war crisis – as we have seen with the Covid crisis – where those involved try to use the crisis situation to renew themselves.

The direct and indirect effects of the war are expressed in many different ways by different organisations. Below is a summary of the main civilian casualties suffered by Ukraine so far, based on a study by the UN (2022):

- » One in two Ukrainian businesses has completely shut down, while others have been forced to operate well below capacity.
- » Initial estimates suggest that US\$250 million a month in funding will be needed to cover the partial loss of income of 2.6 million people who are expected to become poorer.
- » In Ukraine, three in ten people are in need of life-saving humanitarian assistance.
- » The country has lost 1,834 civilians – 691 killed and 1,143 injured.

Given the difficulty of obtaining a clear picture of military casualties, the figures presented here should be treated as provisional.

Since the beginning of the war, according to the Ukrainian General Staff, some 35,870 Russian soldiers, 1,582 tanks, 217 aircraft, 186 helicopters and other enemy equipment have been destroyed in Ukraine (Ukrinform, 2022).

#### 1.2.4. THE POSSIBILITY OF FINISHING THE WAR

In the political arena, the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war has given rise to two distinctive views.

- » The first group includes the major European powers (Germany, France, Italy), which believe that the current situation makes it worthwhile to end the war. This would allow both sides to end it without major loss of face. Today, however, the majority of these powers tend to take the opposite view. Hungary has been of this tendency from the beginning. Slovakia, thanks to the early elections in 2023, is also of this tendency. However, it is important to point out that the statements of the new prime minister (Robert Fico) often seem exaggerated (e.g. ‘the war between Russia and Ukraine started with the uprising of Ukrainian neo-Nazis in 2014’, or Slovakia is not providing Ukraine with any of its military supplies, or ‘It would be a huge mistake to consider Ukraine’s accession to NATO’), but in the background it continues to pursue a policy of toggling between the two opposing poles (Russia and the US). As an example, while Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár held talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Turkey in early March, Slovak Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák held talks with US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in the US (Aktuality, 2024a; Boom, 2024; Pravda, 2024; Újszó, 2024; Világgazdaság, 2024).
- » The other main voices of opinion are the US, Poland and the Baltic states, who believe that the war should continue. This would significantly weaken Russia. Today, the majority of the European Union is of this opinion. The Czech Republic is one of the countries we have studied.

EU leaders are confident that history has repeatedly shown that wars of invasion rarely succeed. Even if weaker, the entire population of the invaded country can often mount a meaningful resistance to the invader (Borell, 2022).

There is also an extraordinary divide in views among the V4 countries. While the Czech (with Prime Minister Petr Fiala at the helm) and Polish (with Prime Minister Donald Tusk, former President of the European Council and in charge since December 2023) governments fully support and follow the line of the ‘EU majority’ (in our list, line 2), the Hungarian (Viktor Orbán) and Slovak (Robert Fico, also elected in autumn 2023) governments promote peace and are not willing to provide military assistance. For these reasons, meetings of the V4 leaders were long delayed; and even after the meeting at the end of February 2024, the leaders reported extreme divisions in their press conferences (Aktuality, 2024b; Index, 2024; Origó, 2024).

### 1.3. SCENARIOS FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

The following is a non-exhaustive summary of possible scenarios for the transformation of the world economy.

#### 1.3.1. LOOKING BACK ON THE ROAD TO DATE

It is worth looking at the analyses, ideas, speculations and events that preceded the many crises, pandemics, shortages of raw materials and wars around the world. It is fair to say that the transformation processes have not just begun and by the 2010s it had become clear that the post- bipolar world order following World War II and the Cold War was about to be transformed. This has been confirmed by the qualitative differences that have become apparent in the second decade of the 21st century, followed in recent years by a series of high-profile, often unexpected, political events. These events have fundamentally challenged previous political agreements or unwritten rules, such as the 'Arab Spring', the gradually deepening crisis in Ukraine that turned into a war, the British exit from the EU, or even the election of US President Donald Trump, who has almost completely upended US foreign policy (Rodrik 2018).

How interesting, almost prophetic, these ideas seem, as revealed by the results of a questionnaire survey of future research studies conducted by the Institute for Foreign Affairs and International Economics. The task of this research was to map the major economic, political and social trends that could typically shape global developments in the period up to 2030.

Most forecasts in 2017 were politically pessimistic and moderately optimistic economically for the next 15-20 years, but on some issues, such as the role of Russia, there was considerable debate in the literature. The results suggest that the world will be both more conflict-ridden and more globalised by 2030. This is an obvious fact at the moment.

From today's perspective, the paper has been confirmed by the contradictory results of the projections processed, which are characterised by overall political and environmental pessimism and limited economic optimism. In the context of the world order embodied by the Pax Americana, there was a growing sense of fear that, with its decline, the resulting power vacuum would no longer be filled by the multilateral institutions and international integrations that had previously been clearly dominant, due to their legitimacy crisis and internal weaknesses, among other things. Most forecasts already envisaged a multipolar order, and global politics was characterised by increasing conflict and a strengthening of nationalist voices, with an intensification of the struggle for resources. The vision of the global emergence of a middle class is brought about by the economic advance of developing countries, the literature argues.

#### 1.3.2. THE STATE AND ITS FUTURE ROLE

The fact is that the role of the state is in a constant state of flux, obviously not disappearing, but changing. Recalling the classical, Westphalian-type system, most analysts agree that the state will remain a dominant player in the world at the global level, but that it will do so with a changed character and importance, increasing the influence of non-state actors and going beyond the traditional concept of the nation-state. The age of the information society, digitalisation and the expansion of internet access already represent a radically new form of expression that will continue to grow, while at the same time the potential for civil society and multilevel governance will be enhanced. In particular, forecasts for the next quarter of a century foresee a multipolar, post-hegemonic order, with an intensification of geostrategic rivalries, nationalism and the likelihood of inter-state conflict. This is what we are feeling nowadays, as typically long-standing conflicts have been renewed in recent

months. At the same time, military-defence spending is forecast to increase, and this is an inherent challenge for NATO, that member states should increase their defence-related spending in their budgets. Digitalisation implies an increase in cyber-attacks and new types of security challenges include a further resurgence of terrorism, see today the repeated disruption of supply chains due to war and chaos on some sections of shipping routes. The forecasts show that the United States will remain a superpower, but possibly with a less interventionist policy, and that the international role of the European Union will gradually diminish if the current structure, which is not exactly one for political reform, is maintained. There is already a sense that China and Russia are acting more assertively in their spheres of influence. As things stand today, the Middle East and North Africa will still be a rather unstable region in 2030, and Latin America will continue to be market-dependent, and its growth prospects will depend on the price of the raw materials it produces and sells. One of the key issues for the next decade remains the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, at around 5-8% per year, but the focus will shift from FDI to domestic consumption and the stabilisation of the middle class, and thus the structure of the economy will change. Accordingly, the change in China's growth model – which has played a prominent role in the decline in the share of world trade in global GDP – is from an increased export orientation to a shift towards the domestic market, with a dynamic growth in demand synchronising the level of trade penetration with the size of the country's economy (Baldwin, 2022/2).

Looking back to the end of the last century, our environment has been characterised by a series of parallel changes, such as different power relations at the international level, population trends, scientific and technological advances, and simultaneous changes in nature and society, which, even individually, have had a major transformative power (Simai, 2007; László, 2008).

In order to understand the crisis situations that have emerged, we can also refer back to previous publications that have already foreseen and anticipated them long before they actually occurred. In a later paper (Fukuyama, 1992), the author did not deny that the great catastrophes of the 20th century were pessimistic, but he also pointed to the successive collapses of dictatorships that were thought to be irreversible.

If we look for the possibility of possible scenarios, we find ourselves once again confronted with roots such as the worldwide spread of Western-style democracy, the very aim of which would be stabilisation – instead of the parallelism of different cultures and civilisations, because of fundamentally different values – becoming a source of constant conflict in the world (Huntington, 1996). Huntington, the aforementioned political scientist, predicted wars between civilisations, as world politics is living in an age of Islamic wars and Muslims are increasingly coming into conflict with each other and with other peoples. With the escalation of this war, it has become a very large-scale regional war and global terrorism (Fukuyama, 2002). In contrast, there are, and have been, other approaches that argue that the world is not necessarily hurtling towards its destruction (Toffler, 1980). The view is that, if at great cost and with significant structural changes, a better future can be built. According to Toffler, the 'super industrial' society was defined by three periods. After the agricultural and industrial phases, the third wave emerged in the last decades of the last century, creating new conditions, a new way of life and a new philosophy of life, with the information society as its goal. A similar view is that a new form of human coexistence and a new type of identity are being realised in the information society (Castells, 1996).

According to the theory of the book 'The Emergence of the Modern World Economic System' (Wallerstein, 1983), during the previous half millennium, starting with the major geographical discoveries, the economies of the different parts of the world have been linked and united in an international division of labour, based on the accumulation of capital.

The first stage of the process involved the European colonial countries, which sought to build a new social and political system to replace the obsolete medieval structure. Within them, the centres are gradually developing

regions, while the remaining parts are becoming peripheral. The current century has begun with changes, as manufacturing and some less knowledge-centred production-related services have shifted from the most advanced to the developing countries (Kutasi, 2010), providing the opportunity for Third World countries to catch up materially and technologically. By 2008, the bipolar world order had reached the point where the G20 group of countries, rather than the G8, was deciding on the most important issues, although there are some views that China, along with the US, will be the other power in the G2 version (Kutasi, 2010). This has been accompanied by intense technological development in the information and communications field, and by the development of means of transport and supply chains, which have brought about a sharp reduction in transaction costs. Today, this has changed to the extent that the longer-term reasons for the slowdown in globalisation include a halt in the decline in unit transport costs.

### 1.3.3. KNOWLEDGE ABOVE ALL

The knowledge-based economy is one of the uncertainties for the future, affecting the direction of development and continuing adverse social trends, as well as demographic imbalances, ecological crisis, environmental pollution and global climate change. Although globalisation is considered to be a complex and interdependent set of economic, political and social processes (Dicken, 2015), the global economy is uneven in space and time, and has a major impact on society and people's lives. Moreover, there is currently no unified position on rethinking production, distribution and consumption in the global economy, let us look at the problem of sustainability. We do not think so, but culture has a strong link to these processes. 'Cultural diffusion, the organisation of cultural production and consumption into a global system, is perhaps the most visible and explosively expanding area of globalisation... Cultural globalisation is thus considered to be one of the most directly perceived and experienced forms of globalisation' (Bayer, 2002). Knowledge, information, and the technologies associated with them, and their diffusion, are central to the information society (Karvalics, 2007).

The Uruguay Round was the culmination of the GATT process up to 1994, which aimed at multilateral liberalisation of international trade. This period of deregulation began well before in the late 1970s in the United States and continued in other developed markets, including the internal market of the European Union, where the completion of the first phase of its unification process in 1992 and the continuation of the process can be defined as deregulation at regional level. Also, after this period, the development of global value chains started in the second half of the 1990s. In addition to the democratic transition of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the transition to a market economy, followed by China's accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 and the opening up of India's external economy, gave a further significant boost to economic globalisation, all of this in an almost mutually beneficial situation. Accordingly, from a political point of view, globalisation, with its increased trade and mobilizable working capital investments, has – triggering the higher risks and the additional costs that go with it – reaped the realisable economic and material benefits without wars (Fazal 2022). The overall picture is modified by the fact that while international trade in goods is slowing down, the same is not true for services (Baldwin, 2022/1).

### 1.3.4. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

Looking back over the different periods of globalisation, its intensity and pattern have been constantly changing, thanks to various external and internal factors, not in a straight line but in a cyclical way, with periods of boom and bust, and periods of decline and slowdown (Constanza-Patten, 1995). The direction, intensity and other features of this process are determined by factors that have an impact over the longer term. In the light of recent developments, it is the pandemic and the war between Russia and Ukraine that have accelerated the



unfolding of the trends that started earlier. The impact of globalisation, as with other phenomena, is twofold: crises and anomalies on the demand and supply side slow down business, but also foreshadow the possibility and conditions for moving forward. The recent talk of deglobalisation is far from being a breakthrough, although globalisation processes have slowed down in the medium term and their characteristics have changed (Shangquan, 2000). The impact of Industry 4.0 continues, accelerated by the pandemics of multiple waves, automation and, more recently, artificial intelligence and its widespread application. Closely linked to the trends outlined above is the issue of sustainability in the medium and long term in terms of the direct impact on the natural environment and the nature and extent of the direct effects on all stakeholders, and the compensation that is reversed, particularly in the case of damage caused. In the context of globalisation, one of the conclusions of this study is that this process is sustainable in the long term (five years is mentioned here), depending on the driving forces, but that its current form and characteristics are changing. The period ahead, however, is influenced by a number of factors, which could even slow it down. One such factor is the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and the possible timing of its end, which cannot be predicted at this stage. It is clear that its outcome will once again create a new situation and set new conditions for the direction of globalisation. What we can see at the moment is that there is little chance of a return to the pre-war period of low commodity and energy prices, not to mention low inflation and liberalised conditions for world trade. Low-cost factors of production such as labour, capital, raw materials and energy are all much more expensive, which means a persistent inflationary environment. Activities previously relocated to other countries, often in the Far East, are at best only partially returned to the home country (reshoring), so global value chains are not broken but rather shortened, with companies relying on multiple suppliers, preferably from several countries, rather than one, which also contributes to the increasing fragmentation of the world economy. The duplication cost of these global value chains would amount to two percent of global GDP. Another view is that globalisation is approaching its limits for two reasons. One is environmental, because globalisation has enabled specialisation – and tariff reductions – so the consequence is the lengthening of value chains. End-users and buyers therefore receive the goods they order through many countries, but the associated environmental costs are not included in this market price. Thus, wittingly or unwittingly, globalisation, due to the malfunctioning of commodity markets, is leading to a focus on environmentally damaging commodity production, which, as an environmental impact of sustainability, is reducing the life chances of future generations. However, corporate efforts to shorten these pathways in response to supply disruptions in value chains, thus worsening globalisation but also strengthening regionalisation, can be seen as a logical step (Legge & Lukaszuk, 2021).

A new type of globalisation formula is the prioritisation of security over economic efficiency, which has been accelerated by the coronavirus pandemic and the Russian war against Ukraine, as well as political pressure for different power goals from different perspectives such as economic, trade, technological, etc. This kind of political motivation, which is also evident in relations, the use of military force, the possible use of military force, the questioning of the institution of private property and the territorial integrity of states, the rise of protectionism – for example, three times as many new protectionist measures have been identified in the world since 2008, than there have been liberalizations (O’Neil, 2022),- the rise of regional trade agreements and the increasing regionalization of international trade in goods is reinforcing the fragmentation of the rules-based global economy, slowing integration and increasing uncertainty. Of course, this does not lead both producers and consumers towards optimal energy use and efficient production. Addressing the consequences of climate change takes a back seat, while the use of military force is presented as a realistic solution to solving problems. The choice between security and efficiency alters the balance between competition and cooperation so that the opposing powers benefit from bilateral economic relations without strengthening each other’s military potential. The new balance between security and efficiency, the predominance of security considerations, is likely to shift the geographical structure of most countries’ external trade towards regional trade. As regions are becoming

more valued, addressing the consequences of climate change and the uptake of renewable energy has seen the precautionary stocks of the three thousand largest global firms rise by a third to around 9 per cent of world GDP between 2016 and 2021. These value chains ensure smooth operations, as does liquidity for financial institutions (Foroohar 2022). Conflict shows that the economic interdependencies created by globalisation do not necessarily automatically guarantee peaceful political relations. The frequently mentioned German idea that change can be achieved through trade, or ‘Wandel durch Handel’, has not been borne out. The situation is similar with sanctions, which are intended as a means of exerting economic pressure and achieving political objectives, with very mixed results, since their impact will only be indirect and presumably longer term. The magnitude of the impact of trade policy sanctions is illustrated by the fact that a model calculation suggests that blocking trade between Russia and the rest of the world for one year would reduce world trade by 0.7 per cent compared to the baseline scenario, such is the contribution that it could make to the moderation of globalisation (Kumagai et al. 2022).

## 1.4. INTRODUCTION OF THE EXAMINED COUNTRIES

The research described in the previous section was conducted in the following three countries in the Central and Eastern European region in the fourth quarter of 2022 and the first to fourth quarter of 2023.

- » Czech Republic (CZ)
- » Hungary (HU),
- » Slovakia (SK).

The economic characteristics of these countries are listed in Table 1/4 below. By comparing the three countries by economic performance, conclusions can be drawn.

- » In 2023, 25.85 million people lived in the three countries under study (Eurostat, 2024b), representing 5.77% of the population of the European Union (Eurostat, 2024b). In the year before the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis (2019), all countries had positive economic growth (2.51% to 4.86%). The same cannot be said for 2020, when the decline ranged from -3.34% to -5.40%. In 2021, growth (3.55-7.20%) was again observed in the countries studied. The 2022 figures were lower than the year before (1.67-4.87%) (Macrotrends, 2024).
- » The unemployment rate in 2019 ranged from 1.3% to 3.8% in the 3 countries. In 2021, unemployment also rose slightly (0.1% in Slovakia, 0.2% in the Czech Republic) or stagnated (Hungary). In 2022, unemployment fell again in all three countries (by 0.3-0.4%) (Eurostat, 2024c).
- » In terms of GDP per capita, the crisis has led to a decline, to varying degrees, in all the countries surveyed, but by 2021 and then 2022, all three countries surveyed had experienced an increase (World Bank, 2024).

Table 1/4 Economic characteristics of the examined countries

Characteristics		CZ	HU	SK	Total/average
Population (million people)	2019	10.65	9.77	5.45	25.87
	2020	10.70	9.77	5.46	25.93
	2021	10.49	9.73	5.46	25.68
	2022	10.52	9.69	5.43	25.64
	2023	10.83	9.60	5.43	25.86
GDP growth (%)	2019	3.03%	4.86	2.51%	3.47%
	2020	- 5.50%	- 4.54%	- 3.34%	- 4.46%
	2021	3.55%	7.20%	4.86%	5.20%
	2022	2.46%	4.58%	1.67%	2.9%
Unemployment (%)	2019	1.3%	2.1%	3.8%	2.40%
	2020	1.7%	2.7%	4.4%	2.93%
	2021	1.9%	2.7%	4.5%	3.03%
	2022	1.5%	2.4%	4.1%	2.67%
GDP per capita (euro/person)	2019	44 212.7	34 645.6	33 453.8	37 437. 37
	2020	42 827.1	34 169.9	32 922.9	36 639. 97
	2021	45 630.0	36 735.9	34 505.3	38 957.07
	2022	49 195.0	41 740.9	37 457.2	42 797.7

Source: Authors' own editing based on Eurostat (2024b, c), Macrotrends (2024), World Bank (2024)

In terms of culture, following the dimensions set up by Hofstede (2001), we can see that Austria has the lowest power distance (11); Hungarians are the most individualistic (80); Slovaks are the most masculine (100); Bulgarians are the most noble (40), with the lowest uncertainty avoidance index for Slovaks (51). In contrast, Hungary (82) and Bulgaria (85) have roughly the same uncertainty avoidance index. Slovaks are mostly long term oriented (77), and finally Austrians are the most volatile (63) (Jarjabka, 2021).

Table 1/5 Hofstede cultural dimensions of the six countries compared

	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	LTO	IND
Austria	11	55	79	82	60	63
Bosnia-Herzegovina	90	22	48	87	70	44
Bulgaria	70	30	40	85	69	16
Hungary	46	80	88	82	58	31
Romania	90	30	42	90	52	20
Slovakia	100	52	100	51	77	28
the Czech Republic	57	70	57	74	51	29

Source: <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries>

## 1.5. PRESENTING THE RESEARCH

We conducted a survey with universities in Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic between the end of 2022 and 2023. The main objectives of the research team are summarised below:

- » We sought to answer the question of what impacts the responding organisations expected in the areas of governance, management and HR after the recovery from the recent Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been a crisis for the last 2 years.

In order to achieve the above objective, we received significant financial support from EGIS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and professional support from the National Association of Human Resources Professionals (HSZOSZ) and the Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BKIK)

Our research was conducted between May 1 2022 and November 30 2023 in relation to the objective presented above.

The questionnaire used in the survey addresses the following major groups of questions, for each of them collecting the respondent's experiences, opinions and expectations:

- » the general characteristics of the respondent organization, its relationship with the Russian and Ukrainian markets, and its preparedness for war,
- » the likely macro and micro economic and financial impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war,
- » the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on your organisation/business in 2022–2023,
- » whether the war or post-war situation also represents an opportunity for the responding organisation,
- » analysing the ways in which the organisation is trying to adapt to the situation created by the war situation,
- » the range of measures that are being planned or implemented to mitigate the negative effects of the Russia-Ukraine war,
- » identification of materials, foodstuffs, spare parts and services which are scarce or difficult to obtain because of the war,
- » characteristics of the respondent,
- » other suggestions and comments.

During an on-line questionnaire survey conducted between 1 May 2022 and 30 November 2023, we received a total of 1,370 analysable responses from different organisations (companies and institutions) in the countries surveyed (Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia). More than 1,000 companies completed our questionnaire. Some of the respondents did not answer some questions due to accidental completion errors or deliberate motivations. Given that our sample is not representative due to the sampling procedure, the usability of the results obtained is mainly guaranteed by the high number of items. Therefore, no questionnaire was excluded from the evaluation. If a question was answered, the organisation was counted in the number of items. The consequence of this is that almost all tables included respondents with different item numbers.

*(Note: It is also important to note that at the end of the current research phase, we are conducting a successful survey in Romania with a university there. Due to the incompleteness of the survey, we were not able to include this survey in the evaluation of the current research phase.)*

Our empirical study is essentially ex-post (Usunier et al., 2017), i.e. we have examined the aforementioned period based on opinions and factual data related to the observation period. The questionnaire includes both closed and open questions. In the context of closed questions, respondents were asked to indicate the most typical pre-written answers, which largely covered the topics of the study, in a one-respondent manner. The responses were analysed using univariate statistical methods to produce the following research report, which is divided into the following sections:

- » Chapter 2 presents the characteristics of the responding organisations and respondents.
- » In Chapter 3, we present respondents' views on the changes that the war crisis has brought and will bring to the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak economies and to the organisations surveyed.
- » In Chapter 4, we review the general and HR-specific crisis management measures in the surveyed organisations.
- » Chapter 5 presents our analysis of the changes/transitions in HR in the surveyed organisations as a result of the crisis.
- » In Chapter 6, we highlight the organisational, management and HR characteristics and opportunities that respondents focused on in relation to the war.
- » In Chapter 7 of the survey, we have asked about the range of materials, food and services that are missing due to the war.
- » In Chapter 8, we describe the government measures indicated by our respondents.
- » In Chapter 9, we describe some of the characteristics of the respondents
- » In Chapter 10 of the survey, we provide the names of the 826 responding organisations (companies and institutions) in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia that gave their names. The call for respondents to our online survey is also available here.

The research we present here cannot, of course, cover all aspects of the subject due to the limitations of time and capacity available. Furthermore, the aim was not to compare our empirical experience with other publications in the literature, but to provide new information as quickly, efficiently and in a targeted manner as possible. We have therefore only outlined the most important features, trends and tendencies.

## 1.6. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Agrárszektor (2022). We have the winners of the brutal drought: they are now winning big. (In Hungarian) Agrárszektor.hu. [agrarszektor.hu/elelmiszer/20220812/megvannak-a-brutalis-szarazsag-nyertesei-ok-most-nagyot-kaszalhatnak-a-foldeken-40155](https://www.agrarszektor.hu/elelmiszer/20220812/megvannak-a-brutalis-szarazsag-nyertesei-ok-most-nagyot-kaszalhatnak-a-foldeken-40155) (Retrieved 16 August 2022)
2. Aké dopady bude mať vojna na Ukrajinu na slovenskú ekonomiku? Analytici zverejnili prvé prognózy (2022). <https://www.webnoviny.sk/ake-dopady-bude-mat-vojna-na-ukrajine-na-slovensku-ekonomiku-analytici-zverejnili-prve-prognozy/> (Retrieved 27 July 2022)
3. Aktuality (2024a). Juraj Blanár v Turecku rokoval so Sergejom Lavrovom. Podľa premiéra Fica to je vyvážená politika na všetky svetové strany. <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/a0Eaiev/juraj-blanar-v-turecku-rokoval-so-sergejom-lavrovom-podla-premiera-fica-to-je-vy vazena-politika-na-vsetky-svetove-strany/> (Retrieved 22 March 2024)
4. Aktuality (2024b). V4 môže byť dôležitým regionálnym formátom, povedal Robert Fico po stretnutí v Prahe. <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/VLWcsxi/v4-moze-byt-dolezitim-regionalnym-formatom-povedal-robert-fico-po-stretnuti-v-prahe/> (Retrieved 22 March 2024)
5. Baldwin, R. (2022/1) Globotics and macroeconomics: Globalisation and automation of the service sector. Challenges for monetary policy in a rapidly changing world. ECB Forum on Central Banking. European Central Bank, 27–29 June. [https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/conferences/ecbforum/shared/pdf/2022/Baldwin\\_paper.pdf](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/conferences/ecbforum/shared/pdf/2022/Baldwin_paper.pdf) (Retrieved 02 August 2022)

6. Baldwin, R. (2022/2) The peak globalisation myth: Part 1. Centre for Economic Policy Research, 31 August. <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/peak-globalisation-myth-part-1> (Retrieved 02 August 2022)
7. Bayer J (2002). Global media, global culture. (In Hungarian) Magyar Tudomány, 6,748-764
8. Bumm (2024). Fico: Slovakia does not give Ukraine anything from its army supplies. (In Hungarian) <https://www.bumm.sk/belfold/2024/03/22/fico-a-hadsereg-keszletebol-szlovakia-semmit-sem-ad-ukrajnanak> (Retrieved 22 March 2024)
9. Castells M (1996). The Rise of the Network Society, The Power of Identity: the information age, The End of Millennium. Oxford: Blackwell.
10. Beauchamp, Z. (2022). Big questions about Russia's war in Ukraine, answered. <https://www.vox.com/22989379/russia-ukraine-war-putin-zelensky-us-nato-explainer-questions> (Retrieved 08 July 2022)
11. Belton, C. (2022). Putin's men.(In Hungarian) Budapest: Libri Kiadó.
12. Berend T.I. (2022). Today's inflation. (In Hungarian) Népszava, augusztus 2, 10.
13. Borell, J. (2022). Russia's war against Ukraine: where do we stand and what can the future bring? [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/russia%E2%80%99s-war-against-ukraine-where-do-we-stand-and-what-can-future-bring\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/russia%E2%80%99s-war-against-ukraine-where-do-we-stand-and-what-can-future-bring_en). (Retrieved 10 July 2022)
14. Bost et al. (ed.) (2021). World economic map. (In Hungarian) Budapest: Pallas Athéné Kiadó.
15. Constanza, R. & Patten, B. C. (1995). Defining and predicting sustainability. Ecological Economics, 15(3), 193–196. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0921-8009\(95\)00048-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/0921-8009(95)00048-8) (Retrieved 02 August 2022)
16. Csabai K. (2022). War inflation – or rather inflation war? (In Hungarian) mfor.hu-Menedzsment Fórum. <https://mfor.hu/cikkek/szobjektiv/haborus-inflacio--vagy-inkabb-inflacios-haboru.html> (Retrieved 11 July 2022)
17. Csillag, K., Ďurinová, P. & Kováčiková, A. (2020). Opatrenia na booj proti socio-ekonomickým dopadom pandémie ochorenia COVID-19 vo vybraných štátoch. Odbor Parlamentný inštitút, Bratislava.
18. Defense (2022). Defense Spending by Country. <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/defense-spending-by-country> (Retrieved 27 August 2022)
19. De Grauwe, P. (2016). How far should we push globalization? CEPS Commentary, 4 November. <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/how-far-should-we-push-globalisation/>
20. Diamond, J. (2019). Upheaval Turning Points for Nations in Crisis. New York: Little, Brown and Company,
21. Dicken P (2015). Global Shift. The Guilford Press. (seventh ed.) New York, London
22. EKB (2021). Miért olyan magas jelenleg az infláció? Európai Központi Bank. (EKB) [https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/educational/explainers/tell-me-11.more/html/high\\_inflation.hu.html](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/educational/explainers/tell-me-11.more/html/high_inflation.hu.html) (Retrieved 11 August 2022)
23. Europa Publications (2019). Central and South-Eastern Europe 2020. New York:Routledge
24. Eurostat (2022). Annual inflation up to 8.9% in the euro area Up to 9.8% in the EU. Eurostat Press Office. 94/2022 – 18 August 2022.
25. Fazal, T. M. (2022) The Return of the Conquest? Why the Future of Global Order Hinges on Ukraine. Foreign Affairs, 101(3). 20–27. <https://www.unauthenticated> (Retrieved 24 January 2024)
26. Fazekas K., Csillag M.Hermann Z. &Scharle Á. (2021).The Hungarian Labour Market 2019. Budapest: Institute of Economics. Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
27. Fergusson, N. (2021). Doom. – The Politics of Catastrophe. New York: Penguin Book.
28. Fónyi-Tisóczy N. (2022): There is warlike inflation, and peace is needed to end it.(In Hungarian) Origó, június 7. <https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20220616-a-beke-hozhatja-el-a-haborus-inflacio-megszuneset.html> (Retrieved 30 June 2022)
29. Foroohar, R. (2022). A deglobalising world will be an inflationary one. Financial Times, szeptember 5. <https://www.ft.com/content/6f7ea222-f21c-4879-8787-5188b93c129c> (Retrieved 02 August 2022)
30. Fukuyama F (1989). The End of History? The National Interest, Summer
31. Fukuyama F (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Penguin, London
32. Fukuyama F (2002). Az iszlám, amelyik gyűlöli a Nyugatot. Élet és Irodalom 2:10
33. Garai A., Szalai, M. & Szóke, D. (2017). The world order in 2030. Examination of global political, economic and social trends. (In Hungarian) Külügyi szemle, 16(4), 3-27.
34. Golle, V.& Smith, M. (2022). Charting the Global Economy: War Driving Inflation, Growth Risks. Bloomberg European edition, [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-26/charting-the-global-economy-war-driving-inflation-growth-risks?utm\\_medium=cpc\\_search&utm\\_campaign=NB\\_ENG\\_DSAXX\\_DSAXXXXXXXXXXX\\_EVG\\_XXXX\\_XXX\\_Y0469\\_EN\\_EN\\_X\\_BLOM\\_GO\\_SE\\_XXX\\_XXXXXXXXXX&gclid=Cj0KCQjwIK-WBhDjARIsAO2sErRoUEkkcTJKNT9jl9sbTjFMxApQIRcKtiLWAlpmqJtHPYIzNXqRAaAil0EALw\\_wcB&gclid=aw.ds](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-26/charting-the-global-economy-war-driving-inflation-growth-risks?utm_medium=cpc_search&utm_campaign=NB_ENG_DSAXX_DSAXXXXXXXXXXX_EVG_XXXX_XXX_Y0469_EN_EN_X_BLOM_GO_SE_XXX_XXXXXXXXXX&gclid=Cj0KCQjwIK-WBhDjARIsAO2sErRoUEkkcTJKNT9jl9sbTjFMxApQIRcKtiLWAlpmqJtHPYIzNXqRAaAil0EALw_wcB&gclid=aw.ds) (Retrieved 11 July 2022)
35. Götz M., Éltető A. & Sass M.(2023). Still attractive for FDI? Location advantages of Visegrád countries in the digital era – the case of Poland and Hungary. European Journal of International Management, 20(1),66 – 88.
36. Gurijev, Sz.&Treismann, D. (2023).SPIN diktárok. Budapest: HVG.

37. Ha, L.& Milenkovic, Z. (2022). What is Driving Global Inflation? <https://www.euromonitor.com/article/what-is-driving-global-inflation> (Retrieved 11 August 2022)
38. Haszán Z. (2022). Even without the war, inflation was permanently higher in Hungary than in the EU. (In Hungarian) *Gazdaság*, július 1. <https://444.hu/2022/07/01/a-haboru-nelkul-is-tartosan-magasabb-volt-az-inflacio-magyarorszagon-mint-az-eu-ban> (Retrieved 11 July 2022)
39. Huntington SP (1996) *The Clash of Civilization and the Remarking of World Order*. Simon and Schuster, New York
40. ILO (2019). *World Employment and Social Outlook – Trends 2019*. Geneve: International Labour Organization
41. ILO (2021). *COVID-19 and the world of work. Seventh edition Updated estimates and analysis*. ILO Monitor, 7th edition, 1-31.
42. IMF (2021a). *The IMF's Response to COVID-19*. <https://www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/imf-response-to-covid-19> (Retrieved 10 July 2021)
43. IMF (2021b). *World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021*. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
44. Index (2024). According to Viktor Orbán, the V4 summit was a meeting of self-reflection. (In Hungarian) <https://index.hu/kul-fold/2024/02/27/orban-viktor-miniszterelnok-v4-csucstalalkozo-praga/> (Retrieved 22 March 2024)
45. James, H. (2021). Globalization's Coming Golden Age. Why Crisis ends in Connection. *Foreign Affairs*, 100(3),10–19. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-20/globalizations-coming-golden-age> (Retrieved 03 August 2022)
46. James, H. (2022) Inflation may pave the way to a new era of globalisation. *Financial Times*, április 4. <https://www.ft.com/content/5c8fe679-c6ba-4948-97d4-fb0baf90de6> (Retrieved 04 August 2022)
47. Jarjabka Á. (2021). Jarjabka Á. (2021). National and organizational culture in an international environment. (In Hungarian) In: Blahó A., Czakó E. & Poór J. *International management*. (In Hungarian) Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
48. Kalantzakos, S. (2018). *China and rare earth geopolitics*. (In Hungarian) Budapest: Pallas Athéné Kiadó.
49. Karvalics L (2007) *Information society – what is it?* In: Pintér R (ed.) *The information society*. (In Hungarian) Budapest: Mandátum.
50. Kilfoyle, M. (2023). Ukraine: what's the global economic impact of Russia's invasion? *Economics Observatory* <https://www.economicsobservatory.com/ukraine-whats-the-global-economic-impact-of-russias-invasion> (Retrieved 20 February 2024)
51. Kumagai, S., Hayakawa, K., Gokan, T., Ikumo, I., Keola, S. & Tsubota, K. (2022). *Impact of Economic Sanctions against Russia on the Global Economy Using the IDEGSM*. IDE Policy
52. Kutasi G (2010) *Régiók és piacok a világgazdaságban – általános körkép*. In: Blahó A.& Kutasi G.(szerk.) *Erőközpontok és régiók*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
53. Lavelok, J. (2014). *A rough ride to the future*. London: Allen Lee.
54. László E. (2008). *World change – The harmonious way of change*. (In Hungarian) Budapest: Nyitott könyvműhely.
55. S (In Hungarian) imai M (2007) *The world economy in the XXI. at the turn of the century*. (In Hungarian) Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
56. Lengyel I. (2022). In a medium development trap. (In Hungarian) *Magyar Narancs*, June 23. 8-9.
57. Legge, S.& Lukaszuk, P. (2021) *Regionalization vs globalization: What is the future direction of trade?* *World Economic Forum*, 15 July. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/07/regionalization-globalization-future-direction-trade/> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
58. Li T. ,Meng Z., Qi, Ch.& Yang, T. (2022). *The Economic Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War on the Energy Industry*. (pp.773-779). In *Proceedings of the 2022 2nd International Conference on Economic Development and Business Culture (ICEDBC 2022)* DOI:10.2991/978-94-6463-036-7\_114
59. Losonczy, M. (2022) *Economic globalization and sustainability*. (In Hungarian) *Educatio*, 31 (4), 555–570. DOI: 10.1556/2063.31.2022.4.3 Budapesti Gazdasági Egyetem
60. McKinsey (2022). *War in Ukraine: Twelve disruptions changing the world*. <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/war-in-ukraine-twelve-disruptions-changing-the-world>. ((Retrieved 16 August 2022)
61. Megjts, M. (2002). Webinar "Academic Life During the Russian War in Ukraine. <https://www.ieeca.org>. (Retrieved 12 July 2022)
62. Mészáros, R. (2016). *Aspects for the interpretation of the 21st century world economy*. (In Hungarian) *ACTA CLIMATOLOGICA ET CHOROLOGICA Universitatis Szegediensis*, Tomus 50/B, 2, 87-93.
63. Németh, A. (2023). *Europe's economy suffered from the Russian-Ukrainian war*. (In Hungarian) *Világgazdaság*. <https://www.vg.hu/nemzetkozi-gazdasag/2023/09/megsinylette-europa-gazdasaga-az-orosz-ukran-haborut> (Retrieved 20 February 2024)
64. OECD (2022). *OECD Unemployment Rates News Release*. January 2022. Paris: OECD.
65. O'Neil, S. K. (2022) *The Myth of the Global. Why Regional Ties Win the Day*. *Foreign Affairs*, 101(4), 158–169. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unitedstates/2022-06-21/myth-global-regional-ties-win> (Retrieved 06 August 2022)
66. Origó (2022). *Európa a háború árnyékában: energiaválság, üzemanyagihiány és éhínség lehet sok országban*. Origó, 05.31. <https://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20220531-europa-a-haboru-arnyekaban-energiavalsag-uzemanyaghiany-es-ehinség-lett-.orszagban.html>. (Retrieved 12 July 2022)
67. Origó (2024). *Orbán Viktor: A V4-együttműködés él és fontos*. <https://www.origo.hu/itthon/2024/02/orban-viktor-a-v4-egyuttmu-kodes-el-es-fontos> (Retrieved 22 March 2024)

68. Plokhy, S. (2023). *The Frontline*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
69. Poór J., Engle D. A. Kovács É.I. & Abdrazakova, A. (2020). Multinationals and the evolving contours of their human management practices in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. *Employee Relations*. 42(3),583-608. DOI 10.1108/ER-01-2019-0082
70. Pravda (2024). Kaliňák: Stretnutie Blanára s Lavrovom nebolo v Spojených štátoch témou. <https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/702532-kalinak-stretnutie-blanara-s-lavrovom-nebolo-v-spojonych-statoch-temou/> (Retrieved 22 March 2024)
71. Pszcel,R. (2022). The consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for international security – NATO and beyond. *NATO Review*, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/07/07/the-consequences-of-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-for-international-security-nato-and-beyond/index.html>. (Retrieved 12 July 2022)
72. Reinhart, C. & Graf von Luckner C. (2022).The Return of Global Inflation. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/return-global-inflation> (Retrieved 11 August 2022)
73. Römisch, R. (2020). COVID-19 effects on Central Europe. <https://www.interreg-central.eu/Content.Node/discover/COVID-19-effects-on-Central-Europe.pdf> (Retrieved 26 March 2021)
74. Shangquan, G. (2000). Economic Globalization: Trends, Risks and Risk Prevention. CDP Background Paper No. 1, ST/ESA/2000/CDP/1 Economic and Social Affairs. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/CDPbp-2000-1.pdf> (Retrieved 02 August 2022)
75. Tass (2022). The share of expenditures on 'National defense' will stand at 2.4% of GDP next year. <https://tass.com/defense/1080646> (Retrieved 27 August 2022)
76. The Economist (2019). The global list. Globalisation has faltered and is now being reshaped. Január 26. pp. 19–20. <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/01/24/globalisationhas-faltered> (Retrieved 02 August 2022)
77. The Economist (2022). Reinventing globalisation. Júnus 18. p. 9. <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/06/16/the-tricky-restructuring-of-global-supply-chains> (Retrieved 02 August 2022)
78. Toffler A (1980). *The Third Wave*. New York: Banton.
79. Wallerstein I (1983). *A modern világgazdasági rendszer kialakulása*. Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó.
80. Trautman, L.& Verteteics, Á. (2022) Világpolitika és Közgazdaságtan — Homloktérben az infláció — A körülmények hálójában – Interjú dr. Kovács Árpáddal, a költségvetési Tanács elnökével. [www.unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/VILPOL20220104](http://www.unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/VILPOL20220104) PDF ([unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu](http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu)) (Retrieved 21 January 2024)
81. Tooze, A. (2022). Ukraine's War Has Already Changed the World's Economy. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/05/ukraine-russia-war-world-economy/> (Retrieved 17 April 2022)
82. Újszó (2024). Fico: Óriási hiba lenne, ha fontolóra vennénk Ukrajna NATO-csatlakozását. <https://uj szo.com/kozelet/fico-oriasi-hiba-lenne-ha-fontolora-vennenk-ukrajna-nato-csatlakozasat> (Retrieved 22 March 2024)
83. Ukrinform (2022). Russia's manpower losses in Ukraine total 35,870 soldiers. <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3520173-about-35870-russian-soldiers-already-killed-in-ukraine.html>. (Retrieved 12 July 2022)
84. UN (2021). Amid onslaught of crises, world must restore trust, solidarity to tackle COVID-19, climate change, Secretary-General says, opening annual General Assembly debate. New York: United Nation (UN). <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/amid-onslaught-crises-world-must-restore-trust-solidarity-tackle-covid-19-climate> (Retrieved 11 July 2022)
85. UN (2022). Ukraine war: \$100 billion in infrastructure damage and counting. *UN News* -Global perspective Human stories. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114022> (Letöltve: 2022. július 12.) (Retrieved 12 July 2022)
86. UNCTAD (2019). *The World Investment Report-2019*. New York: UNCTAD.
87. UNCTAD (2020). *The World Investment Report-2020*. New York: UNCTAD.
88. UNCTAD (2021). *The World Investment Report-2021*. New York: UNCTAD.
89. UNCTAD (2022). *The World Investment Report-2022*. New York: UNCTAD
90. UPSVR (2022). Nezaemestnanost – mesačné štatistiky [https://www.upsvr.gov.sk/statistiky/nezamestnanost-mesacne-statistiky.htm?page\\_id=1254](https://www.upsvr.gov.sk/statistiky/nezamestnanost-mesacne-statistiky.htm?page_id=1254) (Retrieved 12 July 2022)
91. Világgazdaság (2024). Robert Fico elengedte magát: „az ukrán neonácik tombolásával kezdődött” a háború. <https://www.vg.hu/kozelet/2024/02/robert-fico-elengedte-magat-az-ukran-neonacik-tombolasaval-kezdodott-a-haboru> (Retrieved 22 March 2024)
92. WEF (2020). *Challenges and Opportunities in the Post-COVID-19 World*. Geneva: WEF (World Economic Forum).
93. World Bank (2022). *Finance for an equitable recovery: A World Bank Group Flagship Report*. Washington: World Bank



## 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXAMINED ORGANISATIONS (SILVIA TÓBIÁS KOSÁR, ARNOLD TÓTH AND KITTI HAJMÁSI)

*„There are many historical examples that show that there is no strong personality who would not be impacted by long periods of exercising unlimited power. No one can lead without being punished“.*

*Zoltán Sz. Bíró<sup>5</sup> (2023:70)*

This chapter describes the descriptive statistics of the research sample. We would like to make a preliminary comment on Tables 2/1 to 2/8. Our questionnaire was completed by more than a thousand firms. Some of the respondents did not answer some questions due to inadvertent completion errors or deliberate motivations. Given that our sample is not representative due to the sampling procedure, the usability of the results obtained is mainly guaranteed by the high number of items. Therefore, no questionnaire was excluded from the evaluation. If a question was answered, the organisation was counted in the number of items. The consequence of this is that almost all tables included respondents with different item numbers.

### 2.1. OWNERSHIP (MAJORITY) STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANISATIONS IN THE SAMPLE

In our survey we processed questionnaires from 1370 respondents from the three countries surveyed. Almost two thirds of the respondents are public or private organisations with domestic ownership. The proportion is higher in Slovakia, where more than 80% of the organisations belonged to this category.

*Table 2/1 Breakdown of respondents by type of ownership (%)*

Owner	CZ	HU	SK	Total
State, local government	11.2%	19.2%	9.1%	16.3%
Hungarian private	53.6%	47.8%	71.5%	51.9%
Foreign or mixed Hungarian	34.2%	28.9%	17.0%	28.6%
Nonprofit organisation	1.0%	3.4%	1.2%	2.6%
Other		0.7%	1.2%	.6%
Total (100%) n=	295	910	165	1370

*Source: Authors' own editing*

<sup>5</sup> Zoltán Sz. Bíró (1959–) historian, researching Russia at the Budapest Corvinus University.

## 2.2. ORGANISATIONAL SIZE

Organisational size was examined on the basis of two aspects (number of employees and turnover).

### 2.2.1. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

Questions in Table 2/2 were answered by 1370 respondents. The table shows that 295 Czech organisations were surveyed. Here, the share of companies with 1-9 employees is 17.6%, while the share of companies with no employees and between 10 and 250 employees is 42.4%. If the same distributions are examined, the shares are 23% and 39.3%, while in Slovakia the shares are 42.4% and 47.3%. It can be said that the ratios shown are not representative. However, this lack of representativeness cannot be considered an error. Due to the number of elements in the sample (n=1370), the normality of the sample can be assumed on the basis of the central limit theorem. This in turn allows for parametric statistical tests to be carried out and valuable results can be obtained from such a study.

*Table 2/2 Distribution of respondents by number of employees (%)*

Number of employees	CZ	HU	SK	Total
no employees	1.7%	3.8%	7.9%	3.9%
1-9	17.6%	23.0%	42.4%	24.2%
10-49	20.0%	19.0%	22.4%	19.6%
50-249	20.7%	16.5%	17.0%	17.4%
250-499	10.5%	10.2%	3.0%	9.4%
500-1999	12.9%	12.4%	3.0%	11.4%
over 2000	16.6%	15.1%	4.2%	14.1%
Total (100%) n=	295	910	165	1370

*Source: Authors' own compilation*

The organisations in the surveyed countries as a whole represented the largest proportion of organisations with 1-9 employees (24.2%), followed by those with 10-49 employees (19.6%) and those with 50-249 employees (17.4%). Organisations with over 2000 employees were represented by 14.1%, those with 500-1999 employees by 11.4%, those with 250-499 employees by 9.4% and the smallest proportion of organisations with no employees (3.9%).

The distribution of respondents by number of employees varies between countries, with a very small proportion of organisations surveyed in the Czech Republic (1.7%) having no employees, while in Hungary and Slovakia the proportion was higher at 3.8% and 7.9%, respectively. The proportion of organisations with 1-9 employees also varies, with the highest proportion in Slovakia at 42.4%, compared to lower proportions in Hungary (23%) and the Czech Republic (17.6%), while the proportion of organisations with 10-50 employees is very similar in all three countries, with a significant difference in the proportion of organisations with more than 250 employees, where the Czech and Hungarian respondents are over-represented.

## 2.2.2. TURNOVER

Turnover was reported by 1 357 respondents (Table 2/3). Just over half of the respondents have an annual turnover of less than HUF 500 million (or the equivalent in foreign currency), with a further 38.1% having a turnover of between HUF 0.5 and 120 billion. Only 9.4% of firms reported higher turnover. Similar proportions are found in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In Slovakia, the proportion of firms with a high turnover is lower, with 1.8% of the organisations surveyed exceeding the HUF 120 billion revenue category.

Table 2/3 Turnover (%)

Annual budget/revenue in 2022	CZ	HU	SK	Total
< 130 000 € (below 50 million Ft)	22.4%	24.8%	36.8%	25.7%
130 000-260 000 € (51-100 million Ft)	16.3%	9.7%	12.9%	11.5%
261 000-1 301 000 € (101-500 million Ft)	10.5%	16.2%	19.0%	15.3%
1 301 000 – 6.5 million € (501-2.5 bn Ft)	13.9%	15.6%	12.3%	14.8%
6.51-67 million € (2.51-25 bn Ft)	14.6%	14.7%	12.3%	14.4%
67.1-317 million € (25.1-120 bn Ft)	10.9%	9.0%	4.9%	8.9%
> 317 million € (over 100 bn Ft)	11.2%	10.1%	1.8%	9.4%
Total (100%) n=	294	900	163	1357

Source: Authors' own compilation

Among the respondents, the share of enterprises with the lowest turnover (below HUF 50 million) is highest in Slovakia (36.8%), while the share is lower in the Czech Republic and Hungary (22.4% and 24.8% respectively). The share of enterprises with a turnover of HUF 51-100 million is higher in the Czech Republic (16.3%), while it is lower in Slovakia and Hungary (12.9% and 9.7% respectively). For enterprises with a turnover of between HUF 101 and 500 million, Slovakia leads with 19%, followed by Hungary with 16.2% and the Czech Republic with 10.5%. In the turnover categories between HUF 501 million and HUF 25 billion, there are no significant differences between the countries surveyed. In the highest turnover categories, the share of enterprises in the Czech Republic and Hungary is similar (around 10%), while in Slovakia it is significantly lower (4.9% and 1.8% respectively).

## 2.3. MAIN FIELD OF ACTIVITY (BRANCH, INDUSTRY)

Most of our respondents (12.4% combined) work in the wholesale and retail trade category. This proportion is high for all countries surveyed. Slovakia stands out (18.2%), with agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing accounting for 12.1% of respondents. The Czech Republic also has a high proportion of respondents in construction, finance, insurance and agriculture, while a high proportion of Hungarian respondents are active in accommodation, food service, tourism and consultancy.

Table 2/4 Distribution of respondents by field of activity (%)

Field of activity	CZ	HU	SK	Total
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing	7.1%	2.1%	12.1%	4.4%
Mining and quarrying	0.7%	0.5%	0.0%	0.5%
Manufacture of food products, beverages, textiles, wood and paper, tobacco, petroleum and related products	5.4%	5.4%	9.1%	5.8%
Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and pharmaceuticals	0.3%	2.2%	0.0%	1.5%
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, plastics and other non-metallic mineral products	3.7%	2.1%	3.0%	2.6%
Manufacture of computer, electronic and electrical products	2.4%	3.1%	2.4%	2.8%
Manufacture of machinery and equipment	6.8%	2.1%	2.4%	3.1%
Manufacture of transport equipment	4.1%	2.9%	1.2%	2.9%
Other manufacturing	6.8%	1.3%	3.6%	2.8%
Electricity, gas, steam and water supply, waste management	2.0%	2.1%	1.8%	2.0%
Construction	11.9%	5.7%	5.5%	7.0%
Wholesale and retail trade	11.2%	11.8%	18.2%	12.4%
Transport and storage	5.1%	4.3%	7.3%	4.8%
Accommodation, food service and tourism activities	5.1%	8.6%	4.8%	7.4%
Book publishing, broadcasting, motion picture and other media activities	0.7%	1.4%	0.6%	1.2%
Telecommunications, computer and other information service activities	4.1%	3.6%	3.6%	3.7%
Financial and insurance activities	8.1%	5.3%	3.0%	5.6%
Business/management, accounting, bookkeeping and auditing activities, architectural and engineering activities, scientific research and other administrative support service activities	4.7%	9.3%	4.2%	7.7%
Public administration and compulsory social security	3.4%	5.9%	2.4%	5.0%
Education	1.4%	5.8%	6.1%	4.9%
Human health activities, residential care activities, social work activities	2.7%	3.3%	3.6%	3.2%
Law enforcement, defence, disaster management	0.7%	2.7%	0.0%	2.0%
Sports, fitness, recreation and beauty activities	0.3%	1.2%	1.2%	1.0%
Cultural and artistic activities	0.7%	0.8%	1.8%	0.9%
Public transport, passenger transport, air transport	0.0%	1.0%	0.0%	0.7%
Other	0.7%	5.5%	1.8%	4.0%
Total (100%) n=	295	910	165	1370

Source: Authors' own compilation

The sectoral distribution of the proportion of organisations active in each sector differs partly between countries. In the Czech Republic, the highest proportion of organisations from the construction, wholesale and retail trade sectors participated in the survey (11.9%-11.2%), the lowest proportion from the chemical, pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical chemical products and sports, fitness, recreation and beauty services sectors (0.3%) and the lowest proportion from the public transport, passenger transport and air transport sector. In Hungary, as in the total sample, the highest proportion of the total was in Wholesale and retail trade (12.8%), and the lowest in Mining and quarrying (0.5%). In Slovakia, as in the Czech Republic and Hungary, but with a higher share, the overwhelming majority was in the distributive trades sector (18.2%), and Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (12.1%) also had a higher share than in the other two countries. In Slovakia, mining and quarrying; chemicals and pharmaceuticals; police and defence and public transport were not represented at all.

## 2.4. LOCATION OF RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS

The distribution of responding organizations differs between countries (Table 2/5). In the case of the Czech Republic, 29.2% of the organizations and 35.3% in Slovakia came from the capital and central region. In the case of Hungarian respondents, this rate is much higher, exceeding 61%. Although, as we said, our sample is not representative, it still indicates that the country is strongly capital-centric.

*Table 2/5 Distribution of respondents by location (%)*

Regions	CZ	HU	SK	Total
Capital and central regions	29.2%	61.3%	35.3%	51.2%
Other regions of the country	70.8%	38.7%	64.7%	48.8%
Total (100%) n=	291	869	153	1313

*Source: Authors' own compilation*

## 2.5. MARKET RELATIONS

### 2.5.1. IN GENERAL

The examined organizations are primarily present on the national market with their products and services. Overall, approximately a quarter of them offer their products or services on the local market (Table 2/6). Slovakian respondents are overrepresented in the latter market (40%), while the presence at the national level is mostly characterized by Hungarian companies. A fairly high proportion of them carry out business activities that extend beyond national borders. Together, 20.3% of the organizations deliver to the European market, and 17.8% conduct worldwide trade. Foreign activity is mostly characterized by the Czech Republic.

2/6. Table: Main market(s)/territory of the organization's products or services

Main market areas	CZ	HU	SK	Total
Local	23.4%	26.9%	40.0%	27.7%
Regional	31.2%	16.8%	30.9%	21.6%
National	33.2%	41.3%	24.8%	37.6%
European	22.4%	18.2%	27.9%	20.3%
Global	20.3%	18.6%	9.1%	17.8%
Total (100%) n=	295	910	165	1370

Source: Authors' own compilation

### 2.5.2. RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN MARKET RELATIONS

Compared to the previous period, the Russian foreign trade relations of the examined countries decreased by less than half from 2014 (HEPA, 2020a; KSH, 2020; Embassy of Hungary in Moscow, 2022). At that time, the sanctions due to the Russian annexation of Crimea primarily affected imports from Russia, the drop in exports was smaller. Only 4% of all goods imported to Hungary came from Russia in 2019, which further decreased as a result of the pandemic. In the same period, only 1.5% of the total Hungarian exports went to Russia. Although the current war sanctions are more severe, there is no need to expect the relations to drop to zero, because Russian energy sources play a role in the supply of the whole of Europe. It is precisely because of energy sources that the balance of trade in goods is negative from Hungary's point of view. There is a Hungarian export surplus from the other commodity groups, mainly the export of processed products and the health industry to Russia, which amounts to 4-5%.

Ukraine's weight in Hungarian foreign trade is not significant either. Only 1.7% of the total Hungarian foreign trade product turnover is Ukrainian-Hungarian foreign trade product turnover (HEPA, 2020b; Embassy of Ukraine in Hungary, 2022). We export the largest number of machines and transport equipment to Ukraine. This main product group also accounts for the largest share of imports from Ukraine. Ukraine has an export surplus from trade with Hungary only in the field of energy sources. All in all, the war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia as a result will probably not have a significant impact on Hungarian foreign trade in the short term. However, the subsequent transfer effects are still questionable.

The 2/7 and 2/8. tables show the data of the Russian and Ukrainian economic relations of the responding companies.

Some of 18.2% of the responding companies import goods or services from one or both of the warring parties. Organizations dealing with Ukrainian imports are higher for all three examined countries. The Czech Republic stands out, where this rate exceeds 15%.

Table 2/7 Did your organisation import or receive services from the Russian-Ukrainian markets? (%)

Markets	CZ	HU	SK	Total
Russian	11.2%	6.4%	7.3%	7.5%
Ukraine	15.6%	9.2%	9.7%	10.7%
Neither of them	80.3%	87.8%	86.7%	86.1%
Total (100%) n=	295	910	165	1370

Source: Authors' own compilation

The situation is similar for the export of goods and services. Here, 17.7% of companies have Russian and/or Ukrainian business partners. Exports in Ukraine always exceed Russian exports. In the case of the Czech Republic, exports to both countries are higher compared to the other two countries. Comparing exports and imports, the proportion of responding organizations dealing with imports is somewhat higher than that of exporters.

Table 2/8 Did your organisation export to Russian-Ukrainian markets? (%)

Export markets	CZ	HU	SK	Total
Russian	12.2%	6.9%	4.8%	7.8%
Ukraine	14.6%	8.8%	7.9%	9.9%
Neither of them	82.7%	89.2%	90.9%	88.0%
Total (100%) n=	295	910	165	1370

Source: Authors' own compilation

## 2.6. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER TWO

- HEPA. (2020a). Trade and economic country guide Russia. (In Hungarian) [https://hepa.hu/uploads/08e6e7e3a3011c47f-091c483a36888d7012f85f4\\_5f980218f32bc.pdf](https://hepa.hu/uploads/08e6e7e3a3011c47f-091c483a36888d7012f85f4_5f980218f32bc.pdf)
- HEPA. (2020b). Country guide. (In Hungarian) Ukraine. [https://hepa.hu/uploads/364f38ea1e02ff125395ee34e0ba4d1b62f-c2ba3\\_5f805cdb29bee.pdf](https://hepa.hu/uploads/364f38ea1e02ff125395ee34e0ba4d1b62f-c2ba3_5f805cdb29bee.pdf)
- KSH. (2020). Outlook on foreign trade, 2020. (In Hungarian) <https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/kulker/2020/index.html>
- KSH. (2022). Registered economic organizations 2021–2022. (In Hungarian) KSH Statinfo v39. <https://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/haViewer.jsp>
- Magyarország Nagykövetsége Moszkva. (2022). On Hungarian-Russian economic cooperation. (In Hungarian) <https://moszkva.mfa.gov.hu/hun/page/a-magyarorosoz-gazdasagi-egyuettmukoedesrol>
- Marshall, T. (2021). The prisoners of geography. (In Hungarian) Budapest: Park Könyvkiadó.
- Sz. Bíró Z. (2023). Putin's war. (In Hungarian) Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó.
- Ukrajna Magyarországi Nagykövetsége. (2022). Trade and economic relations. (In Hungarian) <https://hungary.mfa.gov.ua/hu/partnership/egyuttmukodes>

## 3. PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR SITUATIONS (TIBOR ZSIGMOND, BEÁTA SZÚCS GÁBORNÉ PATÓ AND SILVIA MOLNÁR)

*„We do not know what type of global order will emerge in the coming years, but we can assume that our world will likely be more divided than it is now.”*

*(Christine Lagarde, 2022)<sup>6</sup>*

### 3.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF PREPAREDNESS

Organizational resilience is a prerequisite for maintaining competitiveness, which prepares market participants to respond effectively to both external and internal challenges. The purpose of this chapter is to show the extent to which the responding organizations have a developed action plan, which serves as a guideline in case of crisis management caused by a war situation.

The leaders of the nation states were still dealing with reversing the losses of human capital caused by Covid-19, as well as developing measures to mitigate the negative economic effects, when the world was faced with another serious challenge. In addition to the humanitarian crisis, Russia's invasion of Ukraine further worsened the short-term prospects for the recovery of the world economy. As Russia, among other things, works through this war to restore the history-beaten Great Russian Empire (Brunk & Hakimi, 2022), an estimated 12 million people have been displaced and another 13 million are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. The war had an immediate global impact on commodity and financial markets and trade relations, the consequences of which were felt by consumers through rising inflation, energy and food prices.

Participants in the industry and trade sector were faced with a drastic increase in the prices of raw materials, basic materials and energy, while trade restrictions in several cases required the immediate transformation of procurement sources and logistics chains (Guénette, Kenworthy, & Wheeler, 2022). Looking at the events of the last few years, we can say that organizations inevitably face external and internal negative effects during their operations that threaten their performance and competitiveness. Interpreted in an organizational context, resilience means that systems and individuals are able to react to disturbances in such a way that they have a minimal negative impact on stability (Linnenluecke, 2015) and, learning from experience, are able to develop situation-specific solutions for later disorders (Lengnick-Hall & Beck), 2005).

<sup>6</sup> Christine Madeleine Odette Lagarde (1956) French politician and economist who was the first female finance minister of France (2007–2011), managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF; 2011–2019) and president of the European Central Bank (2019–).



The scope and impact of the challenges can be local or sector-dependent, such as a decline in demand due to changing trends, product recalls, industrial accidents, or data security incidents, but recently, the appearance of numerous threatening factors that cause worldwide problems has also been observed. Climate change, natural disasters, health pandemics, or terrorism and armed conflicts present challenges to organizations worldwide (Williams et al., 2017). It is the task of researchers and academics to try to understand, describe and explain the nature and impact of current crises, thus helping organizations to develop effective action plans that can be applied in crisis situations. The common characteristic of resilient organizations is a risk-based way of thinking and the ability to adapt to the changing market environment. Management literature divides the dynamics of crisis management into three different stages (Bundy et al., 2017). In the crisis prevention phase, reliable organizations are characterized by a continuous rethinking of formal structures, managerial awareness and pre-developed organizational solutions for low-risk, unexpected events (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). In the second, crisis management stage, strong organizations perceive the crisis not as a threat, but as an opportunity, which opens up space for transforming low-efficiency processes and reducing losses (Kahn et al., 2013). At this stage, individual leadership characteristics come to the fore, so it is important to note that an emotionally-based or reactive leadership attitude can further deepen the crisis (Brockner & James, 2008). The outcome of the third, post-crisis phase is strongly influenced by the course of the previous two phases. On the one hand, learning from a crisis can increase the organization's learning and problem-solving ability and highlight new growth opportunities (James et al., 2011), on the other hand, it prompts increased caution, which reduces innovative thinking and creativity (Haunschild, Polidoro & Chandler, 2015).

According to Herstein et al. (2021), emergency preparedness programmes have evolved a lot over the past decades in accordance with how communities have responded to natural, intentional, and accidental disasters. This development has resulted in a comprehensive, all-hazards approach that spans the entire life cycle of emergency management and includes the following 4 phases: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Mitigation activities prevent the likelihood of an emergency occurring or reduce the impact and severity of an event. Its first step is to assess exposure and vulnerability to potential hazards and threats and consider the direct and indirect effects of hazards on operations. Developing preparedness strategies improves an organization's ability to respond to emergencies, an activity that includes planning, training, and practicing for events that cannot be avoided. An appropriate response to an emergency is aimed at reducing or limiting social and economic damage, which entails recovery efforts aimed at resuming normal or 'new normal' operations.

The degree of preparedness of the responding organizations for war situations can be found in Table 3/1. Examining the organizations of all three countries together, it can be said that only 12.1% of the respondents had an action plan even before the outbreak of the war, of which 5.7% of the organizations had an unchanged form, 6.4% and you can use it after making changes. 12.4% of the respondents did not have an action plan at all before, but in view of the war situation, they prepared one, and another 16.5% of the organizations plan to develop one in the near future. The majority of respondents (59 %) believe that they do not see it necessary to develop an action plan for possible war situations, either now or in the future. Overall, it can be said that the responses were similar for all three countries. In the case of Slovak respondents, the proportion of those who do not have an action plan was slightly higher (18.8% do not have one, but are planning to, while 69.1% do not plan to do so in the future either).

Table 3/1 Existence of a developed action plan for the war situation (%)

Action plan	CZ	HU	SK	Total
There was already one before the current situation, which we use in its unchanged form	3.4%	6.8%	3.6%	5.7%
Existed even before the current war situation, which needed to be amended	5.8%	7.5%	1.2%	6.4%
There was no plan before, but we developed it because of the war situation	11.2%	13.7%	7.3%	12.4%
There is no plan, but we are planning to	16.7%	16.1%	18.8%	16.5%
There is none and we see no need for it	62.9%	55.9%	69.1%	59.0%
Total (100%) n=	294	908	165	1367

Source: Authors' own compilation

Based on data in Table 3/2, 48.5% of the organizations that already have an action plan or would consider it necessary to develop one in the future, would follow the guidelines set by the parent company or the owners, while 51.5% would consider it more appropriate to you develop the plan yourself. In a comparison between countries, Hungarian companies rely mostly on the action plan developed by the parent company (52.6%), while Slovakian companies are the most independent in this respect, 71.1% of them would rather follow their own plan. The individual differences between the countries are only a peculiarity due to the size of the companies in the sample.

Table 3/2 Creator of the action plan for the war situation

Creator of the action plan	CZ	HU	SK	Total
It was/is prepared centrally by the parent company/owner, we follow the guidelines set out therein	44.3%	52.6%	28.9%	48.5%
We developed it ourselves	55.7%	47.4%	71.1%	51.5%
Total (100%) n=	185	610	90	885

Source: Authors' own compilation

## 3.2. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. Bigley, G. A. & Roberts, K. H. (2001). The incident command system: High-reliability organizing for complex and volatile task environments. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44, 1281–1299
2. Brockner, J. B., James, E. H. (2008). Toward an understanding of when executives see opportunity in crisis. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 44, 94-115.
3. Brunk W., I. & Hakimi, M. (2022). RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND THE FUTURE WORLD ORDER. *THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*, 116(4), 687-697.
4. Bundy, J., Pfarrer, M. D., Short, C. E., & Coombs, W. T. (2017). Crises and Crisis Management: Integration, Interpretation, and Research Development. *Journal of Management*, 43(6), 1661–1692
5. Guénette, J-D., Kenworthy, P. & Wheeler, C. (2022). Implications of the War in Ukraine for the Global Economy. *EFI Policy Note 3*, 31 <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099616504292238906/pdf/IDU00bdb5a770659b04adf09e600a2874f25479d.pdf> (Retrieved 13 March 2024)
6. Haunschild, P. R., Polidoro, F. & Chandler, D. (2015). Organizational oscillation between learning and forgetting: The dual role of serious errors. *Organization Science*, 26, 1682–1701
7. Herstein JJ, Schwedhelm MM, Vasa A, Biddinger PD, Hewlett AL. Emergency preparedness: What is the future? *Antimicrobial Stewardship & Healthcare Epidemiology*. 2021;1(1):e29. doi:10.1017/ash.2021.190 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/antimicrobial-stewardship-and-healthcare-epidemiology/article/emergency-preparedness-what-is-the-future/E8FD6EB7BA777355B5DEA41BFAA2E57B> (Retrieved 13 March 2024)
8. James, E. H., Wooten, L. P. & Dushek, K. (2011). Crisis management: Informing a new leadership research agenda. *Academy of Management Annals*, 5, 455-493
9. Kahn, W. A., Barton, M. A. & Fellows, S. (2013). Organizational crises and the disturbance of relational systems. *Academy of Management Review*, 38, 377-396
10. Lengnick-Hall, C. A., & Beck, T. E. (2005). Adaptive fit versus robust transformation: How organizations respond to environmental change. *Journal of Management*, 31(5), 738–757.
11. Linnenluecke, M. K. (2015). Resilience in business and management research: A review of influential publications and a research agenda. *International Journal of Management Reviews*, 19, 4–30.
12. Williams, T. A., Gruber, D. A., Sutcliffe, K. M., Shepherd, D. A., & Zhao, E. Y. (2017). Organizational response to adversity: Fusing crisis management and resilience research streams. *Academy of Management Annals*, 11(2), 733-769.

## 4. EFFECTS OF THE WAR CRISIS ON THE ECONOMY OF THE EXAMINED COUNTRIES IN 2023 (SILVIA TOBIÁS KOSÁR, JÓZSEF BOROS AND KRISZTINA DAJNOKI)

*„The Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) as a whole turned Europe into a complete battlefield. The Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, brought more or less peace until the French Revolution and Napoleon (1789–1815)“.*

*(Kurt Seinitz)<sup>7</sup>*


### 4.1. MACRO LEVEL IMPACTS ON THE ECONOMY AND THE LABOUR MARKET

Amidst the flood of shocks of the past four years, the world economy has proven to be surprisingly resilient (World Bank, 2024). Major economies have mostly emerged unscathed from the fastest rate rises in 40 years – without the usual scars of steep unemployment rates or financial meltdowns. Global inflation was managed without the world falling into recession. However, the weakest global growth performance in half a decade since the 1990s and the awareness of how one in four people in developing countries are poorer than they were before the pandemic is a double whammy. According to the IMF (2024), global growth will remain at 3.1% in 2024 and rise to 3.2% in 2025. In the midst of increased central bank interest rates to fight inflation and high debt levels, the withdrawal of budget subsidies is seriously affecting economic activity. Inflation is falling faster than expected in most regions, amid easing supply-side issues and tight monetary policy. Global headline inflation is expected to decrease to 5.8% in 2024 and 4.4% in 2025.

Examining the price increase of the last 20 years (GKI, 2024), it can be established that in the European Union between 2004 and 2020 we see an average value of 1% per year. In the post-2020 period, supply chain disruptions induced by the Covid-19 pandemic have resulted in rising prices, further exacerbated by the energy crisis stemming from the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict from 2022. Figure 4/1 shows that the price level in the European Union rose by 20% between 2020–2023. The price level of the Visegrád countries has changed to almost the same extent, but above the EU average, and in the case of Hungary, an outstanding price increase of 2.4 times can be realized during the last two decades.

<sup>7</sup> Kurt Seinitz (1947) internationally known Austrian journalist who has been reporting on the world's most famous personalities over the past three decades.

Figure 4/1 Price level changes in the V4 countries, the EU and Romania (2024)



Source: Authors' own editing based on GKI (2024)

Regarding the economic effects caused by the war (Table 4/1), nearly 65% of the surveyed organizations expect inflation above 10% in 2023. Based on the detailed examination results, Hungarian respondents are the most pessimistic, where 18.6% of the surveyed organizations expect inflation above 20%, while this ratio is 9.7% for Slovak respondents and 4.7% for Czech organizations.

The expectations of the responding organizations are significantly more gloomy compared to the 10.27% forecast of the OECD (2022a) and the 11.0-12.6% forecast in the June inflation report of the MNB (2022), as more than a third of the respondents (36.5%) calculates with a value above 15%.

Table 4/1 Expected rate of inflation in 2023 (Question 4.1)

Expected rate of inflation	CZ	HU	SK	Total
below 5%	4.4%	3.4%	1.2%	3.4%
5-10%	23.4%	15.0%	29.1%	18.5%
11-15%	37.3%	24.3%	35.2%	28.4%
16-20%	23.4%	22.7%	15.8%	22.0%
above 20%	4.7%	18.6%	9.7%	14.5%
I do not know	6.8%	16.0%	9.1%	13.2%
Total (100%) n=	295	908	165	1368

Source: Authors' own compilation

Czech GDP growth is expected to gradually recover (EC, 2024a), to 1.1% in 2024 and 2.8% in 2025. Economic growth can be supported by the high savings rate experienced by households in the last three years, the predicted easing of inflation and the rise of real wages, as well as the further easing of financing conditions. However, recent consumer and business confidence indicators are still below historical averages, indicating that private demand is only gradually returning to higher growth rates. Despite the tight financing conditions,

investments continued to grow, which is also due to increasing state investments supported by EU funds and equipment investments, while housing construction activity, on the other hand, remained depressed. The revival of domestic demand, the easing of financing conditions and the acceleration of the implementation of the RRF towards the end of 2024 and in 2025 may support the revival of investment growth. In contrast, net exports are likely to contribute less to GDP growth over the forecast horizon than in 2022 and 2023, as the pick-up in external demand (especially in the automotive industry) will be slower than import growth driven by domestic demand. The relatively high degree of trade openness and energy intensity of the Czech economy still pose downside risks in the event of a possible disruption of global raw material or energy supply chains.

The Hungarian economy is expected to gradually pick up in 2024-25 based on the forecast of the European Commission (EC, 2024b), GDP growth will accelerate to 2.4% in 2024 and 3.6% in 2025, which is supported by falling inflation and interest rates over the forecast horizon. Household income was significantly boosted by the 15% increase in the minimum wage implemented in December 2023, and employment also stabilized, the unemployment rate was 4.2% in December. Rising real incomes and improving consumer confidence are forecast to boost household consumption. New FDI projects are expected to boost exports during the forecast period. Hungary's economic prospects remain sensitive to global investor sentiment. The country is also particularly vulnerable to energy price changes and potential supply disruptions, as it is highly dependent on energy imports and has limited opportunities to diversify imports in the short term.

Slovak economic growth slowed in 2023 due to the decline in private and public consumption (EC, 2024c). The weakening economic prospects of the country's main export destinations resulted in a decrease in exports and imports, accompanied by a depletion of stocks. Real GDP is estimated to have grown by 1.1% in 2023, slightly below the autumn forecast. Looking to the future, the rise in real wages may provide further stimulus to private consumption, as government measures are expected to protect consumers from the impact of high energy prices in 2024 as well. The increase in real incomes will probably extend to 2025 as well. Exports are expected to increase over the forecast horizon as the economic situation of major export destination countries is expected to improve. The use of EU funds in 2024 and 2025 will greatly contribute to the growth of investments. Financing conditions are expected to ease further over the forecast horizon, but remain relatively tight, which somewhat restrains private investment. In light of all of this, economic growth is forecast at 2.3% in 2024 and 2.6% in 2025.

Based on the data in Table 4/2, almost one-third (31.4%) of the responding organizations believed that an upswing in the domestic economy is expected within 2 years. 25.8% of the respondents predicted a protracted economic downturn, according to them, economic growth is not expected in the examined countries in 5 years or within the foreseeable future. Respondents from Slovak organizations are the most pessimistic, where this rate is 30.3%, i.e. almost every third respondent expects a recovery after 5 years or more.

Table 4/2 Expected period of economic recovery in the examined countries in 2023 or after (%)

Expected recovery	CZ	HU	SK	Total
There will be no recovery anytime soon	3.7%	12.6%	12.1%	10.6%
in 1 year	6.5%	7.1%	5.5%	6.7%
In 1-2 years	25.9%	23.6%	28.5%	24.7%
In 3-4 years	33.0%	20.9%	22.4%	23.7%
approx. 5 years later	12.2%	7.1%	9.7%	8.5%
After more than 5 years, only recovery is expected	3.7%	7.4%	8.5%	6.7%
I do not know	15.0%	21.3%	13.3%	19.0%
Total (100%) n=	294	905	165	1364

Source: Authors' own compilation

Examining the results of growth prospects, it can be concluded (Table 4/3) that 16.5% of all responding organizations believe there will be no change. 45.3% of respondents expect a decrease, while 23.2% forecast an increase. Looking at the results per country, Czech respondents are the most optimistic, i.e. every third respondent (33.2%) expects slight or greater growth, while this proportion is the lowest among Hungarian respondents (19.7%), i.e. only every fifth respondent expects slight or greater growth. 15% of the respondents responded that they could not judge the development of growth prospects.

Table 4/3 Growth prospects in the examined countries in 2023 (%)

Growth prospects	CZ	HU	SK	Total
A significant decrease is expected	5.1%	17.7%	22.6%	15.6%
A slight decrease is expected	31.9%	29.2%	28.7%	29.7%
There will be no change	20.0%	16.0%	12.8%	16.5%
A slight increase is expected	30.8%	15.7%	22.6%	19.8%
More growth is expected	2.4%	4.0%	1.8%	3.4%
I do not know	9.8%	17.4%	11.6%	15.0%
Total (100%) n=	295	904	164	1363

Source: Authors' own compilation

Lim et al. (2022) found that the war in Ukraine could have a negative impact on businesses through limited access to funds, reduced purchasing power, increased inflation rates, and threats to sustainable growth and restrictions on trade due to sanctions. It was also noted that the recent Covid-19 crisis, also caused by non-economic factors, particularly affected small businesses, which experienced a rapid decline in profitability, coupled with difficulties in adjusting costs quickly enough (ECB, 2022). According to the results of Prohorovs (2022), as a result of the shocks in the economy, the majority of companies have faced or will face at least two big problems at the same time, which put pressure on corporate income and profits. First of all, the decrease in sales volume and margin in itself leads to a decrease in income, and a parallel increase in tax, raw material and overhead costs occurs. A significant decrease in revenues combined with a significant increase in costs leads to a large decrease in profits and/or an increase in losses for many companies.

Based on the aggregated responses of the organizations in our sample, the war in Ukraine does not clearly represent an advantage or a disadvantage, i.e. an increase or a decrease in sales revenue for the respondents along the same lines (Table 4/4). As a result of the negative consequences of the war activity, about 34% of all respondents predict a negative trend (some decrease in sales revenue) and 28.9% rather expect an increase. As the 'language of the balance sheet', 16.3% of the organizations do not expect a significant change in their sales as a result of the war, while 20.9% of the respondents cannot judge what to expect.

Examining the detailed country-by-country data, almost half of the Slovak respondents (47.9%) expect a decrease, of which 15.8% forecast a decrease of more than 10%. Among Hungarian respondents, on average, every third respondent (32.4%) expects a drop in organizational sales, of which 9.8% expect a drop of more than 10%. 30.8% of the respondents of organizations in the Czech Republic expect a decrease in sales, while only 5.4% expect a decline of more than 10%. 14.4% of Hungarian organizations expect sales revenue to remain unchanged, while 17% of Slovak respondents and 22% of Czech organizations believe that their sales revenue will remain practically unchanged. In accordance with the above, the respondents of Czech organizations are the most optimistic, 34.5% of them expect growth, the largest proportion (16.3%) puts the rate of growth between 5-10%. 24.8% of Slovak organizations plan to grow, more than half of them (14.5%) calculate a growth of 5-10%. Only 23.5% of the responding organizations in Hungary believe in growth, with the largest proportion expecting an increase of 5-10%.

Table 4/4 Expected increase/decrease in the organization's sales revenue in the examined countries in 2023


Changes in sales revenue	CZ	HU	SK	Total
A decrease of more than 10%	5.4%	9.8%	15.8%	9.6%
A reduction of between 5% and 10%	12.5%	13.9%	24.8%	14.9%
A decrease of less than 5%	12.9%	8.7%	7.3%	9.5%
0% - practically unchanged	22.0%	14.4%	17.0%	16.3%
An increase of less than 5%	11.5%	8.6%	7.3%	9.1%
An increase of between 5-10%	16.3%	10.8%	14.5%	12.5%
An increase of between 11-15%	4.7%	4.1%	1.2%	3.9%
An increase of over 15%	2.0%	4.1%	1.8%	3.4%
I do not know	12.5%	25.5%	10.3%	20.9%
Total (100%) n=	295	905	165	1365

Source: Authors' own compilation



In the European Union and the euro area, the unemployment rate remained at a record low level of 5.9% and 6.4% respectively in December 2023 (OECD, 2024b). Among the examined countries (Figure 4/2), Slovakia and the Czech Republic experienced a continuous decrease from the beginning of the 2000s until the economic crisis of 2008, after which the unemployment rate rose until the first quarter of 2010, and then gradually decreased until the middle of 2020. until the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. In recent years, a relatively stable value (between 5-6% in the case of Slovakia and around 2-3% in the case of the Czech Republic) has been observed. Regarding Hungary, we can see an increasing trend between 2004–2010, and then a continuous decrease until the second quarter of 2020. Since the pandemic, the Hungarian unemployment rate has been between 3.5-4.5%.

Figure 4/2 Quarterly evolution of the unemployment rate in the examined countries and the European Union (2004–2023, in %)



Source: Authors' own editing based on OECD (2024a).

During the research, we asked how the leaders of the responding organizations see the development of unemployment in the period under review (Table 4/5). According to a quarter of respondents (25%), the unemployment rate will remain at the level of 2022, while a larger proportion of respondents think it will rise slightly or significantly (43.3%), while 22.3% believe that it will rise slightly, or a significant decrease is expected. 9.4% of the respondents responded that they could not assess the trend of unemployment.

Analysing the distributions by country, it can be established that 27.5% of the respondents of organizations in the Czech Republic believe that the unemployment rate will not change compared to the year 2022. The largest proportion of respondents trust in a small increase (36.9%). Every fourth of the heads of organizations in Hungary believed (25.2%) that the unemployment rate would remain at the level of 2022. 33.3% trust in a small increase, while 16.4% forecast a small decrease. 22.4% of the respondents of Slovak organizations expect a small decrease, 19.4% say it will remain at the 2022 level, while 32.1% expect a smaller increase.


Table 4/5 Trends in unemployment in the examined countries in 2023

Changes in the rate of unemployment	CZ	HU	SK	Total
It will decrease significantly compared to 2022	1.4%	3.4%	5.5%	3.2%
It will decrease slightly compared to 2022	25.4%	16.4%	22.4%	19.1%
It will remain at the 2022 level	27.5%	25.2%	19.4%	25.0%
It will increase slightly compared to 2022	36.9%	33.3%	32.1%	33.9%
Compared to the year 2022, it will increase significantly	6.1%	9.9%	12.1%	9.4%
I do not know	2.7%	11.7%	8.5%	9.4%
Total (100%) n=	295	907	165	1367

Source: Authors' own compilation

In the European Union, the consumer price of food in April 2023 was on average almost 17 percent higher than a year earlier, which means a slight slowdown compared to the previous month, which marked the fastest growth rate in more than two and a half decades (Nelson, 2023). And with rising labour costs and the potential for profit margins, it is unlikely that food prices will drop anytime soon. The United Nations' global index of food commodities, such as wheat, meat and vegetable oil, peaked in March 2022, just after Russia invaded Ukraine, one of the biggest grain producers. The war disrupted grain and oil production in the region and had a global impact, exacerbating food crises in parts of East Africa and the Middle East. In the case of the examined countries, it is clearly visible (Figure 4/3) that the change in food prices compared to the previous year peaked in the first months of 2023 after the Russian-Ukrainian war. In the case of Hungary, in the months of December 2022 and January 2023, an increase of around 50% was measured compared to the year before. Slovakia had the highest monthly growth level of 30%, while the Czech Republic had around 28%. In the mentioned period, the average increase in food prices in the European Union was around 20%.

Figure 4/3 Average change in food prices (January 2018 – January 2024) in the examined countries and the European Union



Source: Authors' own editing based on Eurostat (2024a).

The results above are also confirmed by the opinion of the organizations included in the sample, according to which a significant increase in food prices is expected due to the war (Table 4/6). Almost a third of the responding organizations (29.6%) forecast an increase of over 20%, according to their experience, 22% expect the increase to be between 16-20%, while 22.1% of the respondents put this rate between 11-15%. 2.2% of the respondents are optimistic, they believe in a food price increase of just under 5%, while 7.9% answered that they could not judge.

Analysing the results per country, it can be concluded that the respondents of organizations in the Czech Republic expect a smaller price increase, more than 60% of the respondents expect a food price increase of less than 15%. Among Slovak respondents, the distribution is proportional, 47.2% expect an increase of less than 15%, while 50.3% of them forecast a price increase of more than 20%. The respondents of Hungarian organizations are the most pessimistic, 57.4% of the respondents expect food prices to rise by 16-20% or more.


Table 4/6 The increase in food prices due to the war for the entire year 2023 in the examined countries (%)

Rising food prices	CZ	HU	SK	Total
It will be below 5%	3.4%	1.9%	1.8%	2.2%
It will be between 5-10%	26.8%	11.6%	22.4%	16.2%
It will be between 11-15%	31.5%	18.9%	23.0%	22.1%
It will be between 16-20%	19.0%	23.0%	21.8%	22.0%
It will be above 20%	15.6%	34.4%	28.5%	29.6%
I do not know	3.7%	10.3%	2.4%	7.9%
Total (100%) n=	295	907	165	1367

Source: Authors' own compilation

Figure 4/4 shows the aggregated (annual) flow data of the domestic market of the main industrial groups. In most areas, prices were relatively stable. However, producer prices for energy are very volatile and react much more strongly in times of crisis. Figure 4/4 also shows that the unprecedented increase in producer prices between May 2020 and September 2022 was largely due to the rise in energy prices (Eurostat 2024b).

Figure 4/4 Changes in domestic industrial producer prices in the European Union – overall and by main industrial groups (2015–2023)



Source: Eurostat (2024b)

Analysing the likely economic and financial effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the respondents see the expected rise in raw material prices as follows (Table 4/7). One-fifth of the respondents (20.3%) optimistically think of an increase in raw material prices of less than 10%. Almost half of the respondents (45.5%) expect an increase between 11 and 20%, while a quarter (25.5%) predict a more significant increase of over 20%.

Based on the detailed results by country, the respondents from the Czech Republic are the most optimistic, 31.6% of them plan for an increase in raw material prices below 10%, more than half of the respondents (50.6%) expect an increase of between 11-20%, while 12.9% think there will be an increase in raw material prices of over 20%. 25.6% of managers of Slovak organizations plan a price increase of less than 10%, 42.7% forecast an increase of between 11-20%, while 27.4% say that a price increase of more than 20% is expected in 2023. Hungarian respondents judged the situation due to the war to be the gloomiest. According to 15.6% of the respondents, the increase in raw material prices will be less than 10%, 44.2% expect an increase between 11-20% and 29.2% believe that due to the war, the increase will be over 20% in 2023 an increase is expected.


Table 4/7 Increase in commodity prices due to the war in 2023

Increase in commodity prices	CZ	HU	SK	Total
It will be below 5%	4.4%	2.8%	4.3%	3.3%
It will be between 5-10%	27.2%	12.8%	21.3%	17.0%
It will be between 11-15%	28.2%	20.2%	24.4%	22.5%
It will be between 16-20%	22.4%	24.0%	18.3%	23.0%
It will be above 20%	12.9%	29.2%	27.4%	25.5%
I do not know	4.8%	11.0%	4.3%	8.8%
Total (100%) n=	294	904	164	1362

Source: Authors' own compilation

The European Union is catching up to its digital lag against the United States (EIB, 2023). More than half of the European companies (Figure 4/5) invested in digitization during the Covid-19 pandemic, and they caught up faster with their American counterparts in terms of introducing advanced digital technologies. However, despite progress, Europe is not well positioned for digital innovation and is at risk of becoming dependent on many critical technologies. Based on the results of Revoltella and his co-authors (2020), company size plays a key role in the adoption of advanced digital technologies. 80% of companies employing more than 250 people use advanced digital technologies, while 45% of companies employing less than ten people do. This disparity is likely to slow down digital transformation. The difference in adoption rates is particularly marked for advanced robotics, supporting the idea that certain technologies have significant integration costs and that large companies are more likely to adopt these technologies (Acemoglu et al., 2022).

Figure 4/5 EIBIS Corporate Digitization Index (2022)



Source: EIB (2023).

Therefore, it is important to know whether domestic enterprises consider ‘better’ or ‘faster’ more important: how they relate to technological developments as a result of the war. Table 4/7 illustrates the research results. It can be concluded that the picture is positive for almost a third of the respondents, as 29.9% of the respondents see that technological developments can still be encouraged with support. However, the majority indicates that the developments are slowing down (45.5%), mostly lagging behind (18.9%), or failing (3.3%), and cannot even be implemented with support (2.4%). At the same time, the relatively low percentage of failure gives reason for confidence.

Table 4/8 Decline and lack of technological developments in enterprises due to the war

Lack of development	CZ	HU	SK	Total
they failed	3.4%	2.8%	5.5%	3.3%
they mostly fall short	17.0%	19.0%	22.1%	18.9%
they are slowing down; their implementation is delayed by years	39.1%	48.5%	39.9%	45.5%
they can still be encouraged with support	37.4%	28.3%	25.2%	29.9%
they cannot be implemented with support either	3.1%	1.3%	7.4%	2.4%
Total (100%) n=	294	896	163	1353

Source: Authors' own compilation

The results of the detailed investigations by country show that, similar to the previous results, the managers of organizations in the Czech Republic are the most optimistic. According to 37.4% of respondents, technological developments can still be encouraged with support, while 39.1% think that developments are slowing down. 28.3% of the heads of Hungarian organizations believe that technological development is stimulated by support, but at the same time, almost half of the respondents (48.5%) believe that technological development slows down because of the war, that their implementation is delayed for years or fails (19%). Examining the responses of Slovak organizations, it can be concluded that according to every fourth respondent (25.2%) development can still be encouraged with support, but most of them see that development is slowing down (39.9%) and mostly falling behind (22.1%).

## 4.2. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. Acemoglu, D., Anderson, G., Beede, D., Buffington, C., Childress, E., Dinlersoz, E., Foster, L., Goldschlag, N., Haltiwanger, J., Kroff, Z., Restrepo, P. and Zolas, N. (2022). Automation and the workforce: A firm-level view from the 2019 Annual Business Survey. NBER Working Paper No. 30659. <https://blueprintcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Blueprint-Discussion-Paper-2022.16-Acemoglu-Et-Al..pdf>. (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
2. EC (2024a). Economic forecast for Czechia. [https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/czechia/economic-forecast-czechia\\_en?prefLang=hu](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/czechia/economic-forecast-czechia_en?prefLang=hu). (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
3. EC (2024b). Economic forecast for Hungary. [https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/hungary/economic-forecast-hungary\\_en?prefLang=hu](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/hungary/economic-forecast-hungary_en?prefLang=hu) (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
4. EC (2024c). Economic forecast for Slovakia. [https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/slovakia/economic-forecast-slovakia\\_en?prefLang=hu](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/slovakia/economic-forecast-slovakia_en?prefLang=hu). (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
5. ECB (2022). Assessing Corporate Vulnerabilities in the Euro Area. [https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2022/html/ecb.ebart202202\\_02~7a61e442be.en.html](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2022/html/ecb.ebart202202_02~7a61e442be.en.html). (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
6. EIB (2023). Digitalisation in Europe 2022–2023. Evidence from the EIB Investment Survey. [https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20230112\\_digitalisation\\_in\\_europe\\_2022\\_2023\\_en.pdf](https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20230112_digitalisation_in_europe_2022_2023_en.pdf). (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
7. Eurostat (2024a). Food price monitoring tool – Price trends along the food supply chain. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/web-site/economy/food-price-monitoring/>. (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
8. Eurostat (2024b). Industrial producer price index overview. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Industrial\\_producer\\_price\\_index\\_overview#Role\\_of\\_the\\_industrial\\_producer\\_price\\_index](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Industrial_producer_price_index_overview#Role_of_the_industrial_producer_price_index). (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
9. GKI (2024). Hungary 20 years in the EU: how prices have changed?. (In Hungarian) <https://gki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/A%C3%81rszint-va%C3%81ltoza%C3%81sa-2024-02.pdf>. (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
10. IMF (2024). World Economic Outlook Update, Januar 2024 – Moderating Inflation and Steady Growth Open Path to Soft Landing. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2024/01/30/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2024>. (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
11. Lim, W. M., Chin, M. W. C., Ee, Y. S., Fung, C. Y., Giang, C. S., Heng, K. S., Kong, M. L. F., Lim, A. S. S., Lim, B. C. Y., Lim, Lim, T. Y., Ling, C. C., Mandrinos, S., Nwobodo, S., Phang, C. S. C., She, L., Sim, C. H., Su, C. H., Su, S. I., Wee, G. W. E., Weissmann, M. A. (2022). What is at stake in a war? A prospective evaluation of the Ukraine and Russia conflict for business and society. *Global Business and Organizational Excellence*, 1–14. DOI: 10.1002/joe.22162
12. MNB (2022). Inflation Report June 2022. (In Hungarian) <https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/hun-ir-digitalis-14.pdf>.
13. Nelson, E. (2023). Why Are Food Prices So High in Europe?. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/30/business/europe-food-prices-inflation.html>. (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
14. OECD (2022). Economic Outlook 111 database. <https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=EO>. (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
15. OECD (2024a). OECD Data Explorer – (DSD\_LFS@DF\_IALFS\_UNE\_M) Monthly unemployment rates. [https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?df\(ds\)=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df\(id\)=DSD\\_LFS%40DF\\_IALFS\\_UNE\\_M&df\(ag\)=OECD.SDD.TPS&df\(vs\)=1.0&pd=2004-Q1%2C2024-Q1&dq=SVK%2BEU27\\_2020%2BHUN%2BCZE...\\_Z.Y.\\_T.Y\\_GE15..Q&ly\(rw\)=REF\\_AREA&ly\(cl\)=TIME\\_PERIOD&to\(TIME\\_PERIOD\)=false&vw=tb&lb=bt](https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?df(ds)=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df(id)=DSD_LFS%40DF_IALFS_UNE_M&df(ag)=OECD.SDD.TPS&df(vs)=1.0&pd=2004-Q1%2C2024-Q1&dq=SVK%2BEU27_2020%2BHUN%2BCZE..._Z.Y._T.Y_GE15..Q&ly(rw)=REF_AREA&ly(cl)=TIME_PERIOD&to(TIME_PERIOD)=false&vw=tb&lb=bt). (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
16. OECD (2024b). Unemployment Rates, OECD – Updated: February 2024. <https://www.oecd.org/employment/unemployment-rates-oecd-updated-february-2024.htm>. (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
17. Prohorovs, A. (2022). Russia’s War in Ukraine: Consequences for European Countries’ Businesses and Economies. *Journal of Risk and Financial Management*, 15, 295, 1-15.. DOI: 10.3390/jrfm15070295
18. Revoltella, D., Rückert, D. & Weiss, C. (2020). Adoption of digital technologies by firms in Europe and the US. <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/adoption-digital-technologies-firms-europe-and-us-evidence-eib-investment-survey>. (Retrieved 10 March 2024)
19. World Bank (2024). Global Economic Prospects January 2024. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/7fe97e0a-52c5-4655-9207-c176eb9fb66a/content>. (Retrieved 10 March 2024)

## 5. ECONOMIC AND LABOUR MARKET EFFECTS ON THE RESPONDENTS' ORGANIZATIONS (TIBOR ZSIGMOND, ZSOLT KŐMÜVES AND LÁSZLÓ PÁLMAI)

„According to the latest demographic data, the number of residents of full or partial Ukrainian nationality is 1.2 million in the USA, 961 thousand in Canada. A very significant Ukrainian diaspora lives in North American cities such as New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Toronto, Edmonton and Winnipeg”.

Serhy Yekelchyk (2023:23)<sup>8</sup>

### 5.1. THE EFFECT OF WAR ON ORGANIZATION AND BUSINESS

In our research, we investigated the operational dimension in which the responding organizations feel the impact of the armed conflict. Regarding this, we sought answers in 12+1 categories in our questionnaire (Table 5/1).

Table 5/1 The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on organization/business in 2023 (%)

	The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on your organization/business in 2023		Not typical at all	Rather not typical	Both typical and not typical (neutral)	Rather typical	Very typical	I do not know	N=
1.	There is a shortage of raw materials and spare parts on our domestic market due to the war	CZ	20.7%	19.7%	23.1%	23.1%	7.1%	6.1%	294
		HU	26.3%	17.1%	19.6%	18.9%	6.2%	11.8%	904
		SK	27.3%	11.5%	21.8%	17.6%	15.2%	6.7%	165
		Total	25.2%	17.0%	20.6%	19.7%	7.5%	10.0%	1363
2.	There is a shortage of raw materials and spare parts on our foreign market due to the war	CZ	21.0%	16.9%	24.4%	22.4%	10.8%	4.4%	295
		HU	26.7%	12.4%	17.7%	17.8%	6.3%	19.1%	900
		SK	19.5%	10.4%	20.1%	20.1%	15.9%	14.0%	164
		Total	24.6%	13.2%	19.4%	19.1%	8.5%	15.3%	1359
3.	Threat due to supply (lack) of energy carriers	CZ	14.9%	19.0%	24.4%	25.4%	12.9%	3.4%	295
		HU	19.2%	15.6%	20.5%	22.1%	10.0%	12.6%	902
		SK	16.4%	10.9%	23.6%	22.4%	21.2%	5.5%	165
		Total	17.9%	15.8%	21.7%	22.8%	12.0%	9.8%	1362
4.	Increase in purchase prices due to the war	CZ	6.2%	8.9%	18.2%	34.6%	28.1%	4.1%	292
		HU	9.1%	7.9%	15.0%	33.0%	25.9%	9.1%	900
		SK	4.8%	14.5%	9.7%	24.2%	43.0%	3.6%	165
		Total	8.0%	8.9%	15.0%	32.3%	28.4%	7.4%	1357

<sup>8</sup> Serhy Yekelchyk (1966) professor of Canadian history and Slavik studies at Victoria Univeristy.

	The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on your organization/business in 2023		Not typical at all	Rather not typical	Both typical and not typical (neutral)	Rather typical	Very typical	I do not know	N=
5.	General labour shortage due to the war	CZ	24.2%	32.8%	22.9%	10.6%	4.4%	5.1%	293
		HU	26.6%	25.8%	20.7%	12.8%	4.4%	9.7%	899
		SK	36.6%	18.9%	23.2%	9.8%	5.5%	6.1%	164
		Total	27.3%	26.5%	21.5%	11.9%	4.6%	8.3%	1356
6.	Lack of qualified specialists due to the war	CZ	27.8%	35.6%	21.0%	7.8%	3.4%	4.4%	295
		HU	29.6%	23.9%	18.2%	12.1%	5.3%	10.8%	898
		SK	39.4%	18.8%	17.6%	9.7%	5.5%	9.1%	165
		Total	30.4%	25.8%	18.7%	10.9%	4.9%	9.2%	1358
7.	Threat to the stability of our work/service processes	CZ	21.1%	29.6%	28.6%	11.6%	3.7%	5.4%	294
		HU	24.4%	19.6%	22.8%	17.9%	6.0%	9.3%	904
		SK	28.5%	19.4%	16.4%	20.6%	8.5%	6.7%	165
		Total	24.2%	21.7%	23.3%	16.9%	5.8%	8.1%	1363
8.	The stability and performance of our suppliers has changed due to the war	CZ	15.0%	21.8%	28.6%	23.1%	7.8%	3.7%	294
		HU	19.9%	16.3%	20.9%	21.7%	10.2%	11.0%	903
		SK	15.8%	18.8%	22.4%	18.2%	17.6%	7.3%	165
		Total	18.4%	17.8%	22.8%	21.6%	10.6%	9.0%	1362
9.	The negative effect of the change in the exchange rate of the domestic currency	CZ	8.1%	15.9%	34.6%	23.1%	11.9%	6.4%	295
		HU	7.1%	7.1%	16.4%	29.6%	29.9%	9.9%	899
		SK	15.9%	12.8%	23.8%	18.9%	20.7%	7.9%	164
		Total	8.4%	9.7%	21.2%	26.9%	24.9%	8.9%	1358
10.	Difficulties arising from the employment of refugee workers	CZ	22.4%	25.8%	21.4%	14.2%	9.2%	7.1%	295
		HU	35.0%	16.6%	16.4%	11.5%	6.4%	14.2%	904
		SK	29.1%	9.1%	17.0%	14.5%	11.5%	18.8%	165
		Total	31.5%	17.7%	17.5%	12.5%	7.6%	13.2%	1364
11.	Benefits of employing refugee workers	CZ	22.9%	17.8%	30.5%	14.7%	6.8%	7.2%	292
		HU	34.8%	18.0%	20.8%	8.8%	3.0%	14.6%	899
		SK	33.5%	8.5%	20.1%	9.1%	6.1%	22.6%	164
		Total	32.1%	16.8%	22.8%	10.1%	4.2%	13.9%	1355
12.	Lack of planned/started technological and IT development	CZ	20.3%	20.3%	33.2%	11.2%	4.7%	10.2%	295
		HU	24.0%	17.4%	22.5%	17.8%	5.9%	12.4%	901
		SK	26.2%	17.1%	21.3%	13.4%	7.3%	14.6%	164
		Total	23.5%	18.0%	24.7%	15.8%	5.8%	12.2%	1360



	The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on your organization/business in 2023		Not typical at all	Rather not typical	Both typical and not typical (neutral)	Rather typical	Very typical	I do not know	N=
13.	The consequences of the coronavirus situation are still a bigger problem for us than the Russian-Ukrainian war	CZ	18.0%	15.0%	28.6%	18.0%	12.6%	7.8%	294
		HU	23.4%	16.2%	21.7%	16.1%	10.6%	12.1%	903
		SK	23.6%	17.6%	24.8%	12.1%	12.1%	9.7%	165
		Total	22.2%	16.1%	23.6%	16.0%	11.2%	10.9%	1362
14.	Other	CZ	19.7%	6.6%	18.2%	3.0%	1.0%	51.5%	198
		HU	18.6%	4.0%	11.1%	4.2%	2.3%	59.9%	479
		SK	13.6%	2.3%	4.5%	2.3%	4.5%	72.7%	88
		Total	18.3%	4.4%	12.2%	3.7%	2.2%	59.2%	765

Source: Authors' own compilation

If the three countries are examined together, it can be stated that the most endangered areas are '4. Increase in purchase prices due to the war' (28.4% – largely typical) and '9. The negative effect of the change in the exchange rate of the domestic currency' (24.9%). In the case of Hungary, this is supported by the daily economic events that the forint/euro exchange rate climbed to a historical peak of over HUF 400 (MNB, 2022) by July 2022 (1 EUR – 401.59 HUF), and in this period inflation, i.e. the extent of the sustained increase in the price level also approached 10%, despite the fact that the government implemented price freezes in many areas (e.g. fuel, basic food products, etc.) (Government of Hungary, 2022). The forint exchange rate began to improve during the year 2023, but it was still necessary to pay HUF 370-390 for 1 euro. At the beginning of 2024, a spectacular deterioration occurred again in terms of the forint (Portfolió, 2024).

Observing the individual countries, it can be stated that in all three cases the '4. Increase in purchase prices due to the war' option was considered the most critical. At the same time, in the case of Slovakia, the proportion of those marking the answer 'Typical to a great extent' was exceptionally high compared to the other countries (Czech Republic 28.1%, Hungary 25.9%, Slovakia 43.0%).

Based on our available data, the threat related to the lack of energy carriers (see Question 3, 12.0%) and the fear of supplier stability/performance (Question 8, 10.6%) can also be considered significant. It is still true that the current situation of the Hungarian government bears some resemblance to the Kállay cabinet that reigned in World War II (Németh, 2020). As a member of the European Union, it is our duty to introduce sanctions against the attacking party, but Hungary's energy supply goals must also be taken into account.

In the case of Hungary, there is no change in the 2 most critical areas ('4. Increase in purchase prices due to the war' and '9. Negative effect of the exchange rate change of the domestic currency'). It is interesting that although the Czech Republic also has its own currency (Czech crown), it only came in third place in the '9. The negative effect of the change in the exchange rate of the domestic currency', because only 11.9% marked the option 'Highly characteristic'. In their case, '3. "Threat due to the supply (lack) of energy carriers' came in second place (12.9% 'Highly typical'). In the case of Slovakia, this option also came in second place (21.2%).

On the other hand, it can be stated that – although the war in general increases business risk and uncertainty – the respondents of the three countries basically do not expect benefits from refugee labour (question 11, 32.1% – not typical at all), nor do refugees to difficulties arising from his employment (question 10, 31.5%). In other words, the incoming extra workforce can probably be absorbed by the economy struggling with labour shortages, but the respondents will not benefit significantly from this. One of the difficulties is that newly

arrived employees have to be trained even in physical jobs. Companies can only solve this with the help of some intermediary language, since the number of people living and speaking Ukrainian in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia is low. According to the data of the latest 2011 census, in addition to 4,390 residents of Ukrainian descent, only 4,392 Hungarian citizens spoke the Ukrainian language (KSH, 2011).

It seems that the companies are not particularly afraid of the coronavirus either (question 13, according to 22.2% of them this is not typical at all), and for the time being they do not assume a shortage of raw materials and spare parts on the foreign and domestic markets (Question 1, 25.2%, Question 2, 24.6% is the proportion of answers that are not typical at all), and they do not expect an extreme labour shortage either (Question 5, 27.3%, Question 6, 30.4%).

If we examine each country separately, it can be said that there are no major differences in which effects are considered to be the most negligible (in the case of all three countries, for Options "5", "6", "10" and "11", most people indicated the 'Not typical at all' option).

## 5.2. ASSESSING THE CHANGE POSSIBILITIES INHERENT IN WAR

We can state that there is a double effect in relation to the fact that domestic companies are trying to protect themselves from the unfavourable business environment caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war by making defensive organizational changes that take ethical considerations into account in the short term, or rather they see the situation as an offensive business opportunity (Table 5/2). In this case, this raises self-preservation versus business ethics considerations of change/crisis management. This business attitude related to change management can often be expressed as 'If it happened like this once...' or 'Let us get the best out of the given situation!'.

Table 5/2 Crisis as an opportunity at the organizational level

	1 (do not agree at all)	2	3	4 (agree and disagree (neutral))	5	6	7 (completely agree)	Mean	N=
CZ	19.0%	13.9%	19.7%	30.2%	12.5%	3.4%	1.4%	3.19	295
HU	18.1%	11.2%	14.8%	28.5%	16.2%	6.4%	4.8%	3.52	901
SK	28.7%	12.8%	15.2%	29.3%	9.1%	2.4%	2.4%	2.95	164
Total	19.6%	12.0%	15.9%	29.0%	14.6%	5.3%	3.8%	3.38	1360

Source: Authors' own compilation

If we look at the average of 3.38 of the entire population, it is a lower value compared to the neutral value of 4 (both agree and disagree), representing the 'rather disagree' category. In other words, the responding domestic organizations prefer not to consider the crisis caused by the war as an opportunity for their organization, and only a smaller proportion (23.7%) see it as an opportunity that can be exploited to a greater or lesser extent (Options 5, 6 and 7 combined). The reason for this obviously stems from the organizational behaviour that strives for stability, which wants to suggest security to the owners, employees, suppliers and the customer market.

On the other hand, this defensive organizational behaviour can be called a short-term "postponing" change management tactic, when organizations try to survive the events taking place above them like a snail crawling into its house. All of this is reinforced by the significant proportion of those who clearly reject the use of the opportunities inherent in war (19.6%), in which the business ethics consideration may certainly play a role, according to which an organization should not profit by taking advantage of another's vulnerability in such a

crisis period. The dominant nature of this idea can be seen even more if we compare the value of 19.6% with the value of only 3.8% of the ‘completely agree’ category. It is worth highlighting Slovakia, where the proportion of those who marked the option ‘I do not agree at all’ (28.7%) differs greatly from the values experienced in the other two countries (19.0% in the case of the Czech Republic, while 18.1% in the case of Hungary indicated ‘I do not agree at all’ option). To understand the reasons for this, further studies are needed in the future.

As a hypothesis, it would be worth testing in the future the assumption that if the war can be expected to be prolonged, the necessary modification measures may become inevitable, economic pressure may increasingly override unwritten moral standards, i.e. organizations may switch from a defensive ‘mode of operation’ to an ‘active mode’.

The case of the American car manufacturer Ford from the period of World War I can serve as a good example of the change over time in the ethical value judgment (strategic level) and the subsequent business activity (tactical-operative level) of the corporate sector. The owner had a pacifist attitude, so in the early days he did not deliver to the belligerents. Later, this situation changed: in 1914 and 1915, various American charities sent 16,000 automobiles across the ocean, and in 1916 they helped with 80,000 automobiles. In addition to cars and trucks, the Ford company also supplied the army with many other products, including assault helmets, gas masks, submarine eavesdropping devices, aircraft engines, and camp kitchens. We do not know if the owner’s attitude changed or if the business arguments prevailed, but in addition to ambulances, command vehicles and trucks, Fords stripped of unnecessary body parts and equipped with machine guns also went to war (Ocskay, 2020).

### 5.3. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Irtysheva, I., Kramarenko, I., & Sirenko, I. (2022). The Economy of War and Postwar Economic Development: World And Ukrainian Realities. *Baltic Journal of Economic Studies*, 8(2), 78-82.
2. Koppány, K. & Vakhal, P. (2022). The effects of the war against Ukraine on global value chains (In Hungarian). *Külgazdaság*, 66(3-4), 73–119. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.47630/KULG.2022.66.3-4.73>
3. KSH (2011). Nationality data (In Hungarian). Available online: [https://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak\\_nemzetiseg](https://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak_nemzetiseg). (Retrieved 28 July 2022).
4. Government of Hungary (2022). Price stop (In Hungarian). Available online: <https://kormany.hu/arstop>. (Retrieved 28 July 2022).
5. MNB (2022). The latest official exchange rates of the MNB (In Hungarian). Available online: <https://mnb.hu/arfolyamok>. (Retrieved 21 July 2022)
6. Monteiro, N. P. & Debs, A. (2020). An Economic Theory of War. *The Journal of Politics*, 82(1), 255-268.
7. Murdoch, JC & Sandler, T. (2002). Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial Spillovers. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(1), 91–101.
8. Németh, Z. (2020). The soundtracks of Ferenc Farkas’ years in Cluj (In Hungarian). *Certamen*, (VII), 243-258. <https://doi.org/10.51384/cert-07.16>
9. Ocskay, Z. (2020). Ford vehicles in the First World War (In Hungarian). *Haditechnika*, 54 (2), 64-69. DOI: 10.23713/HT.54.2.12
10. Portfolio (2022). After the government meeting, Viktor Orbán announced HUF 600 million in humanitarian aid (In Hungarian). Available online: <https://www.portfolio.hu/uzlet/20220302/megszolalt-a-kormanyules-utan-orban-viktor-600-millio-forintos-humanitarius-segitseget-jelentett-be-530481> (Retrieved 24 July 2022).
11. Portfolio (2024). Euro exchange rate (EUR/HUF) (In Hungarian). Available online: <https://www.portfolio.hu/arfolyam/EURHUF/EUR-HUF%20Spot> (Retrieved 13 March 2024).
12. Seinitz, K. (2022). What a century. A guide through the world in chaos (In German). Wien: edition.
13. Syvyi, M., Demyanchuk, P., Havryshok, B., & Zablotskyi, B. (2019). Phosphates of Ukraine as raw materials for the production of mineral fertilizers and ameliorants. *Gospodarka Surowcami Mineralnymi-Mineral Resources Management*, 35(4), 5-26. DOI: 10.24425/gsm.2019.128543
14. World Nuclear Association (2022). World Uranium Mining Production. Available online: <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx>. (Retrieved 28 July 2022).
15. Yekelchik, S. (2023). Ukraine. What Everyone needs to know. (2nd edition) New York: Oxford University Press.

## 6. ORGANISATIONAL ADAPTATION AND MEASURES TO THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE WAR (ERIKA SERES HUSZÁRIK, BOTOND GÉZA KÁLMÁN AND KITTI HAJMÁSI)

*“Europe is the bridgehead of Eurasia, Germany is the model student and closest ally to the USA. At the same time, Ukraine is a key state during the conquest of Eurasia”.*

*Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1997<sup>9</sup>*

### 6.1. ADAPTATION

The pandemic caused by the Covid-19 virus, which broke out in 2019 and has since turned into a global pandemic, has brought a new kind of uncertainty to previously successfully applied labour market practices. Quarantine obligations (Mahmoudi, 2022), closures, home office and factory shutdowns (Beibit et al., 2023) have caused significant damage to the economies of individual nations. Some of the companies survived suffering great (e.g. financial, knowledge, market) losses, while others went bankrupt. Jobs and positions have disappeared, working with personal presence has been replaced by the home office and various hybrid solutions, and at the same time we have witnessed the rapid expansion of flexible forms of work. The labour market actors had to react and adapt to the changed working conditions at the same time, quickly and efficiently. According to various sources, Covid-19 accelerated, rather than disrupted, HR trends that had already started/started (Caligiuri et al., 2020; Parry et al., 2021). Not all companies were equally affected by the global Covid-19 crisis (Dajnoki et al., 2023). Moreover, as we progressed between each virus wave, more and more companies indicated that they had found many new opportunities in this situation (Mura, Fóthy, Pásztóová, 2022;).

Nowadays, at the beginning of 2022, we are living in the period of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which will predictably mean additional economic and social challenges, to which all organizations must respond shortly. It has become clear that companies and workplaces themselves are vulnerable in many ways in their current form. Economic problems and the resulting temporary or permanent production stoppages represent an existential threat to companies, institutions and their employees (Poór et al., 2022). All of this threatens the loss of many jobs (Boiral et al., 2021).

However, it should be noted that the crisis caused by the war also offers an opportunity for individual countries and organizations to rethink their existing strategy. Virág (2020) draws attention to the fact that a state of emergency or war does not only have negative consequences, so it can, for example, contribute to the faster spread of technology that determines the development of the economy.


The Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its economic and social consequences presented organizations with new adaptation challenges. These challenges highlight the fact that, going beyond traditional operating models, organizations must find innovative solutions (Virág, 2020), which enable them to respond quickly to changes and minimize the negative effects of crisis situations.

Adaptability and the ability to anticipate future challenges are key to corporate growth and development. In this, both the new generation and the accumulated knowledge capital play an essential role (Malatyinszki 2015;

<sup>9</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928–2017) American politician of Polish origin who was an advisor to US President Johnson and a national security advisor to US President Jimmy Carter.

2020). Ahlawat et al. (2022) identified six key areas where foresight and adaptation are vital for companies to grow resiliently and be resilient.

Figure 6/1 Adaptation possibilities of organizations



Source: Ahlawat et. al, 2022

Corporate adaptation and the resulting measures can include (Ahlawat et al., 2022) for example more flexible scheduling of the workforce, increased use of digital technologies, further development of remote work and digital work environments, and strengthening of internal communication channels of companies. In addition, companies must examine their supply chain (Goreczky, 2020) and, if necessary, diversify it in order to reduce the risks caused by the war conflict.

In the crisis situation generated by the war situation, companies must not only pay attention to their internal operations, but also emphasize their social role (Mosgaard-Kristensen, 2023). Thus, for example, humanitarian assistance, support for refugees and promoting the integration of labour from war-torn regions can also be important goals. Companies must be prepared to take an active role in post-war recovery processes, thus helping economic and social regeneration. This may include developing sustainable operational strategies, strengthening social responsibility and expanding cooperation with local communities.

Possible positive effects of war-induced labour market changes should also be mentioned, such as increasing the diversity of the workforce, which can bring new perspectives and skills to domestic companies. Furthermore, the acceleration of technological innovation and automation, which can increase productivity and reduce labour shortages in the long term (Poór et al., 2022).

Overall, the need for robotization and the development of industrial production may come into focus even more, and thanks to the spread of working at home, it may lead to the development of a more balanced ratio of private life and work. These steps not only provide help in times of crisis but can also promote the long-term sustainability and competitiveness of companies in a world in which rapid and unpredictable changes will become more and more typical.

In connection with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the question may arise as to whether the war will have an indirect or direct effect on the labour market. Even before the outbreak of the armed conflict, it was possible to hear that, due to the labour shortage in Hungary, a further significant influx of foreign workers was expected, mostly from Ukraine. In this way, the shortage of drivers would mainly be alleviated by the companies dealing with transportation, but also by various manufacturing and processing companies. The process may be accelerated by the war, but it is not yet clear whether men between the ages of 18 and 60 who are under military service can leave the country under Russian attack at all (Nagy, 2022).

There is no doubt that in the case of companies, the ability to quickly adapt and the use of the opportunities offered in connection with the post-war opening become even more important factors than before (Goreczky, 2020). Businesses need new approaches to build resilience in critical times, which includes well-thought-out response to current challenges, anticipating risks and developing adaptability, thereby promoting successful growth (Ahlawat et al., 2022). In this chapter, we are looking for an answer to what tools would be effective and appropriate for domestic business organizations to use to eliminate the negative effects of the war that recently broke out in Ukraine, which is neighbouring our country.

## 6.2. MEASURES TO MITIGATE THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

During our questionnaire survey, we sought answers to the following few questions on how the negative effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war are judged, and what measures the respondents would consider effective in order to mitigate them. These reactions are partly general (Malatyinszki, 2009) and partly the consequences of the root cause, i.e. the armed conflict.

Table 6/1 Adaptation of the organization to the situation caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war (%)

Organisational adaptation	CZ	HU	SK	Total
Not enough time has passed since February to be able to measure the impact of the situation	18.0%	19.6%	20.7%	19.4%
There is no need to change, this situation did not cause any problems for us, and we can even grow for the time being	41.5%	23.6%	28.0%	28.0%
It is not possible to return to the situation before the war, new solutions must be sought.	18.4%	26.4%	34.8%	25.7%
I do not know	19.4%	26.1%	10.4%	22.7%
Other	2.7%	4.3%	6.1%	4.2%
Total (100%) n=	294	902	164	1360

Source: Authors' own compilation

The data in the above Table 6/1 show how the respondents think about the effects that have appeared since the outbreak of the war and directly affect economic organizations. The obtained results clearly confirm the uncertainty, since 19.4% of the respondents cannot even really see through it or are not aware of the situation and the possible losses, so they cannot even measure its impact on the organization. Another 22.7% chose the 'I do not know' option without explanation. Thus, the proportion of those who are unsure in the entire sample is 42.1%. Examining the individual countries, the proportion of those who are unsure is the highest among

Hungarian respondents (45.7%), and among Czech and Slovak organizations it is smaller and similar (34% on average).

Those who could answer could choose from two answers. The companies that are not affected by the conflict marked the 'No change...' option. This includes organizations that did not have a Russian and/or Ukrainian partner before the outbreak of the fighting and the consequent EU sanctions, and their supply chains were not affected by the changes. Their proportion in the entire sample is 28%. The frequency of respondents in this way is also the same among Slovak companies. This figure is higher than the results of a survey by the Slovak ČSOB bank and the Datank agency, according to which 15% of Slovak companies claim that they have not yet felt the negative impact of the war (Molnár, 2022b). 41.5% of Czech companies and 23.6% of Hungarians felt the same way.

These ratios can be paralleled with geographical conditions. The companies of Hungary and Slovakia, neighbouring the conflict-affected Ukraine, may have a higher proportion of direct business relations with Ukrainian business partners than the Czech Republic, which has no common border. The degree of Hungarian involvement is clearly demonstrated by the fact that in 2023, more than fifty Russian-owned companies were registered in Hungary, mostly business consulting and info-communication micro-enterprises (Dezső, 2023). Since the beginning of the armed conflict, a total of 133 Russian-owned companies have been established in the country (Cseke, 2023). At the same time, before the war, there were nearly 900 businesses in Ukraine owned by private or legal entities or shareholders with Hungarian citizenship (MNK, 2022). At the outbreak of the conflict in February 2022, approximately two thousand Ukrainian and one thousand Russian-owned companies were operating in Slovakia (Molnár, 2022a).

If we focus on those who chose the 'must be changed...' option, their proportion in the entire sample is 25%, which is 3 percentage points lower than the proportion of those not affected. This decrease is clearly a consequence of the responses of Czech companies, as only 18% of them indicated this answer, which is roughly half of the 41.5% of companies not planning to change. In contrast to the Czech data, the proportion of companies forced to change is 3 percentage points higher in Hungary and 6 percentage points higher in Slovakia than those that do not. The Slovak data on this issue also differ significantly from the results of the already mentioned ČSOB-Datank survey, according to which more than half of the Slovak enterprises answered that the war had had a moderate or severe impact on their business so far (Molnár, 2022b).

The next question of the research assessed the range of planned, possible measures, through which the negative effects of the war could be mitigated (Table 6/2) 'What measures are planned to mitigate the negative effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war?' the importance of the possible measures offered in the question could be answered on a five-point Likert scale (1= do not agree at all; 2= rather disagree; 3= neutral; 4= rather agree, 5= completely agree). The average of the scores of the five answers is 3, which is referred to as the theoretical average. The distribution of the averages calculated from the answers by country is described in 6/2. spreadsheet.

In the entire sample, there are four measures that the respondents indicated as more important than the theoretical average:

- » Increasing organizational efficiency (average 3.15)
- » General cost reduction (average 3.10)
- » Measures to help retain key people and talents (average 3.02)
- » More attention to innovation opportunities (average 3.01)

Based on this, it can be said that most people consider increasing organizational efficiency to be the primary task, in which retaining key people and innovation play the main role.

*Table 6/2 Average of planned measures to mitigate the negative effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war (%)*  
(Explanation: 1= do not agree at all; 2= rather disagree; 3= Neutral; 4= rather agree, 5= completely agree)

	What measures are planned to mitigate the negative effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war?	CZ		HU		SK		Total	
		Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.	It is not necessary to do anything	2.76	294	2.33	899	2.27	165	2.42	1358
2.	Searching for new procurement alternatives	3.10	292	2.43	901	2.90	164	2.63	1357
3.	Strengthening the supplier network	3.09	293	2.69	899	2.94	162	2.80	1354
4.	Domestic commodity funds, ensuring self-sufficiency	2.76	292	2.52	895	2.74	164	2.60	1351
5.	Maintaining export registration	2.47	291	2.13	896	1.99	164	2.18	1351
6.	Entering new markets	2.74	291	2.45	901	2.57	164	2.53	1356
7.	Increasing organizational efficiency	3.32	290	3.06	898	3.32	163	3.15	1351
8.	Supply chain reorganization	2.69	293	2.36	900	2.68	161	2.47	1354
9.	Stronger automation, introduction of new technologies	2.75	292	2.53	896	2.48	163	2.57	1351
10.	Applying more flexible contracts	2.74	292	2.60	904	2.70	164	2.64	1360
11.	Improving Cybersecurity	2.96	291	2.63	897	2.67	164	2.70	1352
12.	Increasing mental support for employees due to uncertainty	2.95	292	2.68	899	2.75	163	2.75	1354
13.	Revising strategy	2.46	290	2.68	896	3.05	162	2.67	1348
14.	Stronger/renewed marketing activity	2.89	292	2.62	901	2.85	163	2.71	1356
15.	More attention to innovation opportunities	3.10	290	2.96	897	3.10	162	3.01	1349
16.	Rescheduling or postponing investments	2.79	291	2.48	890	3.04	163	2.61	1344
17.	Using business consultants in order to solve organizational/operational problems	2.29	287	2.10	901	2.15	162	2.15	1350
18.	Development, strengthening and increasing the professionalism of HR functions	2.61	291	2.54	899	2.33	163	2.53	1353
19.	Measures to help retain key people and talents	3.12	291	2.98	902	3.06	163	3.02	1356
20.	Launching complex knowledge management programmes	2.50	292	2.40	897	2.25	161	2.40	1350
21.	Rethinking employment conditions	2.76	293	2.55	899	2.66	161	2.61	1353
22.	Starting and strengthening training programmes	2.71	287	2.61	894	2.29	163	2.60	1344
23.	General cost reduction	3.27	292	3.02	900	3.24	162	3.10	1354
24.	Strengthening internal communication	3.14	290	2.93	899	2.98	162	2.98	1351
25.	Other	0.79	160	0.70	399	0.47	68	0.70	627

Source: Authors' own compilation



Unfortunately, however, the general cost reduction nominated in second place has the opposite effect, as savings can mostly be made on wages, investments and fixed costs. That is why it is questionable whether the modern (stimulating development) or the old (restrictive) crisis management actually prevails. Analysing the individual countries, the same four issues were nominated as the most important by Slovak and Hungarian companies. According to respondents in the Czech Republic, the order of importance is somewhat different. Here, innovation was not included among the four most important tasks, its place is occupied by internal communication. One of the four least preferred answers in the entire sample is 'It is not necessary to do anything', for which Czech companies gave the highest score.

Among the most important measures is the retention of key people, which is a typically modern response, highlighting the importance of human resource management, which must be managed not only globally, but also locally (Tésits et al., 2008). The respondents believe that in order to mitigate the negative effects of the war, the main focus should be on retaining key people. Based on the data not included in the table, according to 22.2% of them, this is completely typical), secondly, general cost reduction should be sought (21.7%) and thirdly, the increase in organizational efficiency is considered appropriate (21.1%). The importance of retaining key people also stems from the fact that there has been a labour shortage in Hungary for years, which is only getting worse, as can be seen from a 2018 study (Poór et al., 2018). In addition, it is also clearly visible that a significant number of organizations pay special attention to the mental support of employees (19.7%) in the context of 'Health and safety'. In terms of eliminating the negative effects of the war, the use of business consultants suffered the most serious loss, as 37.2% of the respondents stated that the use of this function is the most indispensable. This is consistent with the low presence of external consultants among the SME players in the region, as Győri and Czakó (2018) found in their previous study. About the same number of people saw the strengthening of the supplier network and possibly the search for new procurement alternatives as clearly expedient (14.8% and 14.6%), while entering new markets (16.3%) and revising the strategy (16.7%), the monitoring of innovation opportunities (17.3%) and the strengthening of internal communication (19.5%) are thought by more people to be particularly effective solutions.

In the case of HR solutions used to deal with the negative effects of war, except for the retention of key people, the general opinion tends to shift towards the opinion that is considered less effective.

In summary, it can be said that based on the answers received, it is not possible to draw a clear conclusion as to what the respondents consider to be a highly effective, less effective, or ineffective solution overall. The obtained results typically prove that business organizations try to deal with the adverse effects of the war situation with unique solutions, which is supported by the almost identical results of the answers to these questions of the questionnaire. This dispersion of the results is also significantly influenced by the fact that more than a third of the respondents (35.5%) believed that not enough time had passed since the outbreak of the war to meaningfully measure the effects occurring during the research period, and during operation can be sensed. In relation to this issue, the best thing to say is that the high level of uncertainty that business organizations experience during their daily operations is almost palpable, and they are constantly trying to find possible solutions to avoid the adverse effects of the war situation. Only time will confirm their effectiveness when the war is over.

### 6.3. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. Ahlawat H., Hatami H., Martínez M. M, Natale A., Poppensieker T. & Raggl A. (2022). Can leaders lift their companies to the next frontier of resilience—not only to survive but also to thrive? McKinsey Quarterly. A defining moment: How Europe's CEOs can build resilience to grow in today's economic maelstrom <https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/risk-and-resilience/our-insights/a-defining-moment-how-europes-ceos-can-build-resilience-to-grow-in-todays-economic-maelstrom#/>
2. Beibit R., Fatahi Valilai, O.& Wicaksono, H. (2023). Estimating the COVID-19 Impact on the Semiconductor Shortage in the European Automotive Industry using Supervised Machine Learning. (pp. 302-308). In Proceedings of the 2023 10th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Applications.

3. Boiral, O., Brotherton, M.-C., Rivaud, L. & Guillaumie, L. (2021). Organizations' Management of the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Scoping Review of Business Articles. *Sustainability*, 13(7), 1-20. 3993. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su13073993>
4. Caligiuri, P., DE Cieri, H., Minbaeva, D., Verbeka, A. & Zimmerman, A. (2020). International HRM insights for navigating the COVID-19 pandemic: Implications for future research and practice. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 51, 697-713.
5. Cseke B. (2023). Russians like to found companies in Hungary, but many immediately run into obstacles. (In Hungarian) Telex. <https://telex.hu/gazdasag/2023/12/04/orosz-hatteru-cegek-magyarorszag>
6. Dajnoki, K., Pató, B. SZ. G., Kun, A. I., Varga, E., Tóth, A., Kálmán, B. G., Kovács, I. É., Szabó, SZ., Szabó, K., Majó, P. Z., Dávid, L. D. & Poór, J. (2023). Impact of the three waves of COVID-19 pandemic on the HR practices of Hungarian organizations—Experience from an empirical study. *PLoS ONE*, 18(6), 1-22, e0283644
7. Dezső, A. (2023). There are more and more Russian companies in Hungary, but many do not receive operating licenses. (In Hungarian) Hvg.Hu. [https://hvg.hu/360/20231204\\_Meg\\_mindig\\_szeretnek\\_magyar\\_cegeket\\_alapitani\\_az\\_oroszok](https://hvg.hu/360/20231204_Meg_mindig_szeretnek_magyar_cegeket_alapitani_az_oroszok)
8. Goreczky, P. (2020). Accelerating changes: the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the development of supply chains and FDI flows. (In Hungarian) *KKIelemzések*, 49. [https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/49\\_KKIElemzes\\_FDI\\_Goreczky\\_20200513.pdf](https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/49_KKIElemzes_FDI_Goreczky_20200513.pdf) (Retrieved 15 August 2022)
9. Győri, Á. & Czakó, Á. (2018). Some Features of Hungarian Financial Literacy in the Light of the Economic Behaviour of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. *Public Finance Quarterly*, 63(2), 235-253.
10. Malatyinszki, Sz. (2009). The impact of the crisis on human resources. (In Hungarian) *Körös Tanulmányok*, 12. 65-72.
11. Malatyinszki, Sz. (2015). A menedzsment és az értékek. (Management and values – in Hungarian) *Tudásmenedzsment* 16(1), 51-55. [https://epa.oszk.hu/02700/02750/00037/pdf/EPA02750\\_tudasmenedzsment\\_2015\\_01\\_051-055.pdf](https://epa.oszk.hu/02700/02750/00037/pdf/EPA02750_tudasmenedzsment_2015_01_051-055.pdf)
12. Malatyinszki, Sz. (2020). The new generation as a resource. (In Hungarian), *Multidiszciplináris kihívások, sokszínű válaszok*, 1. pp. 90-101. <https://doi.org/10.33565/MKSV.2020.01.07>
13. MNK. (2022). About Hungarian-Russian economic cooperation. (In Hungarian) *Magyarország Nagykövetsége Kijev*. <https://moszkva.mfa.gov.hu/hun/page/a-magyar-orosz-gazdasagi-egyuettmukoedesrol>
14. Molnár I. (2022a). Thousands of Russian and Ukrainian entrepreneurs have companies in Slovakia. (In Hungarian) *Új Szó Online* <https://ujso.com/kozelet/orosz-es-ukran-vallalkozok-ezreinek-van-cege-szlovakiaiban>
15. Molnár I. (2022b). The war in Ukraine is also destroying Slovak companies. (In Hungarian) *Új Szó Online* <https://ujso.com/kozelet/az-ukrajnai-haboru-a-szlovak-cegeket-is-kiverezteni>
16. Mosgaard M. A., Kristensen H. S. (2023). From certified environmental management to certified SDG management: new sustainability perceptions and practices, *Sustainable Futures*, Volume 6, 2023, 100144, ISSN 2666–1888, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sfr.2023.100144>
17. Mura L., Fóthy V. & Pásztóóvá, V. (2022). State Support for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Pandemic Period: Evidence from Slovakia. *Vadyba Journal of Management*, 1 (38), 37-44. ISSN 1648–7974 <https://doi.org/10.38104/vadyba.2022.1.04>
18. Nagy, K. (2022). May the Hungarian labor market been disrupted by the Russian-Ukrainian war? (In Hungarian) In: <https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20220315/felbolydulhat-a-magyar-munkaeropiac-az-orosz-ukran-haboru-miatt-532817>, (Retrieved 15 August 2022)
19. Parry, E., Morley, J. M. & Brewster, Ch. (2021). *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Approaches to Human Resource Management*. New York: Oxford University Press.
20. Poór, J., Juhász, T., Hámori, T., Karácsony, P., Machova, R. & Csapó, I. (2018) Some issues of the labor shortage in the central Hungarian region based on an empirical study. (In Hungarian) *Metszetek*, 7(4), 1-17. ISSN 2063–6415 <https://doi.org/10.18392/metsz/2018/4/1>
21. Poór, J., Dajnoki, K., Szabó, Sz., Módosné, Sz. Sz. & Jenei, Sz. (szerk) (2022). *Recovery – Reopening – Growth*. (In Hungarian) *Gödöllő: Magyar Agrár- és Élettudományi Egylet*.
22. Roberts, A. (2008). *The Art of War*. Quercus, London ISBN: 9781847245151.
23. Tésits, R., Malatyinszki, Sz. & Katona Z. (2008): The relationship between the improvement of human resource and human infrastructure in Sarkad region, *Modern Geografia*, 3(IV), 1-16. [https://www.moderngeografia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/tesits\\_malatyinszki\\_katona\\_2008\\_4.pdf](https://www.moderngeografia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/tesits_malatyinszki_katona_2008_4.pdf)
24. Virág, B. (2020). Life after pandemics. (In Hungarian) *Világgazdaság*, <https://www.vg.hu/velemeny/2020/03/elet-a-virus-utan-2> (Retrieved 22 August 2022)

## 7. SUPPORTING GOVERNMENT MEASURES (TIBOR ZSIGMOND, SZILVIA SZABÓ AND KLAUDIA BALÁZS)

*'In the post-Cold War world, culture is both a dividing and unifying force. Ideologically separate but culturally united peoples find each other'.*

*(Samuel P. Huntington)<sup>10</sup>*

### 7.1. GOVERNMENT MEASURES

The war broke out on February 24 when Russia launched its operation. In the period since then, both the Government and the EU have taken a number of measures. In this chapter, only the Hungarian government measures are presented. Here we would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that the period of the empirical research and the period of legislative changes do not overlap, i.e. the data collection of the research was completed before the legislation described below entered into force. On the first day of the war, the Government issued two decrees, which were as follows: 149/2022. (IV. 14.) Government decree, in view of the humanitarian disaster in a neighbouring country during the state of emergency, on certain rules regarding the employment and benefits of persons recognized as entitled to temporary protection, as well as LXXX of 2007 on the right to asylum. 301/2007 on the implementation of the law (XI. 9) 106/2022 on the amendment of Government Decree. (III. 12.) on amending the Government Decree and 1088/2022. (II. 24.) Government decision on the National Security Operative Corps. Based on the first decree, Ukrainian refugees are entitled to temporary protection. On the basis of the second decree, the Government sets up the National Security Operative Corps, whose task is to preserve the peace of Hungary and to coordinate the work of various actors (e.g. ministries) to this end.

As a result of the war, many Ukrainians were forced to leave their country. According to the Adat.one (2022) portal article, 8,792,763 Ukrainian refugees left their country until July 7. 905,104 people arrived in Hungary, but only 26,199 of them received asylum, as the vast majority of refugees continued to travel. The government regulates the employment support of Ukrainian refugees arriving in Hungary with the following decree: 96/2022. (III. 10.) Government decree on supporting the employment of persons with Ukrainian citizenship who arrived from the territory of Ukraine. The government created three more decrees regulating the domestic employment of Ukrainian citizens, these are as follows: 173/2022. (IV. 29.) Government decree on supporting the employment of persons with Ukrainian citizenship at certain budget bodies; 172/2022. (IV. 29.) Government decree on supporting the employment of persons with Ukrainian citizenship; 121/2022. (III. 28.) Government decree on the emergency rules for the employment of healthcare workers who have fled Ukraine in Hungary. Each regulation aims to support organizations that employ Ukrainian refugees.

On May 25, the Government of Hungary declared a state of emergency (Government Decree 180/2022. (V. 24) regarding the declaration of a state of emergency and certain emergency rules in view of the armed conflict and humanitarian disaster in the territory of Ukraine, and in order to prevent their consequences in Hungary). According to this, the prime minister is responsible for averting the consequences of the war. After declaring the state of emergency, the government created four government decrees until July 21, 2022. With the first government decree, the government amended the regulation of public finances (Government Decree 224/2022. (VI. 22.) on the different application of certain public finance rules during the state of emergency, as well as

<sup>10</sup> Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008) internationally renowned professor from Harvard.

amending certain government decrees). On the basis of the second decree, the government can bring business associations under the supervision of the Hungarian state (Government Decree 230/2022. (VI. 28.) on bringing the operation of business organizations under the supervision of the Hungarian state within the framework of measures to be taken during a state of emergency). With the third decree, the government creates the legal relationship of border hunters (Government Decree 244/2022. (VII. 8.) on the rules for contract border hunters belonging to the body established to perform general police tasks). With the fourth decree, the government simplifies the regulation of social security benefits for Ukrainian refugees in Hungary (Government Decree 246/2022. (VII. 8.) on the simplification of certain social security benefits for Ukrainian citizens during the state of emergency).

The government has taken a number of measures to preserve the budget balance. Among these, we describe the ones we consider the most important. The XIII of 2022 was created by the government in order to transform the economy. Act 'On the itemized tax of small taxpaying entrepreneurs', according to which the range of businesses that can choose KATA (itemized tax of small taxpaying entrepreneurs) is drastically narrowed. In order to stabilize the budget, the government imposes an extra-profit tax on companies (Government Decree 197/2022. (VI. 4.) on extra-profit taxes). In addition to these, the government will also change the regulation of utility reduction. Pursuant to this, individuals who consume more than the average must pay the market price for the part above the average (Government Decree 259/2022. (VII. 21.) on the determination of certain universal service pricing). Another significant change is that the government limited the number of people who can buy 95 gasoline and diesel at a fixed rate of HUF 480 per liter (Government Decree 278/2022 (VII. 30) on the amendment of certain government regulations related to official fuel prices).

## 7.2. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

In the remainder of Chapter 7, the results of the empirical research are presented to the reader. In the questionnaire, we asked the organizations what proposals they would make for the government, the implementation of which could reduce the economic impact of the war. Based on Table 7/1, the most important thing for the organizers would be for governments to support overhead, energy, and fuel costs, for example by regulating/reducing energy prices, or even in the form of procurement subsidies. In this regard, in the case of Hungary, it is possible to mention the fuel price cap, which the government abolished for companies (Government Decree 278/2022 (VII. 30) on the amendment of certain government regulations related to official fuel prices). Furthermore, many people indicated that they would welcome a reduction in contributions and taxes, as well as the introduction of more favourable tax legislation. In addition, several people indicated that they would be happy if individual governments focused on supporting employment, reducing employment burdens, and increasing wage subsidies, wage settlements and benefits. Additional forms of support, e.g. non-reimbursable state grants and direct financial/budgetary grants would also be welcome. According to some, investment and infrastructure development subsidies, or measures supporting energy efficiency (e.g. renewable energies, heating modernization) would also be useful. Another important aspect for organizations is that they can get cheap credit.

Table 7/1 Recommendations by country – frequencies

		CZ	HU	SK	Total
1.	Utility, energy and fuel cost support, energy price regulation/reduction, procurement support	35	57	31	123
2.	Tax benefits, tax and VAT reduction, more favourable tax rules	13	67	9	89
3.	Employment support, reduction of employment burdens, wage subsidy, wage adjustment/increase, benefits	4	52	4	60
4.	Provision of financial resources, non-reimbursable state support, direct financial/budgetary support	16	32	10	58
5.	Investment and infrastructure development subsidies, energy efficiency (such as renewable energies, heating modernization)	2	34	3	39
6.	Interest subsidies, favourable interest rates or interest-free loans, interest reduction	3	17	1	21
7.	Application opportunities, application grants	1	18	0	19
8.	Subsidies related to workforce retention and training	2	11	1	14
9.	Support and protection of SMEs, small and micro-enterprises, start-up entrepreneurs	2	5	5	12
10.	Support for equipment purchases	0	9	2	11
11.	EU resources, grants, tenders, better cooperation with the EU	0	9	0	9
12.	Strengthening agriculture and domestic products	2	4	2	8
13.	Encouragement and support of R&D, innovation	0	5	3	8
14.	Reducing and speeding up the administration related to the employment of foreign workers	1	7	0	8
15.	Easier/favourable price acquisition of basic and raw materials, stopping of price increases, price support/compensation	3	4	1	8
16.	Subsidies related to the employment of refugees and foreign workers	3	5	0	8
17.	Ensuring exchange rate stability	2	3	0	5
18.	Suppressing and mitigating inflation	0	4	0	4
19.	Development of new raw material sources and procurement channels	1	2	0	3
20.	Assistance in entering foreign markets, new market opportunities	0	3	0	3
21.	Ending the war, promoting peace	0	2	0	2
22.	Other support/comment, suggestion	28	53	21	102
23.	We do not need (further) support / we are not affected by the war	34	30	2	66
	Total	152	433	95	680

Source: Authors' own compilation

Based on Table 7/1, the least ‘ending the war, facilitating the conclusion of peace’; ‘assistance to enter foreign markets, new market opportunities’; ‘building new sources of raw materials and procurement channels’, ‘ensuring exchange rate stability’ and ‘reducing inflation’ were selected as options. The current political situation does not allow for a ‘quick peace’. Based on the above, most organizations currently do not plan to enter foreign markets, even with the help of support. In addition, they are satisfied with their current raw material sources and procurement channels. It is not surprising that the exchange rate is not decisive in the case of Slovakia. In the case of the Czech Republic, although the Czech koruna – Euro exchange rate has increased, the rate of change is negligible. Examining the longer period of time, it can be said that the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic affected it more than the current war – although the impact of the former was not shock-like, and its scale can also be considered negligible (Google, 2024). On the other hand, the EUR – HUF exchange rate shows extremely extreme fluctuations (at the beginning of 2023, it was still over 400, while during the year it decreased to a level of 370). Although currently (in the first third of 2024) the exchange rate started to rise again, during the collection of the data a downward trend was still observed in the case of the exchange rate (Portfólió, 2024). Inflation showed a downward trend in all three countries, so they could not feel it was important for the governments to take measures in this regard.

Table 7/2 Recommendations by organizational size

	SME	Large company
1.	Utility, energy and fuel cost support, energy price regulation/reduction, procurement support	Utility, energy and fuel cost support, energy price regulation/reduction, procurement support
2.	Tax benefits, tax and VAT reduction, more favourable tax rules	Tax benefits, tax and VAT reduction, more favourable tax rules
3.	Employment support, reduction of employment burdens, wage subsidy, wage adjustment/increase, benefits	Employment support, reduction of employment burdens, wage subsidy, wage adjustment/increase, benefits
4.	Provision of financial resources, non-reimbursable state support, direct financial/budgetary support	Provision of financial resources, non-reimbursable state support, direct financial/budgetary support
5.	Investment and infrastructure development subsidies, energy efficiency (such as renewable energies, heating modernization)	Investment and infrastructure development subsidies, energy efficiency (such as renewable energies, heating modernization)
6.	Application opportunities, application grants	Application opportunities, application grants
7.	Interest subsidies, favourable interest rates or interest-free loans, interest reduction	Interest subsidies, favourable interest rates or interest-free loans, interest reduction
8.	Support and protection of SMEs, small and micro-enterprises, start-up entrepreneurs	Support and protection of SMEs, small and micro-enterprises, start-up entrepreneurs

Source: Authors' own compilation

Overall, it can be said that a certain range of government subsidies requested by the organizers were partially realized, e.g. slowing down the devaluation of the forint (but the weakening of the forint could not be stopped), the possibility of tax payments based on euros and dollars instead of the introduction of the euro, taking into account the increase in employee mobility, facilitating the employment of Ukrainian refugees. However, a significant part was not realized, e.g. the government did not reduce VAT, did not moderate energy prices for organizations, and targeted sectoral subsidies did not appear. If, in the future, the government were to introduce the changes advocated by the companies during the creation of the legislation, it would be worthwhile to conduct research to see which of these are the ones that can most effectively contribute to increasing the liquidity of the organizations, and how effective these measures are considered to be.

### 7.3. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1. 96/2022. (III. 10.) Government decree on support for the employment of persons with Ukrainian citizenship who arrived from the territory of Ukraine (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200096.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 21 July 2022)
2. 149/2022. (IV. 14.) Government Decree LXXX of 2007 on certain rules regarding the employment and benefits of persons recognized as entitled to temporary protection, as well as the right to asylum, in view of the humanitarian disaster in a neighboring country during the state of emergency. 301/2007 on the implementation of the law (XI. 9) 106/2022 on the amendment of Government Decree. (III. 12.) on the amendment of the Government Decree (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200149.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 21 July 2022)
3. 172/2022. (IV. 29.) Government decree on supporting the employment of persons with Ukrainian citizenship (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200172.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 21 July 2022)
4. 173/2022. (IV. 29.) Government decree on supporting the employment of persons with Ukrainian citizenship at certain budget bodies (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200173.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 21 July 2022)
5. 180/2022. (V. 24.) Government decree on the declaration of a state of emergency and certain emergency rules in view of the armed conflict and humanitarian disaster on the territory of Ukraine, as well as in order to prevent their consequences in Hungary (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200180.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
6. 197/2022. (VI. 4.) Government decree on extra-profit taxes (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200197.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
7. 224/2022. (VI. 22.) Government decree on the different application of certain public finance rules during the state of emergency, as well as on the amendment of certain government decrees (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200224.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
8. 230/2022. (VI. 28.) Government decree on bringing the operation of economic organizations under the supervision of the Hungarian state within the framework of the measures to be taken during the state of emergency (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200230.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
9. 244/2022. (VII. 8.) Government decree on the rules for contract border hunters belonging to the body established for the performance of general police duties (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200244.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
10. 246/2022. (VII. 8.) Government decree on the simplification of certain social security benefits for Ukrainian citizens during a state of emergency (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200246.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
11. 259/2022. (VII. 21.) Government decree on the definition of certain universal service tariffs (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A2200259.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
12. 278/2022 (VII. 30.) Government decree on the amendment of certain government decrees related to the official fuel price (In Hungarian). <https://magyarkozlony.hu/dokumentumok/c597140eb84c0637278b04c26a70c4fc3f02264a/megtekintes> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
13. 1088/2022. (II. 24.) Government decree on the National Security Operational Board (In Hungarian). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A22H1088.KOR&dbnum=1> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
14. 13/2022. On the specific tax for small taxable persons (In Hungarian). <https://magyarkozlony.hu/dokumentumok/b0cf1960500113f7be79141585b6114944b080ac/megtekintes> (Retrieved 08 August 2022)
15. Adat.one (2022): Number of Ukrainian refugees in Europe (In Hungarian). <https://hu.adat.one/ukran-menekultek-szama-europaban> (Retrieved 21 July 2022)
16. Google. (2024): Euro–Czech koruna (In Hungarian). [https://www.google.com/finance/quote/EUR-CZK?sa=X&ved=2ahUKewiRloPp\\_rPGEAxV8gP0HHfuSBgEQmY0JegQIBxAv&window=5Y](https://www.google.com/finance/quote/EUR-CZK?sa=X&ved=2ahUKewiRloPp_rPGEAxV8gP0HHfuSBgEQmY0JegQIBxAv&window=5Y) (Retrieved 13 March 2024)
17. Huntington, P.S. (1998). The clash of civilizations and the transformation of the world order (In Hungarian). Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó.
18. Portfolio (2024). Euro exchange rate (EUR/HUF) (In Hungarian). <https://www.portfolio.hu/arfolyam/EURHUF/EUR-HUF%20Spot> (Retrieved 13 March 2024)

## 8. CHANGES AND THE FUTURE (ERIKA SERES HUSZÁRIK, GÁBOR SZABÓ-SZENTGRÓTI, ARNOLD TÓTH AND KITTI HAJMÁSI)

*'The nightmare that Russia has unleashed on Ukraine is not over yet, so we do not know how it will end. What we do know is that however it ends, it will reshape the world we all live in, in ways big and small. There is no going back to the previous status quo'.*

*Ingrid Wuerth Brunk–Monica Hakimi (2022:697)*

### 8.1. CHANGES

Based on the data of our research, the economic and political uncertainty caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war situation causes serious concerns among companies and organizations. supply chains. Among the three examined countries, the proportion of those who agreed with this was particularly high in Slovakia (average 4.31), but similarly high average scores were also obtained in the Czech Republic and Hungary (4.09 and 4.08, respectively). The deterioration of the economic outlook and the weakening of purchasing power are also important risk factors, especially in Slovakia (average 4.10), according to which the uncertain economic situation can have a negative impact on the willingness to consume and, in this connection, on investment and investment decisions. The impact of the war situation on a wide range of inputs (e.g. raw materials, production costs) deserves attention, especially in Hungary and Slovakia (with averages of 3.89 and 3.95). A significant proportion of respondents agreed (mean score of 3.79) that the war in Ukraine significantly limited the supply of energy, metals or food and further increased price pressures, indicating that respondents are concerned about supply disruptions and due to price increases. The instability of supply chains can make production and operation difficult, and the price increase effect caused by additional costs is constantly passed on to consumer prices. Dependence on international trade and supply failures are also serious concerns, which are reflected in the average values (SK 3.89; HU 3.79; CZ 3.65). The negative economic effects of the war on Russian and Ukrainian imports (mainly gas, oil, grain) can be felt in all examined countries, but mostly in Slovakia, where the average score of those who agree reached 4.04. In Hungary, these effects were felt to a lesser degree, as the average score of those who agreed was 3.64. Regarding the future development scenarios, which predict higher inflation and weaker economic growth, the situation is also similar: Slovak respondents see a greater chance for this (3.93), the average among the respondents of the other countries is also quite high, indicating pessimistic prospects. The solution to the labour shortage problem by integrating Ukrainian refugees into the labour market was the least agreed in Hungary (average 2.68), while in the Czech Republic and Slovakia it received more neutral values (3.02 and 2.86). From this, we can conclude that the Hungarian respondents are more sceptical about the effectiveness of this solution, that additional solutions are needed to deal with the labour shortage.

Overall, respondents generally agreed that rising energy and food prices, labour shortages, the economic impact of war, deteriorating future economic prospects, and pressure on supply chains are negatively affecting economic activity and paint a generally pessimistic view of the future. Based on the results, these are all areas that require special attention for decision-makers; companies need flexible and effective crisis management strategies to manage emerging risks in order to successfully deal with changing circumstances and maintain their functionality in uncertain times.



Table 8/1 Average of characteristic changes in the examined countries

(Explanation: 1= do not agree at all; 2= rather disagree; 3= neutral; 4= rather agree, 5= completely agree)

		CZ		HU		SK		Total	
		Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.	The continuous increase in the price of energy, fuel and basic foodstuffs negatively affects the activities of business units and the organizations/companies belonging to their supply chain	4.09	293	4.08	692	4.31	159	4.11	1144
2.	The solution to the ongoing labour shortage is the integration of Ukrainian refugees and experts into the Hungarian labour market	3.02	293	2.68	669	2.86	158	2.80	1120
3.	Businesses feel the negative impact of the war mainly through changes in the scope of delivery of the main goods (gas, oil, grain) coming from Russia and Ukraine	3.82	292	3.64	678	4.04	157	3.75	1127
4.	The possible future development scenarios available today expect higher inflation and weaker economic growth	3.68	291	3.71	672	3.93	156	3.73	1119
5.	The war in Ukraine significantly limited the supply of energy, metals or food. The war further increased the price tension	3.76	293	3.76	676	4.03	157	3.79	1126
6.	The war situation affects a wide range of inputs. This puts pressure on producer margins, and this gradually spills over into consumer prices	3.74	291	3.89	672	3.95	157	3.86	1120
7.	The high dependence of the economy on international trade, as well as the failure to supply some basic components of production, negatively affects several industries	3.65	292	3.79	670	3.89	157	3.77	1119
8.	Deteriorating economic prospects and weakening purchasing power are leaving their mark on the economy's performance. High uncertainty may once again manifest itself in the postponement of investment plans and may also contribute to cautious consumer behaviour	3.79	291	3.90	669	4.10	157	3.90	1117

## 8.2. THE FUTURE

In recent years, the world has faced many unforeseen challenges that have had a significant impact on social and economic structures. In particular, the Covid-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions, such as wars and military conflicts, have challenged nations, and thus companies and civil society. The purpose of this chapter is how the external influences have affected and how they are expected to affect different aspects of the company's operation. Table 8/2 shows the views of the respondents and the key areas that need to be paid more attention to in future decision-making processes.

Table 8/2 Typical/average future effects and changes (n= )

Explanation: 1= completely disagree; 2= rather disagree; 3= neutral; 4= rather agree, 5= completely agree

		CZ		HU		SK		Total	
		Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.	In connection with the pandemic and the war, Hungarian society must learn a lesson, while it is crucial to improve Hungary's economic resistance to the unexpected or against expected (e.g. climatic) external effects	3.97	293	3.75	640	3.94	155	3.84	1088
2.	Among other things, the pandemic also pointed to the need to urgently strengthen and modernize healthcare, education and the public sector	3.90	293	4.20	653	4.21	156	4.12	1102
3.	As a result of the pandemic and the war situation, the development of a new type of energy strategy must come to the fore	3.89	292	4.04	650	4.04	153	4.00	1095
4.	The uncertain economic environment created as a result of the pandemic and the war situation makes it even more difficult to preserve the competitiveness of the SME sector, or growth compared to multinational companies	3.49	293	3.87	650	3.77	155	3.75	1098
5.	The popularity of working from home is declining due to the deteriorating energy and inflation situation and rising household expenses	2.94	293	2.78	654	3.02	155	2.85	1102

The surveyed respondents mostly believed that the pandemic drew attention to the need to improve the quality of healthcare, education and public services. During the period of the Covid-19 pandemic, the staff and capacities of health institutions and hospitals were significantly strained. In many cases, they could not even fulfil their basic tasks related to care. The pandemic also posed a challenge to education, as it was not possible to hold classes in person due to restrictions on going out. However, they tried to remedy the problem by introducing the use of online platforms. The electronic presence also led to results in the case of some public services.

Given the different causes of the pandemic, the war triggered different response measures from companies than before Covid-19 (Dajnoki et al., 2023). The respondents also considered it important that a new type of energy strategy could be a solution to the problems that the war drew attention to. As a result of the war conflict, energy prices increased, procurement sources became limited, and the inflationary pressure affecting raw material prices further burdened the population and businesses. Governments were trying to find solutions to the emerging problem and began to develop their strategy in the direction of alternative methods. The results indicate that

while the crisis caused by the pandemic is a threat to human resources (Tóth, Szabó, et al., 2021; Tóth, Kálmán, et al., 2021), the war crisis is primarily caused by the disruption of supply chains.

The respondents did not question the importance and popularity of working from home. High inflation and the increase in energy costs did not result in a decrease in openness to the home-office option. Even before the pandemic, workers in some sectors already had the opportunity to do their work remotely. This alternative became almost inevitable during the closures. Both employers and employees were able to gain a lot of experience during this period. Sensing the beneficial properties of the home office, it became a proven alternative solution later on. Research has highlighted the flexibility and cost-saving benefits of working from home, which has led to a change in attitudes towards telecommuting (Franken et al., 2021). With the continuous development of technology, the trend of remote work is expected to spread even more in the future. The shift toward telecommuting has also created an opportunity for companies to employ talent from different geographies, increasing diversity and innovation within teams. satisfaction and productivity (Konrad-Maerk, 2023).

### 8.3. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Brunk, W.I & Hakimi, M. (2022). *Russia, Ukraine and the Future World Order*. Cambridge University Press. <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/> (Retrieved 03 September 2023)
2. Dajnoki, K., Pató, B. S. G., Kun, A. I., Varga, E., Tóth, A., Kálmán, B. G., Kovács, I. É., Szabó, S., Szabó, K., Majó-Petri, Z., Dávid, L. D., & Poór, J. (2023). Impact of the three waves of COVID-19 pandemic on the HR practices of Hungarian organizations—Experience from an empirical study. *PLOS ONE*, 18(6), e0283644. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0283644>
3. Franken, E., Bentley, T., Shafaei, A., Farr-Wharton, B., Onnis, L., & Omari, M. (2021). Forced flexibility and remote working: opportunities and challenges in the new normal. *Journal of Management & Organization*, 27(6), 1131–1149. doi:10.1017/jmo.2021.40
4. Konrad-Maerk, M. (2023). Remote Innovation: How Remote Work Enables Open Innovation in Times of COVID-19. *International Journal of Innovation and Technology Management*, 20(03).1-27. <https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219877023420014>
5. Tóth, A., Kálmán, B., & Poór, J. (2021). Employment in Hungarian economy as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. *Acta Oeconomica Universitatis Selye*, 10.(1), 84–96. <https://doi.org/10.36007/Acta.2021.10.1.7>
6. Tóth A., Szabó S., Kálmán B., & Poór J. (2021). Employment in Hungary due Covid 19. (In Hungarian). *Új Munkaügyi Szemle*, 2(1), 2–22.

## 9. CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS (GÁBOR LÁNCZ AND BENCE SZELES)

*'The fastest way to end a war way to lose it'.*

*(George Orwell)<sup>11</sup>*

The chapter contains an analysis of the individual characteristics of the people who responded to the research questionnaire, based on the position held in the organization, the gender of the respondent and the time spent at the organization as grouping factors.

### 9.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

In the chapter, the characteristics of the persons filling out the questionnaire are presented in terms of the position held in the responding organization, the gender of the respondent and the length of service

Some of 1,343 responding persons stated their position in the organization, more than half of the respondents (55.3%) participated in the survey as employees. In this regard, there are differences in the three examined countries, as can be read from Table 9/1. While in the case of Hungary and the Czech Republic, mostly non-managerial employees filled out the questionnaire, in the case of Slovakia it was mainly the owners of the companies.

In comparison with the survey conducted only in Hungary in 2022, probing the effects of the war (Poór, 2022b), we must state that during the similar survey in 2022, the questionnaire was mostly filled out by owners in Hungary (55%).

During the research assessing the effects of Covid-19 (Poór et al., 2022b), which was also conducted only in Hungary, the majority of respondents (almost 34%) filled out the questionnaire as non-managerial employees, and the second most typical group in the population were the owners ( 29%).

With regard to the present research, a correlation can be seen in the case of the three countries in terms of company size – see: Chapter 2 – and the position of the filling in, if we can see that in the case of the Czech Republic, organizations with 50-249 employees are the most typical (20.7%), in the case of Hungary companies with 10-49 employees are the most typical respondents (19%), For these countries, non-managerial employees filled out the questionnaire. In other words, the owners probably delegated the task to save their time.

In the case of Slovakia, the most typical company size is lower compared to the other two countries – organizations with 1-9 employees account for 42.4% of the respondents in Slovakia, as indicated above, typically the owners filled out the questionnaire.

It should be noted that in our country 97.8% are micro-enterprises – there are no or only 1-9 employees – on the basis of which the filling organizations do not form the company structure according to the domestic staff category.

<sup>11</sup> George Orwell (1903–1950) English novelist, writer, journalist and critic.

Summarizing the data of the three Central European countries, 16.8% of the respondents filled out the questionnaire as owners, 23.2% held a leading position in the organization, and 55.3% filled out the survey as employees.

*Table 9/1 Respondent's position*

Position	CZ	HU	SK	Total
Owner	10.6%	13.4%	46.0%	16.8%
Number one leader	7.2%	3.4%	11.0%	5.1%
Member of the senior management board	7.8%	5.3%	6.1%	6.0%
Middle manager	18.1%	10.3%	11.7%	12.1%
Employed	52.9%	62.0%	23.3%	55.3%
Other	3.4%	5.6%	1.8%	4.7%
Total (100%) n=	293	887	163	1343

*Source: Authors' own compilation*

1,336 people answered the question about the gender of the respondents, of which 55% were women and 40.5% were men. Differences in the position of the respondents within the organization per country can also be observed in the gender distribution. In the case of Hungary and the Czech Republic, women typically filled out the questionnaire, while in the case of Slovakia, it was typically men.

*Table 9/2 Gender of respondent*

Gender of the respondent	CZ	HU	SK	Total
male	45.9%	36.1%	54.7%	40.5%
female	53.1%	57.6%	44.1%	55.0%
other	1.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.6%
not displayed	0.0%	5.7%	1.2%	3.9%
Total (100%) n=	292	883	161	1336

*Source: Authors' own compilation*

The service period of the respondents at the responding organization is basically not differentiated, there are minor differences only in the case of Hungary and the Czech Republic. The respondents of the Slovak organizations should have a somewhat longer service period compared to the other two countries.

Based on the aggregated data of the three countries, most of the applicants (24.0%) have been working for the organization they represent for 2-3 years. At the time of their entry, they were still experiencing the upswing associated with the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, but the negative impact of the war had not yet been felt.

19.4% of the respondents have been employed for less than a year, so they do not have the personal experience of what their company's situation was before the outbreak of the war or the pandemic. Thus, almost half of the respondents do not have comprehensive experience in the construction of security measures that will necessarily and quickly arise in the event of a potential crisis situation.

In addition, in the case of respondents from the three countries, 13.7% have 4-5 years, and 16.6% have 6-10 years of service in their organization, they could also experience the period of calm growth and crisis management.

*Table 9/3 Length of service of the respondent)*

Length of service (year)	CZ	HU	SK	Total
0-1 year	12.4%	24.6%	5.1%	19.4%
2-3 years	23.7%	26.1%	13.3%	24.0%
4-5 years	17.9%	12.5%	12.0%	13.7%
6-10 years	18.6%	14.2%	25.9%	16.6%
11-15 years	10.3%	8.3%	14.6%	9.5%
16-20 years	5.2%	6.0%	8.9%	6.2%
more than 20 years	12.0%	8.3%	20.3%	10.6%
Total (100%) n=	291	832	158	1281

*Source: Authors' own compilation*

## 9.2. REFERENCES TO CHAPTER NINE

1. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (2024). Summary tables: Number of registered businesses by staff category, (In Hungarian) [https://www.ksh.hu/stadat\\_files/gsz](https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/gsz) (Retrieved 13 March 2024)
2. Poór, J., Bruder, E., Dajnoki, K., Jarjabka, Á., Kovács, I., Pató Gáborné Szűcs, B., & Szabó, S. (2022a). The factors threatening corporate-organizational stability are management, management and HR in the shadow of war (industry, agriculture, services, other areas). (In Hungarian) Gödöllő, Magyar Agrár- és Élettudományi Egyetem.
3. Poór, J., Szonja, J., Dajnoki, K., Szabó, S., Szilvia, M., & Jenei, S. (2022b). Recovery – Reopening – Growth, Expected changes in corporate/institutional management and management in the shadow of the coronavirus. (In Hungarian) Gödöllő, Magyar Agrár- és Élettudományi Egyetem.

## 10. APPENDIX – LIST OF ORGANISATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE RESEARCH (JÓZSEF POÓR AND ZSOLT BARNA)

*‘ECFR’s research shows that while Europeans feel great solidarity with Ukraine and support sanctions against Russia, they are divided on long-term goals. They are divided between the “peace” camp (35% of people), which wants the war to end as soon as possible, and the “justice” camp, which believes that the more urgent goal is to punish Russia (22% of people)’.*<sup>12</sup>

In our survey, 826 organisations (companies and institutions) gave their names out of 1,370 respondents. Respondents included subsidiaries of multinational companies, large Czech, Hungarian and Slovakian companies, public and state-owned companies and a wide range of SMEs from the countries surveyed. The survey included companies from the food, retail, construction, automotive and consultancy sectors, which are representative of the business community in the countries surveyed.

### 10.1. CZECH RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS

No.	Name of organisation
1.	Acetex s.r.o.
2.	Adecco s.r.o.
3.	Agro CS a.s.
4.	Albert ČR
5.	Allianz
6.	Apple Inc.
7.	Armáda České Republiky
8.	Arsenal collection
9.	Auto-Poly s.r.o.
10.	B a K systémy s.r.o.
11.	BENICA s.r.o.
12.	BNM Media
13.	Body line
14.	Boston Scientific ČR s.r.o.
15.	Brilas Group s.r.o.
16.	BRISK Tábor a.s.
17.	Broker consulting, a. s.
18.	Budějovický Budvar n.p.
19.	CB Ocel s.r.o.
20.	Česká Spořitelna
21.	ČEVAK a.s.
22.	ČEVAK, a. s.
23.	CHKK, s. r. o.

No.	Name of organisation
24.	Ciret s.r.o.
25.	CM TRANSPORT TACHOV s.r.o.
26.	CORPSTAV s.r.o.
27.	ČSOB
28.	ČSOB a.s.
29.	Čsz s.r.o.
30.	ČZ a.s.
31.	ČZ a.s.
32.	DEK a.s.
33.	DFHCZ s.r.o.
34.	DM drogerie markt s.r.o.
35.	Domov pro seniory Pohoda
36.	Dopravní podnik hl.m.Prahy
37.	DUKRA D.B., s. r. o.
38.	eDO finance a.s.
39.	EDUCAnet Praha s.r.o.
40.	ENGEL strojírenská, spol. s r. o.
41.	Engel strojírenská, spol. s r. o.
42.	Esence Café
43.	Extrunet s.r.o.
44.	Finanční úřad pro Jihočeský kraj
45.	FORPE GROUP, s.r.o.
46.	Forsocial

<sup>12</sup> Kratsev, I.& Leonard, M. (2022). Peace versus Justice: The coming European split over the war in Ukraine. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/peace-versus-justice-the-coming-european-split-over-the-war-in-ukraine/> (Downloaded 08 July 2022)

No.	Name of organisation
47.	GLOBUS hypermarket
48.	GPN GmbH
49.	Hugo Bike
50.	HUGO Bike s.r.o.
51.	Hutchinson, a. s.
52.	Hutchinson, s. r. o.
53.	IAC Group s.r.o.
54.	Iwis antriebssysteme spol. s r. o.
55.	Jihočeská daňová S.r.o.
56.	Jihočeské divadlo
57.	Kaufland
58.	KFT Kaplice, s. r. o.
59.	KOČÍ a.s.
60.	Komerční banka
61.	Kostečka Group s.r.o.
62.	Kůtalogistik s.r.o.
63.	Lear Corporation Czech, s.r.o.
64.	Leifheit, s.r.o.
65.	Lesostavby Třeboň a.s.
66.	Lidl Česká republika
67.	Linako
68.	Linako Klatovy s.r.o.
69.	Linde s.r.o.
70.	Luna
71.	Marius Pedersen a.s.
72.	Martin Hýbl s.r.o.
73.	Martin Liška (učo 31360)
74.	Městské lesy Volary s.r.o.
75.	Minerva a.s.
76.	MONDI Bupak České Budějovice
77.	Mountfield, a. s.
78.	MSSS Písek
79.	NACHI Czech s.r.o.
80.	PCN GROUP, s.r.o.
81.	Pekárna a cukrárna Dražice s.r.o.
82.	Pekařství Cais s.r.o.
83.	Pivovar a restaurace U Fleků, s. r. o.
84.	Pizzerie v zámku
85.	POLI Libor Polívka
86.	Pradast spol. s.r.o.
87.	Restaurace a penzion U Kohoutu

No.	Name of organisation
88.	Robert Bosch odbytová s.r.o
89.	Robert Bosch s. r. o.
90.	Schwan-STABILO ČR,s.r.o.
91.	SD Active s.r.o.
92.	Silon s.r.o.
93.	SKF CZ, a.s.
94.	ŠKODA Auto a.s.
95.	SOHORS společnost. s.r.o.
96.	Správa železnic, státní organizace
97.	STROS - Sedlčanské strojírny, a. s.
98.	STS Prachatice
99.	Stylově s.r.o.
100.	Šumava, a.s.
101.	Teren stav
102.	Tesco Stores, a. s.
103.	Teta drogerie a lékárny ČR, s. r. o.
104.	T-mobile
105.	To & Mi Vdf. spol. s r.o.
106.	Tomodo s.r.o.
107.	Tomto s.r.o.
108.	Triada
109.	Triangle Recruitment CZ s.r.o.
110.	TSE Electronics s r.o.
111.	UCED
112.	Údržba silnic, s. r. o.
113.	UNIVERSAL PLUS
114.	Velimpex les s.r.o.
115.	Veronika Voňková 29395
116.	Vertiv Czech Republic, s.r.o.
117.	Viaservis CB s.r.o.
118.	Virtual Lab
119.	Vodňanská drůbež, a. s.
120.	Vollmann Metalworks s.r.o.
121.	Vollmann MetalWorx s.r.o
122.	Wavin Czechia s.r.o.
123.	Wooded, s. r. o.
124.	Ypsotec s.r.o.
125.	Zahradní svět MELO Strakonice
126.	Zásilkovna
127.	ZEKOV, s.r.o.



## 10.2. HUNGARIAN RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS

No.	Name of organisation
1.	6x6Taxi Kft
2.	Abacus Medicine Hungary Kft.
3.	Adó Art Stúdió Kft.
4.	Adómester kft.
5.	Adónavigátor kft.
6.	Adventor Hotel Kft.
7.	AESA Hungary Ltd.
8.	Agócs József családi gazdálkodó
9.	Agrotrade
10.	Ahoy Gastrobar
11.	AirFrance KLM
12.	AIRPORT SERVICE BUDAPEST ZRT
13.	Akadémia Dent Bt.
14.	ALB Consulting Kft
15.	ALD Automotive Hungary Kft
16.	Alfa-Glossza Kft.
17.	All You Can Move SportPass
18.	Amplifon Magyarország Kft.
19.	Amrest Kft.
20.	Amway
21.	Anonim Bt.
22.	Apollo
23.	Apple
24.	Aptiv Services Hungary Kft
25.	AquaValorem Kft.
26.	Aquaworld
27.	Arrivabus Kft.
28.	Arsboni Kft.
29.	Aszódivill Kft.
30.	Atidim consulting kft.
31.	Auchan Magyarország Kft.
32.	Audax Renewables Kft.
33.	Audi Hungaria Zrt.
34.	AUMA ELEKTROTECHNIK BT
35.	Automotive Steering Column Kft
36.	Autószerelő műhely
37.	Avenida Travel Kft.
38.	AVIS Budget Group BSC
39.	Axians Digital Solutions
40.	Azomi Sped Kft.

No.	Name of organisation
41.	B&G Trade Kft.
42.	B. Braun Medical Kft.
43.	B.I. Kft
44.	B+N Referencia Zrt.
45.	Backaldrin Hungária Kft.
46.	Bács-Kiskun Megyei Katasztrófavédelmi Igazgatóság
47.	Bács-Szakma Non-profit Közhasznú Zrt.
48.	Bajai és Fia Kft.
49.	Baki Agrocentrum Kft.
50.	Balassi Intézet
51.	Balaton Büfé
52.	Balaton Riviéra Turisztikai Egyesület
53.	Balatonszentgyörgyi Közös Önkormányzati Hivatal
54.	Bárdi Autó Zrt.
55.	Barta Kávéház
56.	Basketball Körmend Sport Kft
57.	Baumit
58.	BáVa BT.
59.	Bázis 1000 Kft.
60.	Beauty & Science Trade Kft.
61.	Beckl Ruben Richárd E.V
62.	Békés Vármegyei Kormányhivatal
63.	Bellozzo Kft.
64.	Béres Gyógyszergyár Zrt.
65.	Berkemann Hungary Bt.
66.	Berkine Somgy Adel Ev.
67.	Bershka
68.	Best Camion Kft.
69.	Best Work Oktató és Szolgáltató Kft.
70.	Béta Kft.
71.	Bezenye Községi Önkormányzat
72.	BKM Nonprofit Zrt.
73.	BKMFÜ NKft.
74.	Blue Sky Air Services Kft.
75.	Bognár Edina ev.
76.	Bor Cukrászda és Kávézó - Dabas
77.	Borbarátok N&N Kft.
78.	Borbély-Tóth Zsuzsa ev.
79.	Bosch Magyarország
80.	Boutique Hotel Kft.

No.	Name of organisation
81.	Börni és Társa kft
82.	BP BSC Kft
83.	BPW Hungária Kft.
84.	Brand M Consulting Kft
85.	Bravogroup rendszerház Kft.
86.	British Petrol
87.	Brooks Instrument Kft.
88.	Budapest Főváros III. Kerület, Óbuda-Békásmegyer Önkormányzat
89.	Budapest Főváros Kormányhivatala
90.	Budapest Gazdasági Egyetem
91.	Budapest Park (Kultúrpark Zrt.)
92.	Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem
93.	Budapesti Fegyház és Börtön
94.	Budapesti Kórház és Rendelőintézet
95.	Budapesti Közlekedési Központ
96.	Budapesti Közlekedési Központ Zrt.
97.	Budapesti Uzsoki Utcai Kórház
98.	Bunge Zrt.
99.	Burger King
100.	Bükkü Napsugár Kft.
101.	BXXLO1
102.	BYD Electric Bus & Truck Hungary Kft.
103.	Bzskh alapítvány
104.	Caffé Perté Kft.
105.	CAOLA Zrt.
106.	Carboferr Zrt
107.	Cascade Engineering Europe Kft.
108.	CBA
109.	CCC Hungary
110.	CEE Thematics Kft.
111.	Cellszervez Trade Kft.
112.	Cembrit
113.	CertUnionn Hungary Kft.
114.	Cetelem bank
115.	Challenge Hungary Kft
116.	Chinoi Zrt.
117.	Cib Bank
118.	CIB Bank Zrt.
119.	Cinema City
120.	Cinema City kft.
121.	Citibank International Plc Magyarországi Fióktelepe

No.	Name of organisation
122.	Cloudpay Kft.
123.	Club Heaven Budapest
124.	Coca Cola
125.	Continental Automotive Hungary Kft
126.	Continental Autonomous Mobility Kft.
127.	COOP Hungary Zrt.
128.	Creativ Bartex Kft.
129.	Cutler Fitness
130.	CYDRILL Szoftver Biztonsági Korlátolt Felelősségű Társaság
131.	Család-és gyermekjóléti Központ
132.	Családi vállalat
133.	Csepeg TKG Család-és Gyermekjóléti Szolgálat
134.	Csepregi Területi Gondozási Központ
135.	Csik Enikő Éva E.V.
136.	Csongrád-Csanád Vármegyei Kormányhivatal
137.	Csubri Autokozmetika
138.	D + V Pack Bt.
139.	Dági Közös Önkormányzati Hivatal
140.	Dallmayr automaten-service
141.	Deák Ferenc Megyei Könyvtár
142.	Debrecen International Airport Kft.
143.	Delivery Hero Hungary Kft.
144.	Deloitte Könyvvizsgáló és Tanácsadó Kft.
145.	Deufol Hungary Kft.
146.	Deutsche Telekom IT & Telecommunications Hungary Kft.
147.	Dextron Kft.
148.	dm Kft
149.	DND TELEKOM CENTER KFT.
150.	Domum Merium kft
151.	Don Pepe
152.	Dóra motors
153.	Dpmv Zrt
154.	DreamPix Kft.
155.	Duna Faktor Követeléskezelő és Pénzügyi Szolgáltató Zrt.
156.	Duna Vitex kft
157.	DunaDigitals
158.	Dunafin zrt
159.	Dunántúli Regionális Vízmű Zrt.
160.	Duo Elektro-vill Kkt
161.	E.ON Ügyfélszolgálati Kft.
162.	Eastjob Bt

No.	Name of organisation
163.	Electro Business Kft
164.	Elektrokim Kft.
165.	Elena Hungary Kft.
166.	Elmű Hálózati Kft.
167.	ELTE
168.	ELTE Savaria Egyetemi Központ
169.	Energo-Group Košice s.r.o.
170.	Energo-Trend Kft.
171.	Eon
172.	Eon Hungária Zrt
173.	EOS Faktor Zrt.
174.	Ernst & Young Tanácsadó Kft.
175.	Erste Bank Hungary Zrt.
176.	Erzsébetvárosi Piacüzemeltetési Kft.
177.	E-summa kft
178.	Euroapi Hungary Kft.
179.	Euronorm Group Builder Kft
180.	EURO-ÖRS BT
181.	Euroraptor Tanácsadó Iroda Kft.
182.	Eurorisk Kft.
183.	Eurotrans Kft
184.	Explorer2000 Kft
185.	Ezerjófú kft.
186.	F&F KFT.
187.	FairBooks Kiadó és Írói Műhely e.c.
188.	Farbtech Kft
189.	Farmos ÖTE
190.	Fedex Eypress Hungary Kft.
191.	Fekete Bárány Étterem
192.	Fémalk zrt.
193.	Ferro-Sped 2000 Kft.
194.	Ferzol Kft.
195.	Feszültség Kft.
196.	Fétis Kft.
197.	Fiatalok a Nemzetért Alapítvány
198.	Fitlife cukormentes cukrászda
199.	FIVEMEN Vasútépítők Kft.
200.	Flaga Hungária Kft.
201.	Flex Films Európa Kft
202.	Fonte Viva Kft.
203.	Fox & Wolf HR Solutions Kft.

No.	Name of organisation
204.	Foxvill Kft.
205.	Fővárosi vízművek
206.	Frutti Ruha Kft.
207.	Futureal Zrt
208.	Futureal Zrt.
209.	Gabnersisten Kft.
210.	Gál Elizabet
211.	Gál Ferenc Egyetem Technikum, Szakképző Iskola, Gimnázium és Kollégium Szegedi Tagintézmény
212.	Galambos Logisztikai Kft.
213.	Galga Gipsz Kft.
214.	GaMa Tech Kft.
215.	Gangnam style kft. (barna abc)
216.	Ganz Transzformátor és Forgógép Gyártó Kft.
217.	Gátiba Energie Kft.
218.	GE
219.	Gery Technologies
220.	Get Work Trend Kft
221.	GetWork Trend Kft.
222.	Gimek. Zrt
223.	GLS
224.	Gravitáció Kft.
225.	GYSEV Zrt
226.	Gyur-Mó Kft
227.	H.G. E.V.
228.	Haberkorn Fairtool Kft.
229.	Hajdú-Bihar VMRFK
230.	Haladás Sportkomplexum
231.	Halász Barbara
232.	Hankook Tire
233.	Haris Park
234.	Hauck Kft.
235.	Hegedűs Gábor E.V.
236.	Hell Energy Magyarország Kft.
237.	Helsa
238.	Helsa Kft.
239.	Henkel Magyarország Kft
240.	HETTYEI-ÉPTECH Kft.
241.	Heves Vármegyei Önkormányzati Hivatal
242.	HI & T Kft
243.	Hi-Lex Magyarország Kft.
244.	Hold Alapkezelő Zrt.

No.	Name of organisation
245.	Honvédelmi Minisztérium
246.	HOR Zrt.
247.	Horváth Alexandra, HVDFOM
248.	Hungária Koncert Kft.
249.	IBM
250.	Igazságügyi Minisztérium
251.	Ihász Építők Háza Kft.
252.	ILCONTO KFT
253.	Inditex Kft Zara
254.	Inditex Magyarország kft
255.	Italinox Hungária Kft.
256.	Ivy Technology AMS Hungary Kft.
257.	Jabil Hungary LP Kft.
258.	Janech Kft.
259.	Janovicz Pékség
260.	Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Kormányhivatal
261.	Jásztejt Kft.
262.	Jelen Kell Lenned Multikulturális és Közösségfejlesztő Egyesület
263.	Jobsgarden Kft.
264.	Jobsgarden Személyzeti Tanácsadó Kft.
265.	Józsefvárosi Gazdálkodási Központ Zrt.
266.	Jusec Kft.
267.	K&H Bank Zrt.
268.	Kádár-Gastro Kft.
269.	Kamarás Zoltán e.v.
270.	Kaposvári Fejlesztési Központ
271.	Kata kft
272.	Katolikus Karitás
273.	Kerca Bt Kőkereskedés és szállítmányozás
274.	Kerca Bt.
275.	Keska kft.
276.	KÉSZ Zrt.
277.	KIRCHHOFF Hungária Kft.
278.	Kis- és közép vállalkozás
279.	Kkl-Zodina-Trio kft.
280.	Klára cipőbolt
281.	Klub sirály étterem
282.	Knaus Tabbert Kft.
283.	Kohászati, szerszámkészítő Kft
284.	Kolcsár Sütőipari Kft.
285.	Koma-Nova Kft

No.	Name of organisation
286.	Komit-home Kft.
287.	Komtermál Kft.
288.	Konyhaüzemeltetési Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft.
289.	Kósza Vándor BT
290.	KovB Finance&Consulting Kft.
291.	Kőrös Luna Bt.
292.	Központi Statisztikai Hivatal
293.	KPMG Global Services Hungary
294.	KPMG Tanácsadó Kft.
295.	Krupp és Társa Kft
296.	KTI Magyar Közlekedéstudományi és Logisztikai Intézet
297.	Kultúrpark Zrt.
298.	Kyndryl Hungary Kft.
299.	Láng kft
300.	László Major KFT
301.	Lat-elektro Kft.
302.	Launai Miklós Református Iskola
303.	Le Belier
304.	Leadec Kft.
305.	Leier Hungária Kft
306.	Lékai Csongor
307.	Leman Industrie Kft.
308.	Lidl Magyarország Kft.
309.	Login Autonom Kft.
310.	Loginfer Paket Kft.
311.	Loginfer Paket kft.
312.	Loginsure KFT
313.	LollipopArt
314.	MAC Jégkorong Kft
315.	Magyar Állami Operaház
316.	Magyar Fejlesztési Bank
317.	Magyar Királyi Vitézi Rend
318.	Magyar Máltai Szeretetszolgálat
319.	Magyar Máltai Szeretetszolgálat Egyesület
320.	Magyar Telekom Nyrt.
321.	Magyar Vöröskereszt
322.	Magyarság Háza Nonprofit Kft.
323.	Marriott Hotels
324.	MÁV Start Zrt
325.	Máv-Hév Zrt.
326.	MAVIR Zrt

No.	Name of organisation
327.	MBH Bank Nyrt.
328.	MBH Bank Zrt.
329.	Mc Donald's
330.	McDonald's
331.	Media Markt Magyarország Kft.
332.	MediaCargoKft
333.	Mediaworks Hungary Zrt.
334.	Mediterrán Ingatlan Kft.
335.	Medmor Kft
336.	Me-GTK
337.	Mentore Interiore Kft
338.	Mercarius Flottakezelő Kft.
339.	Merkantil Bank Zrt.
340.	Mérnök-kereskedelmi KKV
341.	Mezeiné Sütöri Ildikó
342.	Mezőgazdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal
343.	MG Produkt Kft.
344.	M-GEL Hungary Kft.
345.	Millennium Csoport Kft.
346.	Miller Alarm Kft
347.	Mind Kft
348.	MISU-TRANS Kft.
349.	MIVÍZ Kft.
350.	MKB Bank Nyrt.
351.	MLSZ EDZŐCENTRUM KFT
352.	Mogyoródi Aquaréna
353.	MOL Nyrt.
354.	MOMentum Irodaház Zrt,
355.	Móra-Art Kft.
356.	Morgan Stanley
357.	Mortoff Kft.
358.	Motor-Classic Zrt.
359.	Munkácsi Bt.
360.	MVM Next Zrt
361.	Nagybuborék Kft.
362.	Nagytarcsai Rozmaring Néptánc Csoport
363.	Napitender.hu Kft
364.	Napsugár Vegyes ABC
365.	NDN Elektríc Kft
366.	NEBET.HU Kft.
367.	Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal

No.	Name of organisation
368.	Nemzeti Infokommunikációs Szolgáltató
369.	Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem
370.	Nemzeti Szakképzési és Felnőttképzési Hivatal
371.	Nestlé Hungária Kft.
372.	Neumann Nonprofit Kft.
373.	NielsenIQ
374.	Nissan CEE Sales Kft.
375.	Nobarex Kft.
376.	Nokia Solutions and Networks Kft.
377.	NOLATO MAGYARORSZÁG KFT.
378.	NORMBENZ MAGYARORSZÁG KFT.
379.	Novum House Bt.
380.	Nyáregyháza Nagyközség Önkormányzata
381.	Nyírpazonyi Polgármesteri Hivatal
382.	Nyusziwebshop KFT.
383.	Online Zrt
384.	Opinion Builders Kft.
385.	Optilab Kft.
386.	Opti-M Kft.
387.	Orova 2000 BT
388.	Ország-17 Kft.
389.	ORSZÁGOS MENTŐSZOLGÁLAT ALAPÍTVÁNY
390.	Orthel fogászat
391.	OTP
392.	Otp bank Nyrt
393.	OTP Bank Nyrt.
394.	OTP Bank Nyrt.
395.	Outdoor Mission Kft.
396.	OVB
397.	OVB Vermögensberatung Kft.
398.	Örkény Városfejlesztési Nonprofit Kft
399.	Örkényi Polgármesteri Hivatal
400.	P+F Kft.
401.	Palkó-Transz Bt.
402.	Panum Kft.
403.	Pecöli Bóbita Művészeti Óvoda
404.	Pécsi Sörfőzde Zrt.
405.	Pécsvárad Város Önkormányzata
406.	Pedagógiai intézmény, óvoda
407.	PEEK & CLOPPENBURG RUHÁZATI KFT.
408.	Pepsico Hungary Kft

No.	Name of organisation
409.	Perfektum Projekt Kft.
410.	Pernyetipró Bt
411.	PERSOL-2000 Oktató és Szolgáltató Bt.
412.	PERTOM 22 KFT.
413.	PET SHOP NAGYKER
414.	Péterfy Sándor utcai Kórház-Rendelőintézet és Baleseti Központ
415.	Petőfiszállási Csicsergő Óvoda
416.	Philip Morris Magyarország Kft
417.	Piatnik Kft.
418.	Pintér Tüzip KFT
419.	Pizzalapát Kft
420.	Plariné Diétás Bolt
421.	Platinum-Art Kft.
422.	Priváthús Mórahalom Kft.
423.	Process Solutions Kft
424.	Product Mix Ker Kft
425.	Provident Pénzügyi Zrt.
426.	PSC-Invest Kft.
427.	Püspökladányi Járási Hivatal
428.	R Beauty Store s.r.o
429.	Rakpart Étterem
430.	Red Point Office Bt
431.	Redel Elektronika kft
432.	Regina
433.	Regio Játékkereskedelmi Kft.
434.	Remmer Kft.
435.	Richter Gedeon Vegyészeti Gyár Nyrt.
436.	Ringier Hungary Kft
437.	Rise App Kft. (már nem működik)
438.	Robert Bosch Kft.
439.	Roche
440.	Rockwell Vagyonvédelmi Kft.
441.	Roleven Kft.
442.	Rollo kft
443.	Rosenberger Automotive Cabling Kft
444.	Rossmann
445.	Sáfrány Szolgáltató Kft
446.	Sahin-Tóth Dezső e.v.
447.	Samsung SDI
448.	Sanofi
449.	SAP

No.	Name of organisation
450.	SATUR BAITs Kft.
451.	Savaria Egyetemi Központ
452.	Schaeffler Savaria Kft
453.	Schaeffler Savaria KFT Szombathely
454.	School for Executive Education and Development Nonprofit Zrt.
455.	Schuck-Bau Kft.
456.	SDI Media Hungary Kft.
457.	Sechang Kft.
458.	Semilab
459.	Service Flow Kft
460.	Shah
461.	Shoebox Kft.
462.	Shop.hu Kft.
463.	SLH Kft
464.	Sony Camcorder
465.	Sós Dorina
466.	Sos központ
467.	Spar
468.	Sped-Pack k.f.t.
469.	Spirit-All Kft.
470.	SPS Germany GmbH Magyarországi Fióktelepe
471.	Starbucks
472.	Strong (CEE) Kft.
473.	StudioFlash Oktatóközpont
474.	Subventio Consulting Bt.
475.	SUEZ WTS
476.	Suncity Kft
477.	Surman és társa Kft.
478.	SYNDOM Stúdió Kft
479.	Syngenta kft
480.	Systema Mérnökiroda Kft.
481.	Szalai Laura Semmelweis Egyetem, Élettan Intézet
482.	Szaproka Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Bt.
483.	Szécsénke Község Önkormányzata
484.	Szegedi és Társai kft
485.	Szent István Gimnázium
486.	Szent Margit Kórház
487.	Szentkirályi
488.	Szentkirályi Magyarország Kft.
489.	Szépségoázis Kft.
490.	Szerencsejáték Zrt.

No.	Name of organisation
491.	Szerencsi Mezőgazdasági Zrt.
492.	Szerencsi Mezőgazdasági Zrt.
493.	SZERVIZ-TRANS Kft.
494.	Szinapszis Kft.
495.	SZI-ROJ KFT.
496.	SZKTT ESZI Család- és Gyermejjóléti Szolgálat
497.	Szomathelyi sportközpont és sportiskola úszó szakosztály
498.	Szombathelyi Sportiskola és Sportközpont
499.	Szövetségben a Gödöllőiekért Egyesület
500.	Takarék Ingatlan Zrt.
501.	Takarékbank Zrt.
502.	Tama-Hungary Kft
503.	Tar-Trans Kft.
504.	Tecton Kft.
505.	Telekom
506.	Telekom Rendszerintegráció Zrt.
507.	Temarketinged Kft.
508.	Tematik Kábel Kft.
509.	Terézvárosi Önkormányzat Játékvár Óvodája
510.	Tesco Global Zrt.
511.	Texaid Kft
512.	Thunderbolt Kft.
513.	Thyssen Krupp
514.	Thyssenkrupp AG
515.	Tiszaeszlár Község Önkormányzata
516.	Tiszáninneni Református Egyházkerület
517.	Trans-Sped KFT.
518.	Trófea Grill
519.	Trovet Hungary Kft.
520.	TS Hungaria Kft.
521.	Tv-Video Szervíz
522.	TV-Videó-Szervíz
523.	Umbrella Kft
524.	Unicredit bank
525.	Union Biztosító Zrt.
526.	Úsovsko Hungary kft.
527.	Üllő Város Önkormányzata
528.	Váci Jávorszky Ödön Kórház
529.	Vál Község Önkormányzata
530.	Varázsliget tagóvoda
531.	Vár-Lak Vendégház Bogács
532.	Vár-Lak Vendégház Bogács

No.	Name of organisation
533.	VB2MW Kft.
534.	Vectigal Service Kft.
535.	Védelmi Beszerzési Ügynökség Zrt.
536.	Velkei József családi gazdaság
537.	Veluni Iroda Kft
538.	Vémü Kft.
539.	Ventona Trans
540.	Veolia Water Hungary Kft.
541.	VEOLIA WATER SOLUTIONS & TECHNOLOGIES
542.	Vértesi ProFa Kft
543.	Vértesslovas Erdei Iskola és Szabadidőpark
544.	Veszprémi állatkert
545.	VIDEOTON Holding Zrt
546.	Villax-Home Bt.
547.	Villbek Kft.
548.	Vintage Beauty
549.	ViVeTech Nyrt.
550.	Vizi Bence Dávid ev.
551.	VLG
552.	Vodafone
553.	Volán Busz Zrt.
554.	VoLeiSped Kft.
555.	VurMassázs Kft.
556.	Waberer's International Nyrt.
557.	Weger Hungaria
558.	Wizz Air Hungary Légitársaság Zrt.
559.	WOLT MAGYARORSZÁG KFT.
560.	Wolt Services Magyarország KFT.
561.	Work Force Kft
562.	Xy. Anyagmozgató Zrt.
563.	Yettel Magyarország Zrt.
564.	Yves Rocher
565.	ZÁÉV Zrt.
566.	Zala Volán Zrt.
567.	Zalabaksai Közös Önkormányzati Hivatal
568.	Zalaegerszegi Szakképzési Centrum Széchenyi István Technikum
569.	Zalahaláp Község Önkormányzata
570.	Zalai HUK Hulladékkezelési Kft.
571.	ZeemPlusz
572.	ZOLLNER Elektronika Kft.
573.	Zsidai Gastronomy & Hospitality Group

### 10.3. SLOVAK RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS

No.	Name of organisation
1.	Abicom s.r.o
2.	AG Consulting Office s.r.o.
3.	AGRO - MOLD GROUP s.r.o.
4.	Aldam s.r.o.
5.	Ambropek, spol. s r.o.
6.	Audi Hungaria Zrt munkatársa
7.	BAKA AGRO s.r.o.
8.	Bc. Viktória Szabová
9.	BGR s.r.o.
10.	BIG stone s.r.o.
11.	B-J Trade s.r.o
12.	BL Trans s. r. o
13.	B-N Stav, s.r.o.
14.	Bocco Doro Kft
15.	CarTrans
16.	Česká podnikatelská pojišťovna, a.s.
17.	Cinemax a.s.
18.	Class Bistro
19.	Coop Jednota
20.	COOP Jednota Dunajská Streda, spotrebné družstvo
21.	Coop JLC, a.s
22.	COOP JLC, a.s.
23.	Cosmelle s.r.o
24.	Cukrárenská výroba
25.	Datamont,s.r.o.
26.	Do-Bu, s.r.o.
27.	Dominik Ladunga
28.	Ebi Slovakia, s.r.o.
29.	EN_KORSTAV
30.	Fiesta étterem
31.	furbyfy s.r.o.
32.	Futureprincessgym s.r.o.
33.	futureprincessgym s.r.o.
34.	Galla s.r.o
35.	Gartner Slovakia s.r.o.
36.	Gery Technologies
37.	GLS Kft.
38.	GreenCoop družstvo
39.	Greta ABC
40.	Gymnázium - Gimnázium Filakovo

No.	Name of organisation
41.	H & O Konstruktion, s.r.o.
42.	HALI TRADE s.r.o.
43.	Heloro s.r.o.
44.	HELORO, s.r.o.
45.	Ho-máhr Trans Kft
46.	iFox s.r.o.
47.	Ip stavebná firma s.r.o.
48.	J CITY, s.r.o
49.	Knapp Trade s.r.o.
50.	Kofola a.s.
51.	Komáromi Jókai Színház
52.	Kovil sro
53.	Krea office, s.r.o.
54.	Kromberg & Schubert
55.	KTNI-SZETEI, spol.s r.o.
56.	Ladislav Fónod (SZČO)
57.	LEVIagro s.r.o.
58.	LEVIagro s.r.o.
59.	LUPA Realitná kancelária, Nové Zámky
60.	LVD S3, a.s.
61.	LVD S3, a.s.
62.	MABA elektro s.r.o.
63.	Michaela Andrea Bláhová průmysl kamene a.s.
64.	Mini Potraviny ABC
65.	Mlyn Kolárovo
66.	Motor Impex Kft.
67.	msg life s.r.o
68.	NETPRO s.r.o.
69.	NOMAD BAITS
70.	Obecný úrad Trstice
71.	Obuv Michal Kulík
72.	ORVIEN, s.r.o
73.	OVB Allfinanz Slovensko a. s.
74.	P. G. Trade, spol. s.r.o.
75.	Paragraf s.r.o.
76.	PD KLAS ČATA
77.	Penarius s.r.o.
78.	Penta Hospitals SK, a.s.
79.	Pental Hospitals
80.	Pks agrofarm



No.	Name of organisation
81.	Plant B, s.r.o.
82.	Platz s.r.o.
83.	Polnohospodárske družstvo KLAS
84.	Polnohospodarske druzstvo, Kolárovo
85.	Predajňa potravín
86.	Predajňa potravín
87.	Predajňa potravín
88.	Priemstav Levice s.r.o.
89.	Pro Food Bt.
90.	PS Coloring
91.	R Beauty Store s.r.o
92.	Raffenday Slovakia s.r.o, Kolárovo
93.	Restaurant & Penzión Ring Bar
94.	Rooster, spol s.r.o
95.	Rózsa Zöldség Gyümölcs
96.	Samostatne hospodáriaci roľník, Vrbová nad Váhom
97.	Schindler Dunajská Streda a. s.
98.	Seltex s.r.o.
99.	Selye János Egyetem
100.	SK- Remont s.r.o.
101.	SK Remont s.r.u
102.	Slovak Parcel Service s.r.o.
103.	Socnád s.r.o. Gabčíkovo

No.	Name of organisation
104.	Somogyi sro
105.	SOŠ Stredná odborná škola
106.	SOŠ technická a ekonomická J. Szakkayho
107.	SOŠ technická a ekonomická Jozefa Szakkayho
108.	Spotrebné druzstvo
109.	Sprinter Futárszolgálat KFT.
110.	Štefan Csank SHR
111.	Stredná odborná škola technická a ekonomická Jozefa Szakkayho
112.	Student EUBA
113.	Szapu Elektrik
114.	Tesco
115.	The Italian Wine Food
116.	Thorma s.r.o
117.	TOMVIK s.r.o. - (Parabellum)
118.	Toppolír
119.	Waters Research Kft.
120.	World reality,s.r.o.
121.	Xy kft
122.	Základá škola, Farská lúka 64/A
123.	ZELSEED spol. s.r.o.
124.	Zoltán Takács - TZ Accounting
125.	ZPD - Zeleninárske potravinárske družstvo
126.	ZSM Company s.r.o.

